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Orthodox Church in Ukraine

Historical and sociological discourse



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Wydawnictwo Państwowej Akademii Nauk Stosowanych
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INTRODUCTION

In the context of Russian military aggression, modern Ukrainian society witnesses active religious processes that demonstrate a certain political impact numerous internal and external phenomena related to the construction of national religious structures have on the church. Changes in the church life of Ukraine began to take place at the stage Ukraine gained its independence and sovereignty. It was then that there was a shift from Russian Orthodox Church influence, and the national church, especially its Orthodox branch, was actively developing.

Nation-building processes took place not only under the influence of European and American political thought but also under the influence of world Christianity. The influence of neighboring Poland was especially pronounced, helping to define the civilisational challenges for Ukraine.

A new stage in the development of Orthodox religion in Ukraine was associated with the Ukrainian church being granted the Tomos and the beginning of the activities of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which incorporated the best national and world traditions of the Christian world.

In the modern conditions of the development of world civilizations, religious studies have become an important branch of modern philosophical and historical knowledge, and religious processes are now understood through the prism of the analysis of these complex and multifaceted phenomena of the spiritual world. The humanitarian component of religious processes is determined by the affirmation of high moral values and ideals, and it is based on exceptional human values, respect for God, whose image embodies the highest standards of justice and mercy.

Religion is a complex spiritual and social phenomenon, and its study requires a comparison of different views against the background of the development of spiritual culture and in an inextricable connection with the history of human society development.

The study of religious processes and beliefs has a long European tradition. A special place is taken by Polish historiography, which provides a general illustration of religious traditions in Central and Eastern Europe.

In contrast to Soviet historiography, which until the end of the 1980s was characterized by the study of atheism, which corresponded to the ideological foundations of the socialist system, Poland, even under the conditions of socialist doctrine, conducted the study of religious processes.[1] One of these centers was the Catholic University in Lublin, which was not only a center for studying theological sciences in Poland but also maintained contacts with European universities (in particular, with the University of Louvain in Belgium and the Belgian publication "Studio Diplomatica," the scientific editor of which for a long period of time was Roman Yakemchuk).

The modern stage of religious history study in Poland began in the late 1980s and continues to this day. Its level is determined by the scientific research carried out at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski Catholic University in Warsaw, the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, numerous institutions of the Polish Academy of Sciences, as well as universities and religious congregations.[2]

The study of the Ukrainian religious tradition is of great importance. There were several stages in the study of the history of the Ukrainian church. It is considered that the first studies on the history of the church are chronicles, in

1 Markiewicz S. Ewolucja społecznej doktryny kościoła. Warszawa : Książka i Wiedza, 1983. 282 pages; Pierrard Pierre. Historia Kościoła katolickiego / przedm. M. D. Chenu ; przeł. Tadeusz Szafrański. Warszawa : Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1984. 358 pages. (This edition was prepared at the Catholic Institute in Paris. The author reveals the problems of Christian love; clarifies social needs and ways to solve them); Keller J. Prawoslawie. Warszawa, 1982. 266 pages (the publication clarifiedand high lighted the Orthodox doctrine. pp. 169–251).

2 Lukaszuk Tadeusz. OSPPE. Ikona w życiu, w wierze i w teologii Kościoła. Kraków : Salwator, 2008. 276 pages; Chrześcijaństwo w Polsce : zarys przemian 966–1979 : Praca zespołowa / pod red. Jerzego Kłoczowskiego. Lublin : Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1992. 768 pages; Dzieje kościoła w Polsce. Tablice chronologiczne / Opracował Adam Chruszczewski. Lublin : Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1993. 133 pages; Religia i religijność w Polsce / pod red. Jana Drabiny. Kraków : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytety Jagiellońskiego, 2001. 192 pages; Babruk A., Kochan I. Prawosławie w Sedlcach. Siedlce, 2007. 316 pages (the publication presents non-ecclesiastical aspects of the functioning of the Orthodox community, pp. 110–119).

particular, "The Primary Chronicle" (1113), which mentions the missionary activity of St. Cyril and Methodius, the baptism of the Ukrainian people, and the initial period of the history of the Kyiv-Pechersk monastery. The church life of Ukraine is reflected in the Kyiv chronicle (1116–1149), Galicia-Volhynian (1201–1291), and "Western Rus`" or "Lithuanian" chronicles of the 14th–16th centuries. Another stage in the study of Ukrainian church history was the Orthodox-Catholic controversy at the end of the 16th century. It is believed that it was this polemic that determined the relations of the Kyiv Metropolitanate with Rome, Constantinople, and Moscow, as well as its attitude to the Florentine Union of 1439. The appeals of Ukrainian polemicists were stimulated by the works of Piotr Skarha, Vasyl Surazky, Ostrih Cleric, Hypatius Pociej.[3]



Hagia Sophia in Constantinople is the main cathedral of Byzantium. In 1453, the Seljuk Turks captured Constantinople, which became Istanbul. And the main shrine of Eastern Christianity became a Muslim temple, as evidenced by the minarets.

3 Isichenko I., arkh. Istoriia khrystyianskoi tserkvy v Ukraini. Vydannia chetverte. Kyiv : Akta, 2008. P. 15.

Profound materials on the history of the Ukrainian church can be found in the works of Lev Krevda, the treatises of Zaharii Kopystyanskyi, Metropolitan Petro Mohyla. The studies of Sylvester Kosov, Innokenty Gisel, Grigory Konysky and others focus on the Orthodox church historiography from the 1630s.

The Catholic interpretation of the church history of Ukraine was developed in the centers of the Basilian Fathers — Yakiv Sush (1610–1687), Metropolitan Lev Kishka (1668–1728), and Father Ignatius Kulchynskyi (1694–1747).

The development of historical and church science began in the first half of the 19th century. It goes here about Ukrainian archeographer Mykola Bantysh-Kamenskyi, Metropolitan Yevgeny Bolkhovitinov of Kyiv, Metropolitan Makariy (Bulgakov), professor of the Kyiv Theological Academy Fedor Tytov (1864–1922), professor Mykola Petrov (1840–1921), and professor Mykola Holubiev.

In the second half of the 19th century, the study of church history began at universities. Works by Mykhailo Maksymovych, Volodymyr Antonovych, and Lviv University professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky appeared. It is believed that the Catholic concept of the Ukrainian church was presented in the works of Lviv University professor Julian Pelesh (Geschichte der Union der Ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom [History of the Union of the Ruthenian Church with Rome], in 2 volumes. Vienna, 1878–1880).[4]

Certain aspects of the church history in Russia-controlled Ukraine at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries were studied in Kharkiv university (professors Dmytro Bahaliy and Mykola Sumtsov). The same period was studied in the publications by bishop Edward Likowski ("Unia brzeska w 1596," 1896; "Dzieje kościoła unickiego na Litwie i Rusi," 1906, in 2 volumes), Russian historians Yevhen Holybynskyi ("History of the Russian Church," 1880–1917, in 2 volumes), and Anton Kartashov ("Sketches on the History of the Russian Church," in 2 volumes).

After the Bolshevik coup of 1917, the study of church history was no longer an issue. However, the study of religious life and the history of the Orthodox Church continued in Halychyna, Western Volyn, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute and the Orthodox Theological Faculty were established at the University of Warsaw. In particular, in the interwar

4 Isichenko I., arkh. Istoriia khrystyianskoi tserkvy v Ukraini. Vydannia chetverte. Kyiv : Akta, 2008. P. 18.

period, the works of Oleksandr Lotocky ("Ukrainian Sources of Church Law," 1931; "Autocephaly," 1935–1938, in 2 volumes) were published. Professor Ivan Ohienko (Hilarion) worked in Poland. His work "Ukrainian Church" was published during the Second World War, 1941. Other works of I. Ohienko appeared after his immigration to Canada.

Among historical and religious research that appeared in the Soviet period, one should mention the work by M.Y. Braichevsky "The Consolidation of Christianity in Rus`...".[5]

A group of researchers who studied the history of the Orthodox Church was formed in the Ukrainian diaspora during the war and post-war period. These are, in particular, Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko (" The History of the Ukrainian Church," 1949; "Peculiarities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church," 1959; "The Historical Foundations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church," 1964); Ivan Vlasovskyi ("The Essay on the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church" — the edition was prepared and published in the USA, and later in independent Ukraine); and Arkadii Zhukovskyi ("Petro Mohyla and the Question of Church Unity," 1969; he also published "Petro Mohyla's Trebnyk" and a Catechism).

Of particular significance are the achievements of the Order of Saint Basil the Great (OSBM). These are the works of Fr. Athanasiy Velyki — "From the Chronicle of Christian Ukraine," 1968–1977; Fr. Safron Mudryi — "Essay on the History of the Church in Ukraine (returning to Ukraine in 1994, Fr. Safron Mudryi became the rector of the Ivano-Frankivsk Theological and Catechetical Spiritual Institute and published numerous works).

A special place among diaspora studies of the national church is occupied by the works of Professor Mykola Chubaty ("The History of Christianity in Rus-Ukraine," 1965); Fr. Izydor Patrilo ("Sources and Bibliography of the History of the Ukrainian Church," 1975–1999, in 3 volumes); Fr. Athanasius Pekar ("Essays on the History of the Church of Transcarpathia," 1997, in 2 volumes), nun Sophia Senyk ("A History of the Church in Ukraine," 1993, vol. 1).[6]

A new stage in the study of religious processes began in independent Ukraine and was connected with the activities of the Institute of Church History in Lviv

5 Braichevskyi M. Utverzhdenye khrystyanstva na Rusy. Kyev : Naukova dumka, 1989. 295 pages.

6 Isichenko I., arkh. Istoriia khrystyianskoi tserkvy v Ukraini. Vydannia chetverte. Kyiv : Akta, 2008. P. 18.

founded in 1992 by Fr. Borys Gudziak (later he became one of the founders of the Lviv Theological Academy, and in 2001 he established the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv). Fr. B. Gudziak thoroughly studied the history of the Union of Brest and held several conferences in Lviv, Kyiv, and other cities on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the Union of Brest. Currently, the Institute of Church History of UCU is headed by Oleh Turiy.[7]

National and church-religious processes in Ukraine found their academic representation in the writings of Nataliya Yakovenko ("Essay on the History of Medieval and Early Modern Ukraine"); Serhii Plokhiy ("Gates of Europe. History of Ukraine from the Scythian Wars to Independence"); Vasyl Ulyanovsky ("Church in the Ukrainian State in 1917–1920," 1997, books 1, 2); "History of the Church and Religious Thought in Ukraine: in the middle of the 15th — the end of the 16th centuries," 1994, books 1–2).

The current level of study of religious history in Ukraine is connected with both church and secular institutions.

Within the framework of the research processes of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, we highlight the work of Oleksandr Reent and Oleksandr Lysenko, "Problems of Organizing Spiritual and Religious Life in the Context of the Ukrainian Revolution (1917–1921)", which analyzes institutional issues related to the functioning of the main religious denominations during this period, the attitude of state leaders to religious associations, etc.[8]

Works of prosopographical nature have become characteristic of Ukrainian researchers. In particular, the work of O. S. Kucheruk "Petro Mohyla. Research and Observations...".[9]

As part of the study of the 1917–1921 period, we distinguish a number of stages of attitudes toward religion and the church: the stage of the Ukrainian State of

7 The Churches and the War: Religion, Religious Diplomacy, and Russia's Aggression against Ukraine / ed. by Yury P. Avvakumov and Oleh Turiy. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press 2024, 328 pages.

8 Reient O., Lysenko O. Problemy orhanizatsii dukhovno-relihiinoho zhyttia v konteksti Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii (1917–1921) // Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy. 2017. Vyp. 5–6. PP. 254–283.

9 Kucheruk O. Petro Mohyla. Doslidzhennia ta sposterezhennia. Kyiv : Parlamentske vyd-vo, 2019. 168 pages.

Hetman P. Skoropadsky, the UPR Directorate, and the period of Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. In particular, the work of Bohdan Andrusyshyn "The Church in the Ukrainian State. 1917–1920 (the era of the UPR Directorate)" examines the formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (autocephaly of the UOC) and the confrontation between the Patriarchal (ROC) and the Ukrainian (Autocephalous) Church.[10]

The activities of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church are also presented in the work of Iryna Prelovska. The author analyzes documentary materials on the history of the UAOC in the 1920s and 1930s.[11] The work of O. Ihnatusha focuses on the study of the church's activities in the context of the revolutionary processes of 1917–1921. The author characterized the church-organizational factors of this period and the coverage of national, cultural, and religious processes in modern national historiography.[12]

Another source study was the work of V. Shumil "The Corpus of Written Monuments of the Catacomb True Orthodox Church: Issues of Collection, Preservation, and Research."[13] The work presents a part of the Orthodox laity who in the 1920s–1980s did not join the Russian Orthodox Church but remained independent, operating in the underground under the name of the Catacomb Church. The representatives of this church created a corpus of manuscripts and self-published monuments that illustrated the activities of this Catacomb Church.

10 Andrusyshyn B. Tserkva v Ukrainskii derzhavi. 1917–1920 (doba Dyrektorii UNR). Kyiv : Lybid, 1997. 2017.

11 Prelovska I. Dokumentalni materialy z istorii sobornoi diialnosti Ukrainskoi avtokefalnoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy (1921–1930) — Ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy (1930–1937): Dzhereloznavchyi analiz // Ukrainskyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk. Nova seriia. 2009. 412 pages.

12 Ihnatusha O. Tserkva v Ukrainskii revoliutsii 1917–1921 rr. yak predmet suchasnykh istorychnykh doslidzhen: pidsumky dvadtsiatyrichnoho dosvidu vyvchennia problemy // Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakultetu Zaporizkoho natsionalnoho universytetu. 2018. PP. 84–112.

13 Shumilo V. Korpus pysemnykh pamiatok Katakombnoi Istynno-Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy: problemy zbyrannia, zberezhennia ta doslidzhennia // Naukova elektronna biblioteka periodychnykh vydan NAN Ukrainy. 2019. PP. 35–41. URL : http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/158893

The period of the 1920s and 1930s is also covered by the works of A. Zinchenko[14] (analyzes the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council, which took place in October 1921 in St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv); O. Potsulko[15] (examines the evolution of the autocephalous movement in Ukraine; relations with the Soviet authorities, etc.); V. Chuchalin (covered church-state relations in Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s; the principles of Soviet state policy on church property and the liquidation of religious buildings; showed the process of seizing church valuables and church and monastery property).[16]

Researcher Alla Kyrydon highlights the problems of the destruction of religious buildings in the Ukrainian SSR/USSR in the 1920s and 1930s[17]; while M. Blakytnyi — the seizure of church property by the Soviet authorities in Chernihiv region.[18]

Researchers Viktor Dotsenko and Vasyl Serdyuk studied the policy of the Communist Party bodies regarding religion and the church in the 1920s, analyzing the restriction of the rights and freedoms of believers and the implementation of anti-religious propaganda in the state.[19]

A special place in the analysis of religious processes in Ukraine is occupied by the synthetic textbook "History of Religion in Ukraine" edited by Professors

14 Zinchenko A. Vseukrainskyi pravoslavnyi tserkovnyi Sobor 1921 // Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy: Tom I. Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU. Naukova dumka, 2003.

15 Potsulko O. Ukraina. Evoliutsiia avtokefalnoho rukhu v Ukraini (1917–1936 rr.) // Donetskyi instytut zaliznychnoho transportu. 2008. PP. 213–217.

16 Chuchalin O. Kyivska yeparkhiia v umovakh vzaiemyn derzhavy i Pravoslavnoi tserkvy (1920–1930-kh rr.). Umanskyi derzhavnyi pedahohichnyi universytet imeni Pavla Tychyny. 2018. 266 pages ; Chuchalin O. Derzhava i Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini u 1920–1930-ti roky . Uman : Sochinskyi M. 2018. 180 pages.

17 Kyrydon A. Ruinuvannia kultovykh sporud (1920–1930-ti rr.): porushennia tradytsiinoi rytmolohii prostoru // Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky. Vyp. 22. 2013. PP. 91–102.

18 Blakytnyi M. Do istorii vyluchennia radianskoiu vladoiu tsinnostei iz dorohotsinnykh metaliv na Chernihivshchyni 1921 r. // Siverianskyi litopys. 2021. PP. 60–69.

19 Dotsenko V., Seriuk V. Polityko-pravovi osnovy realizatsii bilshovytskym rezhymom antyrelihiinoi polityky v Ukraini v 1920-ti rr. // Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho natsionalnoho universytetu. Seriia «Pravo». Uzhhorod : Vydavnychyi dim «Helvetyky», 2015. T. I. № 35, chastyna 2. 36 pages.

A. Kolodnyi and P. Yarotskyi.[20] The work examines the era of ancient religions. Christianization of Ukraine-Rus'; medieval Christianity; religious life in Ukraine during colonial captivity; early and late Protestantism in Ukraine; religions of national minorities in Ukraine; religious and church processes of the period of Soviet totalitarianism; religious and church life in independent Ukraine; the future of religious life in Ukraine.

Ukrainian independence saw the works by A. Pashuk "The Ukrainian Church: Independence of Ukraine..."[21], M. Yaremenko "Church Holidays and Religious Identity: Ukrainian and Russian Monthbooks of the Late Eighteenth Century..."[22], "History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church..."[23], V. Losten "Our Christian Heritage: Sermons on the Rite on the Occasion of the 1000th Anniversary of the Baptism of Rus'-Ukraine..."[24], "Lviv Stavropegia: History, Personalities, Relationships..."[25], S. V. Petkov "Princess [kniagynia] Olga: the Cornerstone of Church and State..."[26], B. I. Sushynsky's work on religious processes from the end of the sixteenth century and the formation and activities of the Lviv Stavropegia: "Encyclopedia of the Lviv Stavropegion of the XV — early XXI centuries..."[27], "Lviv Stavropegion: Between the Past and Eternity." The History

20 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navchalnyi posibnyk / A. Kolodnyi, P. Yarotskyi, B. Lobovyk ta in. ; za red. A. Kolodnoho i P. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Znannia, 1999. 735 pages.

21 Pashuk A. Ukrainska tserkva: nezalezhnist Ukrainy : monohrafiia. Lviv : Vyd. tsentr LNU im. I. Franka, 2003. 364 pages.

22 Yaremenko M. Tserkovni praznyky ta relihiina identychnist: ukrainski ta rosiiski misiatseslovy kintsia XVIII st. Lviv : UKU, 2023. 272 pages.

23 Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy / D. Hordiienko ta in. Kharkiv : Folio, 2019. 244 pages.

24 Losten, Vasyl (iep.). Nasha khrystyianska spadshchyna: Propovidi pro obriad z nahody 1000-littia khreshchennia Rusy-Ukrainy. Lviv : Svichado, 2019. 232 pages.

25 Lvivska stavropihiia: istoriia, personalii, vzaiemyny / red. V. Aleksandrovych, I. Orlevych. Lviv : Lohos, 2017. 298 pages.

26 Pietkov S. Kniahynia Olha: narizhnyi kamin tserkvy i derzhavy. Kyiv : Artek, 2021. 120 pages.

27 Pietkov S. Kniahynia Olha: narizhnyi kamin tserkvy i derzhavy. Kyiv : Artek, 2021. 120 pages.

of the Lviv Stavropegion..."[28], work by M. Levytsky "Religious Wars of Muscovy: Political and Religious Publicistics..."[29], the work by the Kapranov brothers "The History of Our Church..."[30], S. Chorna "The Ukrainian Church and Moscow Myths..."[31], K. Shchotkina "The Tomos Chronicle: "Own Church": the Path of Ukrainians to Autocephaly..."[32], Ivan Vlasovsky's multi-volume edition "Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church..."[33], A. Zhukovsky "Petro Mohyla and the Question of Church Unity...".[34] Multiple collections on the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church appeared during the period of Ukrainian independence.

A special place in the analysis of religious processes in Ukraine is occupied by the comprehensive works carried out under the guidance of A. Kolodny[35] and

28 Sushynskyi B. Entsyklopediia Lvivskoi stavropihii XV — pochatok XXI st. Odesa : Astroprynt, 2018. 377 pages.

29 Sushynskyi B. Lvivskyi Stavropihion: mizh mynuvshynoiu i vichnistiu. Istoriia Lvivskoho Stavropihionu : monohrafiia. Lviv : Stavropihion, 2008. 495 pages.

30 Levytskyi M. Relihiini viiny Moskovii: polityko-relihiina publitsystyka. Lviv : Apriori, 2020. 368 pages.

31 Kapranov V., Kapranov D. Istoriia nashoi Tserkvy. Kyiv : Zelenyi Pes, 2018. 80 pages.

32 Chorna S. Ukrainska tserkva i moskovski mify. Kyiv : Dnipro, 2021. 220 pages.

33 Shchotkina K. Khronika Tomosu: «svoia Tserkva»: shliakh ukraintsiv do avtokefalii. Kharkiv : Vivat, 2019. 304 pages.

34 Vlasovskyi I. Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy. T. 1. 1998. 294 pages ; T. 2. 1998. 397 pages ; T. 3. 1998. 390 pages ; T. 4, ch. 1. 1998. 384 pages ; T. 4, ch. 2. 1998. 416 pages.

35 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini: u 10 tomakh. Tom 1: Dokhrystyianski viruvannia; Pryiniattia khrystyianstva. Redkol.: A. Kolodnyi (holova) ta in. Za red. B. Lobovyka. K.: Ukr. Tsentr dukhovn. kultury, 1996–1998. 384 pages. Istoriia relihii v Ukraini: u 10 tomakh. Tom 2: Ukrainske pravoslavia. Red-kol.: A. Kolodnyi (holova) ta in. K.: Ukr. tsentr dukhov. kultury, 1996–1998. Za red. P. Yarotskoho. 1997. 376 pages. Istoriia relihii v Ukraini: u 10 tomakh. Tom 3: Pravoslavia v Ukraini. Red-kol.: A. Kolodnyi (holova) ta in. K.: Ukr. tsentr dukhov. kultury, 1996–1999. Za red. A. Kolodnoho i V. Klymova. K., 1999. 560 pages; Relihiia v istorii i dukhovnosti ukraintsiv. Vybrani pratsi Yuriia Mulyka-Lutsyka / Uporiadnyk i nauk. redaktor prof. A.Kolodnyi. Seriia «Myslyteli ukrainskoi diaspory». K.: UAR, 2019. 264 pages; «Russkyi myr» Kyryla ne dlia Ukrainy: Zbirka naukovykh statei / Red. kol.:

a series of works by O. Sagan.[36] Researchers study publications on the history of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in different periods (G. Nadtoch and I. Gorpinchenko[37], A. Richynsky[38], V. Shevchenko[39], S. Zdioruk[40]).

A separate group on the history of the Orthodox Church and religious processes in general consists of works devoted to national and religious processes in certain regions of the state. These are, in particular, works by Y. Voloshyn, "The Parish Community of the Pyriatyn Protopopia in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century (Social and Historical and Historical and Demographic

A. Kolodnyi, P. Pavlenko, O. Sahan, L. Fylypovych, V. Shevchenko. Ukrainska asotsiatsiia relihiieznavtsiv. K.: UAR, 2014. 343 pages.

36 Sahan O. Vselenske pravoslavia: sut, istoriia, suchasnyi stan. K.: Svit Znan, 2004. 910 pages; yoho zh: Yedyna Pomisna Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini: suspilnyi zapyt ta neobkhidnist konstytuiuvannia. K.: KPBA, «Svit Znan», 2016. 40 pages; yoho zh: Yedyna Ukrainska Pomisna Pravoslavna Tserkva: suspilnyi zapyt ta neobkhidnist konstytuiuvannia. 2 vyd. Kyiv : KBSB, 2017. 40 pages; yoho zh: Natsionalni proiavy pravoslav'ia: ukrainskyi aspekt. K.: Svit Znan, 2001. 255 pages; yoho zh: Pravoslavna Tserkva Ukrainy: konstytuiuvannia ta perspektyvy rozvytku. K., 2019. 103 pages; yoho zh: Suchasne pravoslavia v Ukraini: «rozmoskovlennia» istorii ta perspektyvy rozvytku / O. Sahan. Ternopil: «Kryla». 2025., 224 pages; Sahan O., Doroshenko O. Praktychni porady dlia tserkovnykh hromad, yaki vyrishyly doiednatysia do Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy Ukrainy. K.: Hetmanskyi fond Petra Doroshenka, 2022. 88 pages.

37 Nadtoka H., Horpynchenko I. Pravoslavna tserkva v Ukraini druhoi polovyny XIX stolittia. Istoriohrafiia. Za red. H. M.Nadtoky. K., 2018. 208 pages.

38 Richynskyi A. Problemy ukrainskoi relihiinoi svidomosti. Uporiadnyky A. Kolodnyi, O. Sahan. Vydannia tretie. Ternopil, 2001. 442 pages.

39 Shevchenko V. Pravoslavno-katolytska polemika ta uniina problematyka v zhytti Rusi-Ukrainy doberesteiskoho periodu ; u 2 t. / V. Shevchenko. K., 2018. T. 1. 718 [2] pages; yoho zh: Pravoslavno-katolytska polemika ta uniina problematyka v zhytti Rusi-Ukrainy doberesteiskoho periodu ; u 2 t. / V. Shevchenko. K., 2020. T. 2. 1170 pages.

40 Zdioruk S. Suspilno-relihiini vidnosyny: vyklyky Ukraini KhKhI stolittia: Monohrafia. — K.: Znannia Ukrainy, 2005. 552 pages.

Dimension)..."[41], I. Dubylko, "Pochayiv Monastery in the History of Our People..."[42], O. Dukh "Honorable Ladies. Women's monastic communities of Lviv and Przemysl dioceses in the early modern period..."[43], collective edition "Spiritual Heritage of Ancient Halych..."[44], Ye. Shmorgun "...And Darkness Will not Break it. Pages of the Life of the "Peresopnytsia Gospel"..."[45], I. I. Lyman's work "State Church and State Power: Southern Ukraine (1775–1861)..."[46], "The Russian Orthodox Church in the South of Ukraine in the Last Quarter of the Eighteenth-Mid-Nineteenth Centuries...".[47]

Modern historical studies of the church are based on a significant set of works by religious figures, whose scientific research we interpret as both a source of information and historiographical analysis. These include the works by Metropolitan Hilarion (I. I. Ohienko) "The Lamps of the Ukrainian Land..."[48], materials of the international scientific conference "The Patriarchate of Constantinople in the History of Ukraine: Past, Present, Future..."[49], T. V. Romaniuk

41 Voloshyn Yu. Parafiialna spilnota Pyriatynskoi protopopiia druhoi polovyny XVIII st. (sotsialno-istorychnyi ta istoryko-demohrafichnyi vymir) : monohrafiia. Lviv : Vyd-vo UKU, 2023. 420 pages.

42 Dubylko I. Pochaivskyi monastyr v istorii nashoho narodu. Kyiv : Tsentr uchbovoi literatury, 2020. 114 pages.

43 Dukh O. Prevelebni panny. Zhinochi chernechi spilnoty Lvivskoi ta Peremyshlskoi yeparkhii u rannomodernyi period : monohrafiia. Lviv : Vyd-vo UKU, 2017. 752 pages.

44 Dukhovna spadshchyna Davnoho Halycha : nauk. zb. / I. Skochelias, V. Frys. Lviv ; Ivano-Frankivsk : Vyd-vo UKU, 2018. 168 pages.

45 Shmorhun Ye. I. ...I pitma ne zlamaie yoho. Storinky buttia «Peresopnytskoho Yevanheliia». Rivne : Azaliia, 2011. 164 pages.

46 Lyman I. Derzhavna tserkva i derzhavna vlada: Pivdenna Ukraina (1775–1861). Zaporizhzhia : RA «Tandem-U», 2004. 397 pages.

47 Lyman I. Rosiiska pravoslavna tserkva na pivdni Ukrainy ostannoi chverti XVIII — seredyny XIX stolittia. Zaporizhzhia : RA «Tandem-U», 2004. 486 pages.

48 Ohiienko I. (mytr. Ilarion: 1882–1972). Svitylnyky zemli ukrainskoi / uporiad., avt. peredm. M. Tymoshyk ; Fundatsiia im. mytropolyta Ilariona. Kyiv : Nasha kultura i nauka, 2017. 444 pages.

49 Konstantynopolskyi patriarkhat v istorii Ukrainy: mynule, suchasne, maibutnie : zb. dop. mizhnar. nauk.-prakt. konf. (10 chervnia 2016, m. Kyiv) / red. O. Sahan. Kyiv : Kyivske Bohoiavlenske stavropihiiske bratstvo, 2017. 152 pages.

"Patriarch Volodymyr, or Memories of the Father..."[50], Myron Mykush (Archpriest) "The Unified Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine..."[51], O. Sagan "The Unified Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church: Public Request and the Need for Constitutionalization..."[52], collective work "The Main Principles of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church...".[53]

Works published in the Ukrainian diaspora remain relevant for assessing contemporary religious processes. These are the studies by V. B. Antonovych "What the Union Brought to Ukraine. The State of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Half of the Seventeenth to the End of the Eighteenth Century..."[54], O. Voronin "The Historical Path of the UAOC..."[55], the exhibition catalog "History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Publications of the Ukrainian Diaspora..."[56], the work by O. Kupranets "The Orthodox Church in Interwar Poland 1918–1939..."[57], etc. Of special significance is the publication of Wilhelm de Vries "Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Confrontation or Complementarity?".[58] The theoretical and methodological conclusions of this work were important.

50 Romaniuk T. Patriarkh Volodymyr, abo spohady pro batka. Kyiv ; Vyshneve : Dukhovna vis, 2020. 196 pages.

51 Mykush, Myron (protoiierei). Yedyna Ukrainska Pomisna Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini. Lviv, 2017. 136 pages.

52 Sahan O. Yedyna Ukrainska Pomisna Pravoslavna Tserkva: suspilnyi zapyt ta neobkhidnist konstytuiuvannia. 2 vyd. Kyiv : KBSB, 2017. 40 pages.

53 Holovni zasady Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy / Lviv. Kraiove stavropihiiske bratstvo sv. ap. Andreia Pervozvannoho. 2 vyd., pererobl., dop. Lviv, 1999. 32 pages.

54 Antonovych V. Shcho prynesla Ukraini Uniia. Stan ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy vid polovyny XVII do kintsia XVIII st. Vinnipeh : Ekkleziia, 1991. 132 c.

55 Voronyn O. Istorychnyi shliakh UAPTs. Keninhston : Voskresinnia, 1992. 135 c.

56 Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy u vydanniakh ukrainskoi diaspory : kataloh vystavky / KhDNB im. V. Korolenka; uklad. O. Riabtseva, O. Dmytriieva. Kharkiv, 2003. 16 c.

57 Kupranets O. ChSVV. Pravoslavna Tserkva v mizhvoiennii Polshchi 1918–1939. Rym : Vyd-vo OO Vasyliian, 1974. 235 c.

58 Kupranets O. ChSVV. Pravoslavna Tserkva v mizhvoiennii Polshchi 1918–1939. Rym : Vyd-vo OO Vasyliian, 1974. 235 c.

Certain aspects of religious processes in Ukraine at the present stage are presented in the works of Professor O. Sukhyy[59], joint works with Professor K. Rejman[60], and researchers Y. Pachkovsyy and O. Demkiv.[61] The contemporary dimension of the issue is determined by historical and philosophical approaches presented in the works of F. Medvid, M. Chorna, A. Medvid, V. Baran, A. Kovalenko, and others.[62]

59 Sukhyy O. Halychyna: mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom. Narysy istorii XIX — pochatku XX st. 2-he vyd., dop. Lviv : LNU imeni I. Franka ; Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NAN Ukrainy, 1999. 232 pages.; yoho zh: Etnichnyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy. Rosiiany v Ukraini: sfery prysutnosti, politychni pozytsii, mainovyi status, formy hromadskoi aktyvnosti // Arkusha O., Kondratiuk K., Mudryi M., Sukhyy O. Chas narodiv. Istoriia Ukrainy XIX stolittia : navch. posib. / za zah. red. M. Mudroho. Lviv : LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2016. PP. 122–137.; yoho zh: Relihiini protsesy na Lvivshchyni v kintsi 1980-ykh — 1990-ykh rr.: suspilno-politychna sfera ta mizhkonfesiini vidnosyny. Lviv : PAIS, 2016. 244 pages.; yoho zh: Mizhkonfesiini stosunky na Lvivshchyniv 1990-ykh rr.: suspilno-politychni aspekty // Zagadnienia religijne i narodowościowe w współczesnych badaniach polskich, słowackich i ukraińskich na terenie Euroregionu Karpackiego. Aspekt historyczny, prawny, sociologiczny, filozoficzny i etyczny. Część I / Pod. red. Krzysztofa Rejmana, Wacława Wierzbieńca. Jarosław, 2015. PP. 327–342.

60 Rejman K., Sukhyy O. Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine: History and Modern Times: monograph. Rzeszow, 2020. P. 91. 185 pages. Rezhym dostupu: https://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/fcp/mGBUKOQtTKlQhbx08SlkTUgxQX2o8DAoHNiwFE1xVTnVTFVZpCFghUHcKVigEQUw/18/public/otwarty-dostep/2020/k_rejman-2.pdf

61 Rejman K., Pachkovskyy Y., Demkiv O., Sukhyy O. Ukraiński Kościół Greckokatolicki i jego wpływ na kształtowanie religijnego kapitału społecznego ukraińskich migrantów pierwszej fali: analiza historyczna i socjologiczna // Historia Ecclesiastica, XIII, 2022, 2. PP. 185–201.

62 Medvid F. Vzaiemozviazok natsionalnoi i relihiinoi idei v konteksti relihiino-dukhovnoho zhyttia Ukrainy // Visnyk UADU. — K.: Vyd-vo UADU, 2003. — № 1. PP. 363–368.; yoho zh: Doslidzhennia roli relihii v natsionalnomu samovyznachenni derzhavy // Kyivska tserkva. Almanakh khrystyianskoi dumky. — Kyiv-Lviv: Misioner, 2000. — № 1(7). PP. 130–132.; yoho zh: Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi yak dukhovnyi budivnychyi ukrainskoi natsii // Politychnyi menedzhment. — 2005. — № 4(13). — 2005. PP. 167–175; Medvid F., Baran V. Kultury i relihii u "Chornomorskii doktryni" Yuriia Lypy // Istoriia relihii v Ukraini: naukovyi shchorichnyk / uporiad. O. Kyrychuk, M. Omelchuk, I. Orlevych. — L.: Instytut

The study of religious processes in Ukraine is currently under the strong influence of Polish, American, and European historiography.

relihiieznavstva — filiia Lvivskoho muzeiu istorii relihii: vyd-vo "Lohos", 2013. — Knyha I. Istoriia. PP. 808–818; Medvid F., Kovalenko A. Inspiruiucha rol relihii v politychnomu zhytti Ukrainy // Rizdvo Khrystove 2000. Statti i materialy. — Lviv: Lohos, 2001. PP. 116–119; Medvid F., Kovalenko A. Rol relihii u politychnomu zhytti Ukrainy // Kyivska tserkva. Almanakh khrystyianskoi dumky. — Kyiv-Lviv: Misioner, 2000. — № 2(8). PP. 92–95; Medvid F., Medvid A. "Slovo pro Zakon i Blahodat" Mytropolyta Ilariona yak vyznachna rytorychna pamiatka relihiieznavchoi dumky v Ukraini // Istoriia relihii v Ukraini. Naukovyi shchorichnyk 2007 rik. Knyha II. — Lviv: Lohos, 2007. PP. 175–184; Medvid F., Medvid A. Dokhrystyianski viruvannia u "Slovi o polku Ihorevim" // Istoriia relihii v Ukraini: naukovyi shchorichnyk / uporiad. O. Kyrychuk, M. Omelchuk, I. Orlevych. — L.: Lvivskyi muzei istorii relihii; vyd-vo "Lohos", 2010. — Knyha I. PP. 97–104; Medvid F., Medvid A. Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi yak dukhovnyi budivnychyi Ridnoi Khaty // Istoriia relihii v Ukraini. Naukovyi shchorichnyk 2006 rik. Knyha II. — Lviv: Lohos, 2006. PP. 175–184; Medvid F., Medvid A. Ukrainska natsionalna ideia: khrystyianski zasady // Istoriia relihii v Ukraini. Naukovyi shchorichnyk. 2009 rik. Knyha I.– Lviv: Lohos, 2009. PP. 865–872; Medvid F., Chorna M. "Slovo pro Zakon i Blahodat" Mytropolyta Ilariona yak vyznachna pamiatka khrystyianskoi dumky // Ukrainska derzhav i Tserkva: filosofski, teolohichni ta praktychni aspekty spivpratsi v interesakh liudyny: Materialy naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii, m. Kyiv, MAUP, 19 travnia 2016 r. — K.: DP "Vyd. dim "Personal", 2016. PP. 169–187; Medvid F., Chorna M. Relihiina skladova systemy natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy// Humanitarnyi korpus. Vypusk 54. Zbirnyk statei z aktualnykh naukovykh problem Do 190-richchia Ukrainskoho derzhavnoho universytetu imeni Mykhaila Drahomanova. Do 60-richchia kafedry bohoslovia ta relihiieznavstva. Kyiv: UDU im. M. Drahomanova, 2025, PP. 39–42.

1. THE BEGINNINGS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS IN RUS`

The first stage of religious beliefs in the era of Kyivan Rus' was associated with pre-Christian beliefs, which were based on polytheistic ideas about the supernatural, while gods personified various phenomena of the external world and its perception by man. At the early stage of the birth of the state in the East Slavic area, the divine phenomenon was associated with a polytheistic perception of the world, the content of which was determined by the gods: Perun — the god of fertility, thunder and lightning, Svarog — the god of the Sun, heavenly fire, Dazhbog — the god of the Sun (son of Svarog and Heaven), Veles — the god of abundance, trade, guardian of livestock; the goddess Mokosha, the sister of the Sun, goddess of rain; the goddess Lada protected the family, Yarylo was the god of fertility and the flourishing of nature.

In the era of the formation and strengthening of Kyiv as the state, the civilized relationships of the state with other countries of the world, and especially with Byzantium, deepened. Christianity became a major religion.

The Christian tradition was establishing itself in Ukrainian lands for many centuries. This was primarily due to the cultural and civilizational influence of the Greeks who lived in the cities of the Northern Black Sea at the beginning of our era. According to the plot of "The Tale of Bygone Years" or "The Primary Chronicle," Apostle Andrew the First blessed the Kyiv mountains and placed a cross on the place where St. Andrew's Church was later built.[1]

However, Apostle Andrew the First was not the only one who promoted Christianity in Kyiv state. Also Apostle Pavlo was likely to reach its western

1 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo: navch. posib. Kyiv : Znannia, 2012. P. 197; Pietkov S. Kniahynia Olha: narizhnyi kamin tserkvy i derzhavy. Kyiv : ArtEk, 2021. 120 pages.

borders. It was him who made St. Androniks, one of his disciples, a bishop in Pannonia, which covered both Transcarpathia and Prešov region.[2]



St. Andrew's Church in Kyiv (1747–1762) in the Baroque style designed by Francesco Bartolomeo Rastrelli

Christian communities in the south of Ukraine arose in the middle of the 3rd century. Panticapae (Bosporus) and Chersonese became such centers where at the end of the 3rd and the beginning of the 4th centuries there were church organizations headed by bishops. Christianity took root from the Goths, who formed a strong state in the south of Ukraine.

Theophilus, the Gothic bishop, took part in the meetings of the first Ecumenical Council of Nicaea (325), as well as the bishop from Bosporus.

In the 4th century, the Chersonese and Goth dioceses were formed in Crimea, and in the 5th–8th century episcopal sees were also established in other cities.

2 Hordiienko D., Klos V., Mytsyk Yu., Prelovska I. Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy. Kharkiv : Folio, 2019. PP. 5–6.

They included the Diocese of Sourozh, the Diocese of Fulda, and other dioceses. All the abovementioned witnesses testified to the spread of Christianity. From the 5th century, southern Ukraine was gradually occupied by Slavic tribes, and in the 8th century, they began to settle in that region, established ties with the Greeks, and were under their cultural influence.[3]

Broad Christianization of the Chersonese population dates back to the 6th–7th centuries and it was related to the activities of the Byzantium enlightened in the Crimea. It was also the period of intensive Christian construction in Chersonese, redevelopment of urban quarters, construction of Christian temples. If during the first centuries AD Christianity spread mainly among the low layers of the Ukrainian population, then with the change of the state policy from the ruling of Constantine the Great, new religion attracts more and more wealthy citizens.[4]

At the end of the 9th century, there was an orientation towards the Byzantine world. In particular, as the researcher Yu. I. Tereshchenko noted, after the famous attack on Constantinople in 860, Byzantine diplomacy sought to seize the initiative in the "civilization" of Rus', which was tangibly threatening the geopolitical positions of the empire. Patriarch Photius sent a bishop to Rus', who was supposed to introduce there Christian rites and customs. As the chronicler mentions, he was received by Askold, baptised the prince [kniaz`], his army, and his people.[5]

Yu. I. Tereshchenko believes that this pastor-bishop was a supporter of Patriarch Ignatius, who recognized the supremacy of Rome and Pope Nicholas I, and named Prince [kniaz`] Askold as Nicholas during his baptism. These measures of Byzantium contributed to the involvement of Rus' in the process of establishing a new religion, which ended in the main states of the then Europe at the end of the 8th century. The 9th century was a turning point for the Slavic peoples.

3 Bidnov V., Antonovych D. Ukrainska tserkva // Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha / uporiad. S. Ulianovska ; vstup. st. I.M. Dziuby ; pered. slovo M. Antonovycha ; dodatky S. Ulianovskoi, V. Ulianovskoho. Kyiv : Lybid, 1993. P. 197.

4 Hordiienko D., Klos V., Mytsyk Yu., Prelovska I. Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy. Kharkiv : Folio, 2019. PP. 5–6.

5 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit: narys istorii vid utvorennia Starokyivskoi derzhavy do kintsia XVI st. : navch. posib. Kyiv : Perun, 1996. P. 61.

Moreover, the Kyiv state, in the same way as Bulgaria and Moravia, became an object of rivalry between the West and the East.[6]



King Mieszko I of Poland (960–992) was a representative of the Piast dynasty. In 966 he converted to Christianity from Rome.

There are numerous versions regarding the baptism of Rus'. First of all, it was about the baptism of the princes [kniazi] — Kyi and Askold (860), on whose

6 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navchalnyi posibnyk / A. M. Kolodnyi, P. L. Yarotskyi, B. O. Lobovyk ta in. ; za red. A. M. Kolodnoho i P. L. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Zannnia, 1999. PP. 83–86; Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit: narys istorii vid utvorennia Starokyivskoi derzhavy do kintsia XVI st. : navch. posib. Kyiv : Perun, 1996. P. 61.

grave a church was built. Since that time, another diocese has appeared in the Patriarchate of Constantinople — the Rusyn one.



Polish King Bolesław I the Brave (992–1025). In 1018, summoned by his son-in-law, Prince [kniaz`] Sviatopolk Okayansky of Kyiv, he marched to Volyn, defeated Yaroslav the Wise on the banks of the Western Bug, captured Kyiv, and instead of handing it over to Sviatopolk, he himself settled in it. But the people of Kyiv, outraged by the plundering of his wife, began to beat the Poles, and Bolesław was forced to leave Rus in 1019. Poland retained the Czerveny towns until 1030.

At the same time, there were opponents to Christianity. Particularly, it goes about Prince [kniaz`] Oleh who came to power in Kyiv and is associated with anti-Christian reaction. However, already after his death, Princess [kniagynia] Olha actively supported the Christian church. One can trace her contacts with

Byzantium, when in 959 she appealed to Otto the Great, the Emperor of the Roman Empire, with a request to send a bishop of the Eastern Christian rite to Kyiv. Some researchers of the history of the church note that later Princess [kniagynia] Olha refused the guardianship of the Roman Curia.[7]



Princess [kniagynia] Olga (945–969). On October 18, 957, Princess [kniagynia] Olha of Kyiv was baptized in Constantinople. She received the baptismal name Helen in honor of her godmother Helen of Labapine. Her godfather was Romanus, the son with co-emperor Constantine VII. Olga is considered the first Christian ruler in Kyivan Rus.

7 Pietkov S. Kniahynia Olha: narizhnyi kamin tserkvy i derzhavy. Kyiv : ArtEk, 2021. 120 pages.

Social and political changes caused primarily by state-forming processes during the era of Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr (980–1015) led to a new stage of Rus'Christianization. It is generally accepted that Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr, who adopted Christianity, considered it an ideological basis for the consolidation of tribal associations and their transformation into ethnic and political integrity. The baptism of Rus'-Ukraine during the time of Volodymyr was also caused by economic, political, and cultural ties with neighbouring Christian states.



Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr (980–1015). Most historians believe that the baptism took place in 988 on the Pochayna River, a tributary of the Dnipro. The Tale of Byzantine Years also indicates this. Volodymyr captured the Byzantine city of Chersonesos in Crimea and demanded marriage with the emperor's daughter Anna and help in the baptism of Rus. Volodymyr was baptized under the name Basil.

According to "The Tales of Bygone Years," the baptism of Kyivans took place on August 14, 988, on the Pochayna River, a tributary of the Dnieper. According to the chronicle, that ceremony was accompanied by the destruction of the pagan

idols. In particular, Perun was tied to a horse's tail and dragged to the Dnieper. Accordingly, Christian temples were built on the sites where pagan idols stood.



Monument to the Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Grand Duke of Kyiv Volodymyr-Vasylii Sviatoslavovych the Great in Kyiv. (Fas)



(Full-face) Contemporary photograph

As mentioned in the manuscript "The Tales of Bygone Years," Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr sent delegations to various countries in order to recognize their religions. There is an assertion that finally the prince [kniaz`] and his advisors stopped in Constantinople due to the beauty of Byzantine church services, a wonderful liturgical motif, and other positively convincing things. Some researchers believe that Greek Christianity was particularly close and dear to the people of Kyivan Rus'.



The Baptism of Rus-Ukraine (painting by Petro Andrusiv). Recognized as the official painting of the Millennium of the Baptism of Rus' by the Ukrainian diaspora in 1988, the painting was purchased by the UCC Metropolia in the United States. Today, it is kept in the building of the Metropolitan Ordinariate in Philadelphia.

However, the period concerning the adoption of Christianity from Byzantium caused the hottest discussions among the researchers of church history. In particular, the historian Stefan Tomashivskyi believed that the choice of Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr was a tragic and epochal mistake, and in this regard, "due to the adoption of Christianity in its eastern form, Rus'-Ukraine condemned itself to spiritual stagnation and barrenness, and blocked the possibility to become full members of the European community."[8] These provisions are quoted from the article of I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, "Ukraine between East and West." The diaspora historian argues that this view resonates with the famous theory of Arnold Toynbee, who in his scheme of world "civilizations" draws a distinct line of division between the Western civilization, which includes the Catholic and Protestant nations of Europe together with their overseas branches, and the "Eastern Christian civilization", that is, medieval Byzantium and its modern heir, Rus'.[9]

8 Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Istorychni ESE : v 2 t. / per. z anhl. M. Badik, U. Havryshkiv, Ya. Hrytsaka, A. Deshchytsi, H. Kyvan, E. Pankeievoi. Kyiv : Osnovy, 1994. T. 1. P. 7.

9 Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Istorychni ESE : v 2 t. / per. z anhl. M. Badik, U. Havryshkiv, Ya. Hrytsaka, A. Deshchytsi, H. Kyvan, E. Pankeievoi. Kyiv : Osnovy, 1994. T. 1. P. 7.

In the middle of the 9th century, the mission of the Slavic educators Saints Cyril and Methodius began. St. Cyril began his preaching activity among the Gentiles with a mission among the Khazars at the end of 860. The mission lasted for about three years. "Life of St. George of Amastris" reports that Cyril had a successful discussion with the Jews in Khazaria, after which many Khazars were baptized. On his way back to Constantinople via the Crimea Cyril made a stop in Chersonese where he found the relics of St. Clement.

First in the Crimea, then in Moravia, while engaged in missionary work, the brothers translated liturgical literature into the Slavic language, Old Bulgarian, and introduced the Slavic alphabet, Cyrillic. At that time, the languages of worship were ancient Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. By introducing the Slavic language, contrary to the policy of some popes, the enlighteners opened the Holy Scriptures to the other nations, showing the way to further development of their cause by translating the Holy Scriptures into national languages.

The success of the Slavic mission provoked opposition among the German bishops; however, they received full-fledged support from Pope Andrian II, which was facilitated by a generous gift of the brothers to the Roman See — the sacred relics of Pope Clement of Rome.[10]

Prof. A. I. Pashuk draws attention to the fact that scientific literature mentions two baptisms of Ukraine-Rus'. The scholar states that baptism can mean the adoption of a Christian religion by a person, a group of people, or nation following a certain ritual. However, baptism means also "establishing one's own church structures," i.e. "establishing church administration."[11]

A. Pashuk notes that there cannot be a baptized people without an appropriate church structure, but there cannot be a church structure without baptised people. In Ukrainian history, a dilemma arises: what was the first baptism — was

10 When the brothers were staying in Rome, on February 4, 869, Cyril died. Methodius was ordained bishop by Pope Leo. To persuade the princes [kniazi] of Great Moravia, Rostislav, and Pannonia, Kotselia, he created a separate ecclesiastical province from their lands, independent of the German bishops. Methodius managed to hold on to his position for a while, but after his death on April 6, 885, his disciples were forced to leave the country and move to Bulgaria // Hordiienko D., Klos V., Mytsyk Yu., Prelovska I. Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy... PP. 13–14.

11 Pashuk A. Ukrainska tserkva i nezalezhnist Ukrainy : monohrafiia. Lviv : Vydavnychyi tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2003. P. 13.

it the baptism of Rus' or the baptism of Rus' people? Based on numerous studies, the author believes that the first baptism was the baptism of the Rus' people in Chersonese during Askold and Dir's campaign, which occurred in 868.[12]

Accordingly, the second stage of the baptism of Rus'-Ukraine was preceded by the following processes: Volodymyr was baptized in Chersonese in 987; Halychyna adopted Christianity in 872, in the time of Methodius; there were separate Christian communities and churches in other parts of Rus' ("Askold's Baptism," Olha's baptism, etc.); in particular, there were the diocese of Przemysl (probably 899), the diocese of Tmutarakan`, and the diocese of Chersonese (868).[13]



Askold's Grave (painting by Taras Shevchenko).
Executed in the summer of 1846.

Consequently, in 988–989 there was the second baptism of Rus' related to the activities of Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr. This stage was crucial for the transformation of the state into a Christian country. As for church organization, it was associated with the creation of the dioceses and metropolitanate. At the end of the 9th century, three dioceses were established under Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr: Kyiv, Novhorod, and Belhorod. Having adopted Christianity, Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr pursued a church policy which was independent of

12 Pashuk A. Ukrainska tserkva i nezalezhnist Ukrainy... P. 14.

13 Pashuk A. Ukrainska tserkva i nezalezhnist Ukrainy... P. 15.

Byzantium, elevating the role of Kyiv in the Christian world. It was important for the prince [kniaz`] to rely on the national church hierarchy.[14]

Christianity in Kyivan Rus' was finally established in the state dimension in 988–991. This period was characterized by a certain "phenomenon of trust," that is, a simultaneous period of practicing two religions — Pagan and Christian. Church history researchers indicate a certain sense of compatibility of religions, as Christianity was the official religious factor, while Paganism played the role of a folk religion. It is believed that the period of mutual influence contributed to significant cultural ritual borrowing. Though Christianity won over other religions, pagan cultural borrowings were significant: Christian shrines were built on the places of pagan temples; the holiday of the Nativity of Christ was replaced by the pagan Christmas Carol; the holiday of John the Baptist was replaced by the pagan holiday of Ivan Kupala; Saint Blaise replaced the pagan Veles.[15]

There are several branches in modern Ukrainian historiography regarding the question of Christian rite preference by Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr. Most researchers state that the choice made by Volodymyr was not accidental. The decisive fact was that for a long time, the Ukrainian lands belonged to Greek and Hellenistic culture. According to I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, the process of this influence took place one and a half millennia before the adoption of Christianity. As early as the 7th century BC, there were Greek city-states on the southern coast of Ukraine and in the Crimea, which significantly influenced the Proto-Slavic tribes, imposing trade and cultural contacts on them. Some of the settlements perished during the Great Migration of Peoples, while the others have survived.

14 The first archbishop of the Kyiv Rus` Church was Leontius of Tmutarakan` (independent of the Byzantine patriarch), who lived around 1004–1008. The second archbishop of Rus was Yoan I (1004–1034). It is believed that he did not come from Byzantium but was the Patriarch of Ohrid at the time of the complete conquest of Bulgaria by Byzantium in 1018–1019. the Ohrid (Bulgarian) Patriarchate was abolished; in 1037–1043. The Metropolitan of Kyiv was Theopemptus; in 1051, Yaroslav the Wise appointed the Rusyn Ilarion as Metropolitan of St. Sophia (it is known that the prince [kniaz`] made this move without the consent of Byzantium).

15 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo... P. 199.

The revival of the Kyiv state took place in the conditions of close ties with Byzantium and its Christian world.[16]



Yaroslav the Wise. Prince [kniaz`] of Kyiv (1019–1054).
He completed the Christianization of Rus.

Analyzing the processes of Christianization in Europe, I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi argues that "the Byzantine Empire in the 10th century was under the rule of the great Macedonian Dynasty and was at the peak of its political and cultural power. At that time, Byzantium could probably bring more to young Rus' than Latin Christianity gave to the newly converted peoples of Northern and Central Eastern Europe. Planting rich Greek-Byzantine culture (partly borrowed directly from Tsarhorod and partly appropriated in its Bulgarian version) to the welcoming young Slavic country gave an impetus to the rapid cultural development of Kyivan Rus', which made it equal to relatively most developed countries of the then Europe. However, despite its brilliance and sophistication, Byzantium betrayed some striking manifestations of frailty in the long run. It was rather static, and it lacked the extraordinary dynamism and creative power that Latin

16 Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Ukraina mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom // Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Istorychni Ese : v 2 t. / per. z anhl. M. Badik, U. Havryshkiv, Ya. Hrytsaka, A. Deshchytsi, H. Kyvan, E. Pankeievoi. Kyiv : Osnovy, 1994. T. 1. P. 7.

Christianity developed after the year 1000, during the Romanesque and Gothic eras..."[17]

At the same time, there are arguments substantiating the idea that Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr's goal was to establish Slavic Christianity in the Kyivan state, the ideas of which had been implemented by the Slavic educators Cyril and Methodius. It goes about the fact that, in view of this Slavic tradition, Volodymyr did not baptize his country under the influence or tutelage of any church existing at that time, but he did it independently, aiming at the formation of an independent church.

At the same time, the foundation of an independent church was connected with the fact that it had to be recognized by other Christian churches and their hierarchs. In this regard, it is indicative that Prince [kniaz`] Yaroslav the Wise was forced to negotiate the establishment of an Orthodox Church in Rus' with the Patriarch of Constantinople. However, Byzantium rejected the intentions of the Prince [kniaz`] of Kyiv to obtain autocephaly. At the same time, Yaroslav the Wise was consistent in his intentions to acquire the status of autocephaly. Later, a centralised religious organisation was formed in the Kyivan state headed by a metropolitan, appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople and approved by the Emperor of Byzantium. Thus, the church organization of Kyiv was subordinated to the Patriarch of Constantinople.



Seal of Yaroslav the Wise. First half of the eleventh century. In ancient times, seals were used to certify the authenticity of documents, conclude contracts, and identify the owner. The seal was an important element in legal procedures, confirming the intention of the parties and the legality of the transaction.

17 Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Ukraina mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom // Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Istorychni Ese... PP. 7–8.

Changes in the organization of church power occurred in 1051, when, after the death of Greek Metropolitan Theophylact, Prince [kniaz`] Yaroslav the Wise appointed a Rus' priest, Hilarion, as metropolitan without the consent of the Byzantine emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople. Subsequently, Metropolitan Hilarion, together with the scholar-philosopher Klymentiy Smolyatych, would try to separate the Ruthenian Church from the Byzantine Church. The main philosophical concepts of Metropolitan Hilarion were presented in his work "The Word on Law and Grace."

However, he failed to assert the independence of the church hierarchy in Kyiv, and later Constantinople restored its right to send metropolitans to Kyiv.

The adoption of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine was associated with its own traditions. I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi noted: "The Kyivan state was marked by the following significant feature: it combined a predominantly Eastern, Greek-Byzantine religious and cultural tradition with a predominantly Western social and political structure. It is significant that political Byzantinism remained completely alien to Kyivan Rus'. (Byzantine theocracy was later grafted onto the Moscow kingdom, during its rise, where it was combined with a state organisation modelled on the oriental despotism of the Golden Horde)".[18] Furthermore, I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky notes that, unlike Byzantium and Moscow, in pre-Mongol Rus', as in the medieval West, the state and church power were not united but separated, with each being autonomous in its own sphere. The statehood of Kyiv bore the distinct mark of the spirit of freedom. This was due to the following factors: a social system characterized by contractual relations; respect for the rights and dignity of the individual; limitation of the monarchical power of the prince [kniaz`] by the boyar council and the people's assembly; self-governing life of urban communities; and territorial decentralisation in a quasi-federal style. This freedom-loving, European spirit is also characteristic of the Ukrainian state organizations of later epochs."[19]

In this period of the first half of the 11th century, the Christian East and West coexisted relatively harmoniously, and later, there was a struggle between them for spheres of influence on Rus'.

18 Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Ukraina mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom // Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Istorychni Ese... P. 8.

19 Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Ukraina mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom // Lysiak-Rudnytskyi I. Istorychni Ese... P. 8.

At the same time, the introduction of Christianity helped unite Rus' into a single feudal state and contributed to the development of the economy, social relations, education, spirituality, and culture. Christian Rus' was gaining equal weight with the monotheistic states of the civilized world, strengthening its international authority.



St. Sophia of Kyiv (1037). Chronicles were kept in the cathedral, and the first known library in Rus' was created there. It is not known for certain who founded the cathedral; there are two common versions of the foundation of the shrine. The Tale of Bygone Years states that the founder of the cathedral was Kyivan Prince [kniaz`] Yaroslav the Wise (c. 978–1054), who built the cathedral in 1037 after defeating the Pechenegs. Other sources claim that the cathedral was founded by Volodymyr the Great (c. 958–1015) in 1011. After examining wall inscriptions inside the cathedral, historians have suggested that the foundation of the cathedral may have been laid in 1011. The second theory was accepted by both the Ukrainian authorities and UNESCO, which celebrated the cathedral's 1000th anniversary in 2011.

Introduction of Christianity in Kyivan Rus' had positive consequences. It strengthened the authority and power of the prince [kniaz`] and contributed to the development of the state. The new ideology gave a significant impetus to the rise of ancient Ruthenian culture. Only since the "baptism of Rus'" did

writing and books spread in the country, and the population has become familiar with the best achievements of world literature and science. Schools and scriptoriums were established in Kyiv and later throughout Rus', and soon the East Slavic country became one of the most cultured in Europe. Another important consequence of the Christianization of Rus' was the fact that the state joined the circle of Christian countries. This created opportunities to develop equal relations with Byzantium and other European states.[20]

In 1037, Nestor the Chronicler wrote: "Yaroslav founded a great city and the church of St. Sophia the Metropolitan, and then the church of the Holy Virgin of the Annunciation at the Golden Gate, then the monasteries of St. George and St. Irene."[21]

The main church of the state was St. Sophia Cathedral, built in the 20s–30s of the 11th century. Its architecture enchants with its perfection and sophistication of forms and proportions. The interior of the cathedral is decorated with shining mosaics and polychrome frescoes that are among the masterpieces of world art. According to the Old Rus' legend, the cathedral was built on the spot where Yaroslav won a victory over the Pechenegs.[22]

During the 9th–13th centuries, monuments of hagiographic literature were created. Only a small part of them has survived to this day. Among them is the outstanding philosophical work of Hilarion "The Word on Law and Grace" (30–40s of the 11th century). The work reflects on the heroic past and predicts the glorious future of the Rus' people.

The "lives" of Rus' saints are also monuments of the hagiographic art of the Kyivan Rus' era. Among them, the most famous are "The Lives of Borys and Hlib" and "The Life of Theodosius of Pechersk", created in the second half of the 11th century. Researchers believe that the latter was written by Nestor the Chronicler.[23]

20 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia : u 2 t. / O. Hurzhii, Ya. Isaievych, M. Kotliar ta in. ; pid red. V. Smoliia. Kyiv : Ukraina, 1995. T. 1. 350 pages.

21 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... PP. 60–61.

22 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navchalnyi posibnyk / A. M. Kolodnyi, P. L. Yarotskyi, B. O. Lobovyk ta in. ; za red. A. M. Kolodnoho i P. L. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Zannnia, 1999. 735 s; Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 61.

23 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... PP. 86–87.



The Church of St. Pantaleimon in Halych (ca. 1200). It is the only Old Rus building on the territory of the Galician principality that has preserved its walls. Some researchers explain the rare dedication of the church by the fact that its founder was Prince [kniaz`] Roman Mstyslavych of Galicia and Volyn, whose grandfather, Prince [kniaz`] Izyaslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv, had the baptismal name Panteleimon.

Churches were the main decoration of Kyivan Rus cities. Most of them were built of wood, while the churches of large cities were made of stone. The first stone church of the Virgin Mary, luxuriously decorated with mosaics and frescoes, was built in Kyiv by Volodymyr Sviatoslavovych (989–996). This church was called the Church of the Tithes as the prince [kniaz`] gave a tenth of his income for its maintenance, along with the entire church organization of the

Kyivan state. In addition to the majestic St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, churches were built in other cities of Rus'. Some of them, such as the Assumption Cathedral in Chernihiv and Volodymyr-Volynskyi, St. Panteleimon Church in Halych and St. Cyril Church in Kyiv, have survived to this day.[24]

In 1051, the famous Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery was founded with the participation of St. Anthony of Kyiv, who returned from Athos.



King Danylo (Galician) (1230–1264). In December 1253, in Dorohychyn, the Abbot of the Benedictine monastery from Messina, Opizo, who was sent by Innocent IV, presented Danylo Romanovych with a crown, crown, and scepter.

The development of writing and professional art was especially active in the Halychyna and Volhynia state, which was connected with the activities of the church. Bishops' departments, monasteries, and parish communities were the centers of the cultural and educational movement. The direction of spiritual development was significantly influenced by the entry of Ukrainian lands into the

24 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 88.

circle of countries of the Cyril and Methodius tradition, which was characterized by a combination of local Slavic heritage and the achievements of Christian culture in its Byzantine version. Although entering the sphere of Byzantine cultural influences narrowed the range of contacts with the Latin West and the Muslim East, these contacts remained an essential factor in shaping Ukrainian culture.[25]



St. Nicholas Church in Lviv (built between 1264 and 1340). One of the first churches in the city. Chroniclers mention it as early as 1292, and archaeologists see its foundations as one of the oldest buildings in the settlement, built on the model of Byzantine architecture.

In Halychyna, the oldest East Slavic version of the New Testament was created, which is noticeably different from the first version borrowed from the southern Slavs. Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Y. D. Isayevych states that a number of ancient monuments, such as the

25 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 108.

12th-century Apostle of Chrystynopol, the 12th–13th-century Buchach Gospel, and others, have been preserved in the monastery of the village of Horodyshche in the southern Volyn region, near modern Chervonohrad, which was a major cultural center in the 13th–14th centuries. During the reign of Lev Danylovych, two gospels were rewritten in Kholm, in which typically folk Ukrainian linguistic features are clearly seen in the Church Slavonic basis of the text of literary books.[26]

The construction of churches in the Halychyna-Volhynia region was influenced by the Kyivan architectural tradition. In particular, the Assumption Cathedral in Volodymyr, which was completed in 1160, repeats the plan of the Assumption Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery. In Halychyna cities, such as Przemysl, Zvenyhorod, Vasyliv, and Halych, the construction of white stone churches was initiated.

At least 30 stone monumental structures are known to be located in Halych alone. The construction of the Assumption Cathedral in Halych is connected with the establishment of the diocese here in 1157.

Local iconography in the Halychyna-Volhynia state also developed under the influence of Kyivan iconography. Among the works of artists of a high professional level is the icon of Our Lady Hodegetria of the late 13th and 14th centuries from the Church of the Intercession in Lutsk.

The famous Icon Our Lady of Czestochowa, so popular in Poland, was taken out of Halychyna in the 14th century.

Halychyna fine art of the 14th century is represented by the famous icon of St. George the Serpent-Slayer on a black horse from the village of Stanyli near Drohobych.[27]

A number of Ukrainian icons floowed the artistic traditions of the Halychyna-Volhynia region during the later period.[28]

Adoption of Christianity in the Kyivan state became an important condition for strengthening the political, moral, spiritual, and religious foundations of princely power. The development of Christian traditions during the reigns of Volodymyr and Yaroslav the Wise contributed to the spiritual and organizational

26 Krypiakevych I. Halytsko-Volynske kniazivstvo. Kyiv: Nauk. dumka, 1984. P. 132. Isaievych Ya. Halytsko-Volynska derzhava // Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 108.

27 Now the icon is stored in the Lviv State Museum of Ukrainian Art.

28 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 108.

rise of the state, strengthening state, political, and national unity. The church became an important factor in the development of Ukrainian culture, including the organization of schools, development of writing, church construction, and the formation of new cultural centers.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN OF THE CHURCH IN THE KYIVAN STATE. KYIV METROPOLIS

In the second half of the 11th century, the Christian world underwent changes caused by the division of the church into Orthodox and Catholic churches (1054). Rus' priests remained subordinate to the Church of Constantinople.

The reign of Yaroslav the Wise in 1019–1054 led not only to the economic rise and political growth of the state but also to cultural growth. The church-religious aspect resulted in the construction of churches. Historians say that there were about 400 churches in Kyiv at that time, and the city was known as "Kyiv the Golden-Domed." Among the churches were the Tithe Church, the monasteries of St. George and St. Irene, St. Basil's Church, etc. Sophia Cathedral (1037) became the jewel of the capital city (1037 p.).[1] Foreign travelers and merchants were amazed by the Christian shrines of Kyiv.

In addition to the construction of churches, the emergence of a network of dioceses was crucial for Rus'. During the 10th and 11th centuries, the Patriarch of Constantinople appointed metropolitan bishops, mostly Greeks, to the diocesan thrones. Subsequently, 20 Orthodox dioceses began to operate in the state. As for Kyiv, its metropolis was autonomous. Historians believe that the Kyivan metropolitan actually enjoyed patriarchal rights.[2]

1 Ostafiichuk V. Istoriia Ukrainy: suchasne bachennia : navch. posib. 4-te vyd., vypr. Kyiv : Znannia-Pres, 2008. P. 54.

2 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo... P. 201.

In addition to church parishes, monasteries also played the important role, and there were about fifty of them in the 13th century. Monasteries became centers of education and literacy, and from the time of Volodymyr's reign Kyiv, Novhorod, and other cities had centers for training clergy. Monasteries had schools where liturgical books were copied and the first chronicles were written. At the same time, researchers argue that a special form of Christianity, called "Kyivan Christianity," was formed in the Kyivan state. Its content was determined by the fact that, while adopting the Byzantine religious tradition, "Kyivan Christianity" did not accept its theocracy (a form of government in which all power in the state belonged to the clergy) and at the same time opposed caesoropapism (a form of religious organization in which the head of the church is actually the ruler of the state, who even owned the fooundation for appointing hierarchs).[3] In theory, "Kyivan Christianity" distinguished between the functions of the church and the state, the responsibility of each person before God, and was concerned about its own state.

The schism of the Church in 1054 was the beginning of a new understanding of the vertical, hierarchical structure of the Church — universal ecclesiology. Church history researcher Oksana Khomchuk argues that the Eucharistic Orthodox and universal Catholic ecclesiologies are incompatible. In addition to an additional number of dogmatic issues that divide Orthodoxy and Catholicism, different interpretations of the nature of the Church make interchurch dialogue unpromising. In fact, the split between the Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic Churches cannot be overcome until either the Orthodox world accepts the Catholic understanding of the Pope: "The Pope is less than God, but more than a man," or until the Catholic world changes the dogma of the Pope as the Head of the entire Church of Christ in favor of the Orthodox understanding of the equality of the entire episcopate of the Church. That is, either the prerogative of the Pope to lead the entire Church will be recognized, or the opposite idea — the conciliar structure of the Church — will be affirmed."[4] And then the researcher notes: "All the concessions made by both sides in the 2nd half of the 20th century, the revocation of the mutual anathema of 1054 between the

3 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo... P. 201.

4 Khomchuk O. Tserkva poza tserkovnoiu ohorozheiu. Rozkoly i ruinatsiia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy v poshukakh «konstantynopilskoho vyznannia». Chikaho ; Illinois, 2002. PP. 21–22.

Patriarch of Constantinople and the Pope, the principled agreement of Catholic theologians to sing the Creed without the addition of "Filioque," the statements of the Roman Councils on "special respect for the Eastern Churches," etc. — can only create a friendly coexistence of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches in the world, but cannot restore the unity of the Church."[5]

The well-known church and political figure and theologian of the 11th century Hilarion was a priest of the princely church near Kyiv, and in 1051, without the consent of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Yaroslav the Wise and the church council made him Metropolitan of Kyiv. It was he who drew up the Statute on Church Courts and participated in chronicling, translation, and book publishing. Hilarion became the author of the religious and theological treatise "The Word on Law and Grace," one of the world's best examples of religious and philosophical thought. The basis of the treatise is the apology of the Rus land and the immanent involvement of its people in world history. Hilarion's work examines the emergence of Christianity, the individual baptism of each person, and the acceptance of the Christian faith by individual nations as cardinal, crucial, and revolutionary moments in the linear process of world history on the way to its unfolding from the creation of the world by God the Father through the birth and death of Jesus Christ to the Last Judgment, the end of history, posthistorical and radically different from the earthly, complete, heavenly life of God's elect.[6]

Changes in the Church Life of Kyivan Rus' following the death of Yaroslav the Wise, his eldest son Iziaslav was enthroned in Kyiv. Sviatoslav and Vsevolod Yaroslavovych took the princely thrones in Chernihiv and Pereyaslav. The Yaroslavovych "triumvirate" became a conventional form of government, when state power belonged to a group of princes-relatives. At the same time, the Chernihiv and Pereyaslav regions were politically separated, which led to the establishment of separate metropolitanates in these cities. However, the Yaroslavovych triumvirate soon collapsed, and in 1078, after Iziaslav's death, Vsevolod Yaroslavovych took over the princely throne, and church administration was again concentrated in the hands of the Kyiv Metropolitan.[7]

5 Khomchuk O. Tserkva poza tserkovnoiu ohorozheiu... P. 22.

6 Bodnar S. Ilarion. Filosofska dumka v Ukraini : bibliohrafichnyi slovnyk. Kyiv, 2002. PP. 86–87. URL : http://litopys.org.ua/fdm/fdm.htm

7 Motsia O., Rychka V. Kyivska Rus: vid yazychnytstva do khrystyianstva: navch. posib. Kyiv : Hlobus, 1996. P. 99.

In the struggle to preserve the dynastic order of succession to the princely throne, the unity of Rus', and the strengthening of its own church, the 1072 canonization of Princes Borys and Hlib, uncles of the three sons of Yaroslav the Wise who ruled at the time, was of great importance. The cult of Borys and Hlib was meant to symbolize the unity of the Yaroslavovychs and at the same time emphasize the priority of their elder brother, Iziaslav.[8]

In the context of the growth of new political centers in the 12th and 13th centuries, bishop's sees, which were the ideological support of the local land nobility, were established in the capitals of the ancient Rus' principalities. In an effort to raise the prestige of their principality to the level of Kyiv, local rulers often competed with its masterpieces of religious architecture, trying to implement its best examples in local construction.[9]

The next stage, when the Kyivan Metropolis was headed by a person of Rus origin, is associated with the name of Klyment Smoliatych.

Klyment Smoliatych (date of birth unknown-died after 1164) was the Metropolitan of Kyiv (1147–1155), a church writer. After receiving thorough theological education in Byzantium in his youth, Klyment Smoliatych returned to Rus' and retired to the Zarubskyi Prechystenskyi Monastery, located on the right bank of the Dnipro River, opposite the mouth of the Trubizh River. Here he lived in deep asceticism for a long time. On July 21, 1147, he was elected metropolitan at a church council in Kyiv, convened on the initiative of Prince [kniaz`] Iziaslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv. (He was elected by six votes, with three votes against. Such actions of the prince [kniaz`] and some hierarchs of the Kyivan Rus Orthodox Church were caused, according to Professor M. F. Kotlyar, by the political bias of Klyment's predecessor, the Greek Michael II, who was the leader of Byzantine policy in Rus'.[10]

Klyment Smoliatych was the second metropolitan of Kyiv of Rus origin after Hilarion. However, this precedent did not find support either from the Old Rus' clergy or the Patriarch of Constantinople. After his election as metropolitan, Klyment immediately sided with Prince [kniaz`] Iziaslav, who was fighting

8 Motsia O. P., Rychka V. M. Kyivska Rus... P. 99.

9 Motsia O. P., Rychka V. M. Kyivska Rus... P. 100.

10 Kotliar M. Kyivskyi tserkovnyi sobor ruskykh yepyskopiv 1147 // Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy : u 10 t. / redkol. V. Smolii (hol.) ta in.; Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy. Kyiv : Naukova dumka, 2007. T. 4. 528 pages.

for all-Rus' power with his uncle Yuri Dolhoruky. At the initiative of Dolhoruky and with the support of Archbishop Niphon of Novhorod, in Rus, the opposition formed against Klyment.

After the death of his patron, Prince [kniaz`] Iziaslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv (1154), Klyment Smoliatych was officially removed from the metropolitan see (1156) and transferred to Volodymyr (now Volodymyr-Volynskyi). In manuscripts, the hierarch is characterized as a "scholar and philosopher" and "Rus' has never had." Klyment Smoliatych was the author of many literary and ecclesiastical works. "The Epistle written by Klyment, Metropolitan of Rus', to Thomas, the presbyter, interpreted by Athanasius the Monk" has survived to this day.[11]

Then the Greek Theodore, appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, established himself in Kyiv. In the early 1160s, the new Kyivan prince [kniaz`] Rostyslav Mstyslavych unsuccessfully sought from the Patriarch of Constantinople the approval of Klyment to the metropolitan throne.[12]

The Christianization of Rus' had a multifaceted impact on all aspects of the country's economic, social, political, and cultural life. Owing to Volodymyr's epochal choice, Rus' became connected with the advances of Christian West. This process of orientation toward Christian Europe continued in the 11th century. It was this connection with Europe that led to the dangerous historical, social, and cultural development of Kyivan Rus'. The new ideology helped to strengthen statehood, legislation (the collection of laws "Rus' Pravda"), and the administrative system. Thanks to Christianization, the population of Kyivan Rus became part of world culture, literature and art, education, and scientific knowledge. The Kyivan state was equal in potential to many countries in Europe and the Middle East. Even the mighty Byzantine Empire had to reckon with Rus'.[13]

During the reign of Yaroslav the Wise and his successors, the Kyiv Metropolis continued to be organized. In particular, "The Tale of Bygone Years," dated 1051, contains a lengthy account of the founding of the Kyiv Pechersk Monastery.

11 Klyment Smoliatych // Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy : u 10 t. / redkol. V. Smolii (hol.) ta in.; Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy. Kyiv : Naukova dumka, 2007. T. 4. P. 349.

12 Klyment Smoliatych // Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy : u 10 t. / redkol. V. Smolii (hol.) ta in.; Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy. Kyiv : Naukova dumka, 2007. T. 4. P. 349.

13 Ostafiichuk V. Istoriia Ukrainy: suchasne bachennia : navch. posib. 4-te vyd., vypr. Kyiv : Znannia-Pres, 2008. P. 53.

This is the beginning of the history of Ukrainian monasticism, which is associated with the name of St. Anthony the Great and Metropolitan Hilarion. The political realities of the late 12th and early 13th centuries complicated the activities of the Kyiv Metropolitanate.

3. THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AT THE END AND DURING THE 1439 COUNCIL OF FLORENCE

In the context of feudal fragmentation that occurred in Kyivan Rus' at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries, the role of Kyiv gradually began to diminish, and new political centers emerged. The weakening of Kyiv also occurred in connection with the Mongol-Tatar invasion of the mid-13th century. In particular, Professor A. I. Pashuk argues that two religious fronts first opened up for the Kyivan Metropolis — it dealt with the two centers of world Christianity — Constantinople and Rome, with which it had certain relations. At the next stage, it faced the following new factors—Polish and Catholic expansion on the part of the Polish-Lithuanian state and the Muscovite-Byzantine onslaught on the part of Muscovy.[1] Muscovy's pressure was carried out with the support of Byzantium

This stage was particularly difficult in the history of the Kyiv Metropolis. Under these conditions, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was forced to show strong resistance, experiencing hard times, a decline in culture and spirituality.

In the second half of the 13th century, the territory of the Kyivan Metropolis was divided between Lithuania, Poland, Novhorod, Moscow, and others. The Kyivan metropolitan had to deal not only with multi-tribal authorities but also with authorities of different faiths.[2] This difference and the political struggle between these states greatly complicate its position. Researchers V. Bidnov and

1 Pashuk A. Ukrainska tserkva i nezalezhnist Ukrainy : monohrafiia. Lviv : Vydavnychyi tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2003. P. 49.

2 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha / uporiad. S. V. Ulianovska ; vstup. st. I. Dziuby ; pered. slovo M. Antonovycha ; dodatky S. Ulianovskoi, V. Ulianovskoho. Kyiv : Lybid, 1993. P. 201.

D. Antonovych note that the proximity of Tatar nomads and the danger of living in areas close to the steppes forced Kyivan metropolitans to seek a quiet place of residence. Cyril (1245–1281), Maksym (1283–1305), and St. Peter (1308–1326) changed their seats, staying for a longer period in Volodymyr-on-Kliazma, and Peter in Moscow. The princes [kniazi] of Moscow are most favored by the metropolitans, who, since Peter's time, have vigorously supported Moscow's policy, thus turning other political centers against them. As a result, there are attempts to divide the single metropolis. In the 14th century, the metropolitanates of Halychyna and Lithuania were established next to the Kyivan metropolis.[3]

The first attempt was made in 1303 by the Halychyna prince [kniaz`] Yurii Lvovych, who established the Halychyna Metropolis. The first metropolitan was Nifont. It was composed of Halychyna, Przemysl, and Kholm (formerly Ichnia) dioceses. They existed with lengthy intervals during the 14th century.

On the initiative of Olherd, the Lithuanian Metropolis was established, covering the dioceses of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The first metropolitans were Theodoret, ordained by the Bulgarian patriarch (1353), and Roman (1355–1361). However, these two metropolitanates could not exist for long, as the Patriarch of Constantinople supported the unity of the metropolis and was more inclined to side with Moscow. However, some metropolitans sided with Moscow themselves and thus restored the unity of the Kyivan Metropolitanate. Peter of Halychyna, Cyprian of Lithuania, did so, and Lithuanian Metropolitan Gregory Tsamblak (1415–1418) abdicated and thus helped Photius (1408–1431) to extend his power to Lithuania.[4] That is why the Kyivan Metropolitanate remained united and covered its pre-Mongol territory until the half of the 15th century, when Moscow decisively separated from Kyiv. The reason for this was the appearance in the Kyiv Metropolis of the Greek Isidore, a supporter of the union with Rome.

Kyiv metropolitans of the 15th–16th centuries did not live in Kyiv but in Novohrudok or Vilna and owned large land estates in different parts of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. With the consent of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the metropolitan chose the council of bishops, and the patriarch was asked only for a blessing, that is, they were not sent to Constantinople. The metropolitan ordained the locally selected candidates for bishops, monitored their activities, and,

3 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 202.

4 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 202.

if necessary, convened councils. The metropolitans and bishops of Rus' came from the nobility, which was determined not only by customs but also by state laws. In addition, their choice was influenced by the great princes [kniazi] of Lithuania, who, after 1385, were simultaneously Polish kings. V. Bidnov and D. Antonovych note that secular authorities abused the elections of metropolitans and bishops, especially in the first half of the 16th century, due to the so-called right of patronage.[5]

A special place in the assessments of historians is occupied by the problem of church and inter-confessional relations during the Lithuanian state. The majority of researchers believe that social struggle regarding religious convictions was unknown to Ukrainian lands during the reign of the Lithuanian state, first of all, because of the tolerance expressed by the rulers of Lithuania towards different confessions. It was determined by the historical circumstances. The founder of the state, Prince [kniaz`] Mindovg who did not have enough force to fight the Teutonic Order, which led an offensive against Lithuania under the slogan of fighting paganism, was forced to be baptized according to the Latin rite and found an episcopate in 1251. However, in 1260, Mindovg broke the agreement with the Order and the Pope and renounced Christianity guided by his own political views. His successor Gedimin was also guided by pragmatic considerations, trying to establish trade relations with the Hanseatic cities. In his messages to the West, he agreed to be baptized and build churches. Later, when the circumstances changed, he resolutely rejected the proposal of the pontifical delegates to convert to Catholicism.[6]

Changes in the religious life of Lithuania took place in the 14th century and were connected with Rus' influences: Orthodoxy was adopted by the Gedimin's sons — Lubart, Koriat, Narimunt, Yavnut, Olgerd, and almost all his children. Family ties of Lithuanian princes [kniaz`] with the Orthodox dynasties of North-Eastern Rus' were also widespread. Prince [kniaz`] Jagiełło's marriage with the daughter of Dmytro Donsky also had to correspond to the above tradition. According to the previous agreement, the Lithuanian prince [kniaz`] was supposed to become Orthodox.

5 Bidnov V., Antonovych D. Ukrainska tserkva // Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... PP. 202–203.

6 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 137.

However, history developed in a different way. Having married Queen Jadwiga, Jagiełło's linked his country to Catholic Poland.

The religious situation in Lithuania was resolved according to the documents of the Union: according to the Union of Krevo, pagan Lithuanians were baptized in the Lithuanian traditions, and Catholic boyars were granted equal rights with Polish nobility. Under the Union of Horodlo in 1413, Catholic Lithuanians received the exclusive right to hold the posts of voivodeship castellans and participate in the work of the state council.[7]

As the internal political situation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania got complicated, these rights were extended to Rus' princes [kniazi] and boyars with the privileges of 1432 and 1434 in order to stabilize the situation in the country and avoid a split between the people of the Lithuanian state. However, almost a century later — in 1529 — the validity of the Horodlo Privilege was confirmed, which was preceded by the Lithuanian nobility protest against the appointment of the Orthodox prince [kniaz`] Konstantin Ostrozky as Trotsky voivode (1522).[8]

A characteristic feature of the ruling circles of Lithuania in relation to the Orthodox Church was their efforts to get rid of dependence on Moscow. In the 20s of the 14th century, the Metropolitan moved to Moscow. With the political separation of the Eastern Slavic lands, the existence of a single metropolis, the relic of the ancient Rus', failed to meet the realities of the time. Lithuanian rulers wanted to have an independent church organization within their country. At the same time, lots of efforts were taken to restore the unity of the Catholic and Orthodox churches.[9]

In the 14th century, the Lithuanian state sought to unite "all Rus`" under its rule, but encountered great resistance from the Moscow principality, which also started "gathering" Rus lands. In 1368, an open conflict broke out between the two states, when Prince [kniaz`] Olgerd supported the Tver prince [kniaz`] in his confrontation with Moscow. The Lithuanian army approached Moscow, surrounding Prince [kniaz`] Dmitry Ivanovich in the Kremlin. It was not possible to capture the Kremlin and Olgerd was forced to retreat. This

7 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 137.

8 Popovych M. Narys istorii kultury Ukrainy. Kyiv: ArtEk, 1999. PP. 170–179.

9 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 138.

Lithuanian-Moscow war of 1368–1372 was the beginning of long years of confrontation between the Moscow principality and the Lithuanian state.[10]

After the death of Prince [kniaz`] Olgerd in 1377, there were changes in the arrangement of forces in East Europe. In the last period of his reign, Olgerd transferred Vilno, Vitebsk, Minsk, and Novhorodok to his eldest son Jagiełło. Accordingly, Jagiełło (1377–1392 — Grand Duke of Lithuania; 1386–1434 — King of Poland) received supremacy over the Gedyminovichs and Olherdovichs. However, this led to a personal confrontation between the Olherdovichs. In particular, a Polish prince [kniaz`] Andriy Olherdovich opposed Jagiełło, siding with Moscow in 1377. In 1379, he took part in the campaign of the Polish prince [kniaz`] from Brensk to the south. Dmytro Olgerdovych, who owned Chernihiv-Sivershchyna, also sided with Moscow. Lubert Volynskyi, the Koriatovich princes [kniazi] in Podilla and Dmytro Korybut in Novhorod-Siverskyi were against the supremacy of Jagiełło. Moscow wanted to use the confrontation between the Lithuanian princes [kniazi] by swaying the South Ruthenian princes [kniazi] to its side and preparing for battles with the Mamai Horde.[11]

During the reign of Prince [kniaz`] Vitovt, attempts were made to establish a church union with Rome. In particular, Vitovt sought to eliminate the influence of Moscow principality on the church in the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. He considered relations with Rome as an opportunity to ensure proper religious life in his state. Researcher Yu. I. Tereshchenko notes that the prince [kniaz`] did everything in his power for Metropolitan Cyprian to arrive in Kyiv and stay in the Lithuanian Orthodox dioceses for a long time. New dioceses in Volodymyr-Volynskyi and Kholm were also subordinated to him. At the same time, Cyprian attempted a rapprochement of Rus' and Rome. He conducted negotiations with Jagiełło on that matter and was trying to find out the mood of the Ukrainian clergy regarding the possible unification of churches.[12]

In 1414, the synod of Ukrainian and Belarusian hierarchs appointed Gregory Tsamblak the head of Kyiv Metropolis. The above situation confirmed that Vitovt succeeded in achieving the independence of the Orthodox Church from Moscow and proved the desire of Ukrainians to achieve ecclesiopolitical and

10 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... PP. 286–287.

11 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... PP. 288–289.

12 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... P. 296.

administrative-ecclesiastical independence, connected with the rise of the Lithuanian-Rus' state.[13]

Researcher Yu. I. Tereshchenko notes that the important area of Vitovt's activity at that time was the preparation of the union, in which the prince [kniaz`] saw an important means of countering both Polish Latinization and the absorption of the Ukrainian church by Moscow.[14] Supporting the idea of uniting the churches of the Roman and Eastern rites, Vitovt advocated not for the absorption of the latter but for the union based on the preservation of rites and identity of the Ukrainian church.[15]

The Ukrainian process is connected with the Council of Constance in 1418, where Tsamblak greeted the Pope and expressed hope for the union of the Eastern and Western churches. Historians note that the Metropolitan of Kyiv headed a large Lithuanian-Rus' delegation, which also included secular princes [kniazi] and magnates. It is believed that only the Halychyna delegation consisted of several hundred people. The delegation was met by the German Emperor Sigismund. However, the new Pope Martin V did not accept Tsamblak's proposal regarding the organising of the union. It was about convening a joint council of both churches with the participation of prominent theologians and experts of canon law. Researcher Yu. I. Tereshchenko expresses the opinion that the existence of various branches in the Catholic Church at that time, which were unacceptable for the Roman throne, made the union issue next to impossible.

It was the Council of Constance where different views on the primacy of the Pope in the Catholic church were revealed. The negotiations that began between the Byzantine emperor and the Roman Pope temporarily dulled the great Lithuanian princes [kniazi] vigilance. Therefore, after the death of Tsamblak, Vitovt agreed to recognize the pro-Moscow Photius as the only metropolitan of Kyiv. Thus, the case of a separate Ukrainian metropolis and the issue of the union were postponed.[16]

13 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navchalnyi posibnyk / A. M. Kolodnyi, P. L. Yarotskyi, B. O. Lobovyk ta in. ; za red. A. M. Kolodnoho i P. L. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Zannnia, 1999. PP. 121–124.

14 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... P. 296.

15 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... P. 296.

16 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... P. 297.

A new stage of unification in the Christian world was associated with the Council of Florence in 1439, and its consequences became important for the churches and religions of the Slavic peoples.

In the middle of the 11th century, a complete divide occurred between the Eastern and Western churches. The former peaceful relations between them turned into hostile ones. Despite this, the Greeks and Latins often attempted to unite the churches. There were special reasons that prompted them to seek church union. The popes, in the conditions of divided churches, did not lose hope of subordinating the Greek-Eastern Church to their authority. To this end, they strove with all their might to restore communication between the churches, understanding by the restoration of communication not the union of the churches but the subordination of the Eastern Church to the Western one. The Greeks, in accordance with political calculations, on their part also sometimes thought about uniting the churches. Since the popes could not be swayed in their favor by anything other than an expression of readiness to unite the churches, with the subordination of the Eastern Church to the Western, the Byzantine governments in all negotiations with Rome put the issue of the unification of the churches to the forefront. Thus, on both sides, calculation played the main role in mutual attempts, and this alone did not promise them success. The fragility of attempts to unite the churches was also due to the fact that they did not have a general character, at least in the East. On the Greek side, the emperors mainly sought to unite the churches, while the majority of the Greek church hierarchy and the people were always against the union, since they considered it to be the subordination of the Eastern Church to the Pope. Of the many attempts to unite the churches, generally unsuccessful, two are particularly remarkable, brought to the end by all sorts of tricks and violence and accompanied by sad consequences for the Greek-Eastern Church. These are the so-called Council of Lyon (1274) and Florence (1439).

The Union of Florence in 1439 split society into two camps, which fought each other with more ferocity than the Orthodox fought the Catholics. The union of the Greek-Eastern Church with Rome is underestimated, while the liturgy in the Slavic language, which Rome would not allow the Slavs to have, was infinitely valuable to all the Slavs; they owe their ancient literature to it. If this union had been introduced consciously and benevolently, success would have been inevitable. But what the Roman clergy did, under the spiritual guidance

of the Jesuits and the patronage of the Polish king, was almost a mockery of Christian love.[17]



Ferrara-Florence Council (1438–1445). The Union of Florence in 1439 was an agreement on the union of the Churches, which resulted from the Council of Ferrara and then Florence (both cities in Italy; 1438–1440) with the participation of representatives of the Eastern patriarchs, the Pope, and Christian statesmen.

17 Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439 // Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy : 10 t. / redkol.: V. Smolii (hol.) ta in.; Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy. Kyiv : Naukova dumka, 2013. T. 10. P. 307.

The agreement on the union of the churches was the result of a Council in Ferrara and later in Florence (both cities in Italy) with the participation of the Eastern patriarchs, the Pope, and the statesmen of Christian countries. An ardent opponent of the union was Marco-Eugenicus of Ephesus (1392–1445), who suggested a union on the condition that the dogma of felioque (the statement about the descent of the Holy Spirit not only from the Father but also from the Son) be removed from the Creed. The Byzantines hoped to achieve unification on the basis of agreement only on the felioque, but the Roman side demanded recognition of the existence of purgatory, the use of unleavened bread for the Eucharist, and the complete supremacy of the Roman see over other apostolic capitals and Constantinople.

As for the political factor, the council took place when most of Byzantium was captured by the Ottoman Empire. The Byzantines were waiting for help from the West to hold on to the remains of the empire.[18]

At the beginning of the 15th century, Byzantium was finally limited by the Ottoman Turks. The Byzantine government sought help from the West, and it was mainly Emperor John VI Palaeologus (1425–1448) who decided to save the empire in an extreme way — under the pretext of uniting the churches and subordinating the Greek-Eastern Church to Rome, for which it was to receive help from Western leaders. To this end, he began negotiations with Pope Eugene IV. The pope agreed to the emperor's proposal. They decided to convene an ecumenical council of representatives of the Greek and Latin churches and decide on the unification.

John the Paleologist began to persuade the Greek fathers to come to an agreement with the supporters of Latin rite. Under the influence of persuasion and threats, they agreed to the Latin reading of the symbol, as well as to the recognition of the supremacy of the Pope. There were no serious disputes over ritual differences: the Latins agreed to allow the rites of both the Latin and Greek churches to be equally valid. An act of unification of the churches was drawn up. It was solemnly read in the cathedral church in Latin and Greek. As a sign of unification and unity, the Greeks and Latins hugged and kissed.[19] The Greeks went home. Upon return, Paleologus saw how fragile the union of the churches looked, accomplished through various tricks and violence. The same Greek

18 Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439... PP. 306–307.

19 Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439... P. 307.

bishops who had agreed to the union in Florence refused to accept it upon arrival in Constantinople, explaining that they had been forced to agree to unite with the Latin rite supporters.

The Council of Ferrara-Florence took place in the context of the spread of clericalism in the Western Church — an attempt to strengthen the power of the Pope. This movement took off in the 14th and 16th centuries and developed in parallel with the formation of secular parliamentarism. In accordance with the Union of Florence, the Roman Catholic Church envisioned the extension of the Pope's power beyond the Latin world. As for the Eastern churches, they insisted on the pentarchy model, which was aimed at establishing the equality of churches in a single Christian oecumene.[20]

The theology of the Eastern and Western Churches was differentiated through the period of iconoclasm in the Byzantine world and the parallel formation of theology in Western Europe during the early Middle Ages. When the Greeks abandoned iconoclasm and returned to orthodoxy, they began to insist on the inviolability of the decisions of the 7 Ecumenical (i.e., joint) councils.

The Council of Nicaea (now Iznik, Turkey) was held during the reigns of Empress Irene and Emperor Constantine VI.[21] The Ecumenical Council was held in 325 to resolve a dispute between Bishop Alexander and Arius. Pope Sylvester was represented at the council by two legates, and in total, the council gathered 3/8 of the bishops and many presbyters and deacons. It was the first ecumenical council in the history of Christianity. The council was offered the baptismal symbol of the Church of Caesarea, to which, at the suggestion of Emperor Constantine, the characteristic of the Son "consubstential with the Father" was added, which affirmed that the Son is the same God in essence as the Father: "God from God."[22]

As for the Union of Florence, it provided for the conclusion of a union decree. In particular, Metropolitan Isidore of Kyiv agreed to accept the formula of the Holy Spirit's descent "through" the Son, which was interpreted as "from the

20 Panasiuk I. „Florentiiskyi sobor ta yoho vplyv na tserkovno-relihiini vidnosyny kyivskoi zemli (persha pol. xv st.)." Aktualni pytannia humanitarnykh nauk (2025): 43–48; Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439... P. 307.

21 Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439... P. 307.

22 Pershyi Nikeiskyi sobor, Vikipediia — Vilna entsyklopediia, data zvernennia 15 travnia 2025, https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Перший_Нікейський_собор

Son," but this was rejected by Marko-Eugenicus of Ephesus. On July 6, 1439, the council agreed on a doctrinal definition, which was signed by Pope Eugene IV and Byzantine Emperor John VIII Paleologus. Regarding the formula for the descent of the Holy Spirit, both versions ("from the Father and the Son" and "from the Father") were supported, since both formulas had the same meaning, which came from the Holy Scriptures and the writings of the Church Fathers. The researcher V. Ye. Zema notes that it was agreed that those who die in mortal sins should go to hell, although their punishments are not identical. The supremacy of the Bishop of Rome is recognized as the successor of St. Peter and the Vicar of Christ, the head of the Church and teacher of all Christians.[23] However, upon returning to Constantinople, most Greeks decided to refuse to support the decisions of the Council.

At the same time, Kyiv Metropolis had a different attitude to the decisions of the Union of Florence. In particular, its head, Isidore, had the most supporters in Ukraine. In 1441, he arrived in Kyiv, where he was greeted with honors by Kyivan Prince [kniaz`] Olelko, an active supporter of the union.

However, Isidore and the ideas of the union were not well received in Moscow, so when he arrived there, the Moscow prince [kniaz`] declared Isidore a heretic and imprisoned him in the Chudnov Monastery. Isidore managed to escape from prison to Lithuania, and later he moved to Rome. For some time, the Moscow Church did not dare to violate the rights of Constantinople Patriarch Gregory III Mammis in relation to the Rus' Church. However, to prevent the return of Isidore and his power, on December 15, 1448, a council of Russian bishops elected Bishop Jonah of Ryazan as "Metropolitan for entire Rus'."[24]

As for Isidore, he sought to restore his power over the Rus' church during his visits to Constantinople. A milestone in that process was his meeting in Budapest with the Polish king Władysław III in 1443. The king issued a privilege to the Ukrainian church, which equalized the rights of the Ukrainian-Belarusian clergy with the Latin clergy. This document was repeatedly confirmed by Polish kings in 1501, 1543, and 1621; it was the legal basis for the existence of the Ukrainian Church in Poland.[25]

23 Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439... P. 307.

24 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... P. 314.

25 Popovych M. Narys istorii kultury Ukrainy. Kyiv: ArtEk, 1999. PP. 174–175; Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... PP. 314–315.

Yu. I. Tereshchenko believes that Isidore actually continued to manage church affairs in the Moscow-Polish Orthodox dioceses. He gives the following example: Bishop Danylo of Volodymyr and Brest went to Constantinople, received instructions from Isidore, and was received by the clergy of the episcopate without opposition. The researcher also notes that, in general, Ukrainian-Belarusian clergy, as well as the magnate-princely circles, remained loyal to Isidore. The Olelkovychs showed special affection to him. In particular, Olelko Volodymyrovych, who met Isidore in a friendly way, was inclined to receive him in Kyiv again and join the union.[26]

However, Isidore's arrival in Kyiv and further consolidation of the union were impeded by political changes in Rome and Constantinople. After the death of the initiators of the Union of Florenc — Pope Eugene IV (1447) and the Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palailogus (1448), their successors proved unable to continue the work of the churches unification. Byzantium did not receive the promised help against the Turks, and a protest movement against the union broke out in Constantinople. Gregory Mammis was deprived of the patriarchal rank and moved to Rome.

After the rejection of the Union of Florence in Constantinople in 1451 and the expulsion of the Uniate Patriarch Mammis, the election of Jonach as Metropolitan was confirmed by the patriarchal capital. For some time Jonach managed to be the Metropolitan of "all Rus'," except for the Halychyna dioceses. In that situation, the Latin-Polish clergy spoke out against the union, as they saw in its implementation the possibility of the rise and development of the Ukrainian church, which was undesirable for them. They were satisfied either with its complete latinization or with the preservation of its subordination to Moscow. Under the pressure of Polish church hierarchs, Casimir confirmed Jonach's right to the metropolitan throne of Kyiv and all Rus' by a deed dated 1451. That decision had been a cause of major discontent among the Ukrainian bishops and the prince [kniaz`] of Kyiv. However, the Prince [kniaz`] of Kyiv and the magnates were forced to sign the privilege of Jonach to manage the Lithuanian dioceses. Isidore's attempts to appeal to Pope Nicholas V did not yield practical results. Although the Roman high priest confirmed the illegality of depriving Isidore of power over the Ukrainian and Belarusian dioceses, supporters of the latinization

26 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... P. 315.

of the Ukrainian-Belarusian church supported Jonach, which led to Jonach's establishment in Kyiv Metropolitanate.[27]

With the accession Callixtus III of (1455–1458) to the papal throne, some changes took place. He supported the ideas included in the resolutions of the Union of Florence. The Pope consulted on the proclamation of a separate Kyiv Metropolis. The restoration of the Metropolitanate in Kyiv was supported by the Olelkovychs, in particular, Prince [kniaz`] Semen became an active supporter of the independence of the Ukrainian Church. In 1458, Hryhoriy (Isidore's disciple, his former archdeacon) was appointed as the Metropolitan of Kyiv by a Polish bulla. The Metropolitan of Kyiv was actually and nominally a Uniate hierarch who was ordained by a former patriarch Gregory Mammis and confirmed by Pope Pius II. In 1458, the final division of the Moscow and Ukrainian Orthodox churches took place. The latter actually existed as an autocephalous until 1686.[28]

The Kyiv archdiocese, as well as the dioceses of Bryansk, Smolensk, Polotsk, Turiv, Lutsk, Volodymyr, Przemysl, and Halych were subject to the jurisdiction of the Kyiv Metropolitanate.

Researcher O.V. Rusyna notes that contacts with the Tatars, which lasted for centuries, regardless of their character, could not help affecting the mentality, daily life, and customs of the population of Ukrainian lands. Despite these and other foreign influences, the awareness of its national identity — "Ruthenian" — was preserved, which was perceived not only as ethnic but also as a confessional category. The researcher gives the following example: baptism according to the Orthodox rite was regarded as transformation into a "Ruthenian," and she illustrates this on the basis of a legendary story of the 16th century about the Lithuanian prince [kniaz`] Gynvil, who married the daughter of the Tver prince [kniaz`] Borys. As a result, he was "baptized in the Rus' (Orthodox) rite, and they gave him the name Borys, as his father-in-law, the prince [kniaz`] of Tver had. And that Gynvil, named Borys, built a town on the Berezyna River and named it Borysov. As a Ruthenian, he was very pious."[29] A similar metamorphosis is

27 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... PP. 315–316.

28 Tereshchenko Yu. Ukraina i yevropeiskyi svit... P. 316.

29 Rusyna O. Ukrainski zemli u skladi Lytvy ta Polshchi // Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia : u 2 t. / O. Hurzhii, Ya. Isaievych, M. Kotliar ta in. ; pid red. V. Smoliia. Kyiv : Ukraina, 1995. T. 1. P. 131.

recorded in Athanasius Kalnofoyskyi's "Theraturgym" (1638): after converting to Orthodoxy, Calvinist Martin, a native of Pomorie, became an "obedient Ruthenian of the Eastern Church."[30]

V. Ye. Zema cites the following example: returning via Venice, Eastern clerics celebrated a liturgy in St. Mark's Cathedral but did not mention the name of Pope Eugene IV or the appendix to the Creed, which meant the defeat of the very idea of the union. The official cancellation of the agreement took place in 1484 in Istanbul.[31]

Religious discussions and rulings related to the Union of Florence had a significant impact on interconfessional polemics in the late 16th and 17th centuries.

30 Rusyna O. Ukrainski zemli u skladi Lytvy ta Polshchi... P. 131.

31 Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439... P. 307.

4. UKRAINIAN CHURCH IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 15TH–16TH CENTURIES. UNION OF LUBLIN

The Greek clergy and people got irritated when they learned about the union and considered the Uniates to be heretics. In 1443, a council was held in Jerusalem, at which all supporters of the union were excommunicated. The emperor himself, not having received the expected help from the West, cooled down on the union cause. Under his successor, shortly before the fall of Constantinople, the Eastern patriarchs once again condemned the union at a council in Constantinople (1450). When Constantinople was taken by the Turks in 1453, it was no longer time to think about the Union of Florence. At first, it seems that this union did not have any significant consequences, but this is not entirely true. There were consequences, and they were very significant, but they did not appear immediately. The union had particularly severe consequences in those territories where the Catholic and Orthodox population lived side by side.[1] For example, in Poland, the struggle between the Uniates and the Orthodox lasted for four centuries, and it was more fierce than the struggle between Catholics and Orthodox. The authorities were on the side of the Catholics, which even more aggravated the situation of the Orthodox, who were constantly oppressed: they were prevented from performing their worship, their priests were openly mocked and insulted, and their churches were rented out to Jews who then demanded money for their opening. Many cities expelled Orthodox Christians

1 Hordiienko D., Klos V., Mytsyk Yu., Prelovska I. Istoriia ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy. Kharkiv : Folio, 2019. PP. 41–43.

from their governments and even excluded them from the burger class; churches and church property were taken away from them; in short, the oppression became unbearable. Anti-Orthodox sentiment was spreading throughout the East. Now there was no room in Poland for non-Christians. The Orthodox tried to organize themselves, tried to do something, but the gap between the two camps was getting deeper.



Lithuanian Prince [kniaz`] Jagiello — Grand Duke of Lithuania and Rus' (1377–1381, 1382–1386) and King of Poland (1386–1434) — and Polish Queen Jadwiga (1384–1399)

From the time that the Lithuanian prince [kniaz`] Jagiello married the Polish queen Jadwiga and came to the Polish throne, Catholicism began to be introduced in Lithuania. Pagans were converted directly. As for the Orthodox, they were only required to recognize the authority of the pope, without defining what their submission to the Roman See would consist of. When the Union of Florence was concluded in 1439, the Lithuanian government recognized it, and

the rights of the Catholic clergy were equalized with those of the Orthodox.[2] At the end of the 15th century, the number of union supporters was probably very high. In 1468, in a letter to the Pope Casimir, he admitted that there were many "schismatics" in Lithuania and that their number was growing. To support Catholicism, he summoned the Bernardines from Krakow and founded a monastery for them in Vilna. In about 1480, he forbade the construction of new Orthodox churches in Vilna and Vitebsk. As the oppression of the Orthodox intensified, the northern princes [kniaz`] fell away from Lithuania and sided with Moscow. The persecution of the Orthodox in Lithuania continued under Casimir's successor, Alexander, although he constantly assured that Orthodoxy in Lithuania enjoyed complete freedom. Under Alexander, a new attempt was made to introduce a union in Lithuania. After the successors of Isaiah, who remained Orthodox, Bishop Iosyp Bolgarinovich of Smolensk was appointed to the Kyiv Metropolis, and he immediately began to act in favor of a union with Rome. In 1501, Iosyp died. After him, there were no attempts to introduce a union in Lithuania for a long time. The metropolitans who followed him remained strict zealots of Orthodoxy. After the war with Moscow (1500–1503), one of the reasons for which was the oppression of the Orthodox in Lithuania and the northern princes [kniaz`] taking the side of Moscow, the Polish-Lithuanian king Alexander became more lenient toward the Orthodox. His successor, Sigismund I, was quite amicable toward non-Christians, Protestants, and the Orthodox. At the end of his reign, Sigismund II Augustus began to fall under the influence of Catholics. In 1564, Bishop-Cardinal Stanisław Gozier called the Jesuits to Poland, which further strengthened the position of the Orthodox.[3]

The unification of Poland and Lithuania into one state took place at the Sejm in Lublin, which lasted from January 10 to August 12, 1569. The Sejm completed the unification process that had begun in Krevo in 1385. From the end of the 14th to the middle of the 16th century, many interstate agreements were concluded, when finally in Lublin, this unification process was completed.[4]

2 Zema V. Florentiiska tserkovna uniia 1439... P. 307.

3 Fris V. Pravoslavia i katolytstvo. Protystoiannia chy vzaiemodopovnennia? / per. z nim. A. Prokopovych. Lviv : Vyd-vo UKU, 2009. 150 pages.

4 Ostafiichuk V. Istoriia Ukrainy: suchasne bachennia : navch. posib. 4-te vyd., vypr. Kyiv : Znannia-Pres, 2008. PP. 79–82.

The Polish gentry was aimed at unification, as they were attracted by the vast expanse of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) lands. Lithuanians, on the other hand, fervently defended their state independence. The situation was changed by the Livonian War with Moscow of 1558–1583, which depleted the country's material resources and significantly affected the position of the nobility, which saw a way out of the predicament in a union with Poland.[5] The Lithuanian leadership was not favourably disposed to the union, scared off by the prospect of losing its political power. This was evidenced by the behavior of the Lithuanian deputation, which, after months of negotiations with the Poles, secretly left Lublin on the night of March 1.

In these circumstances, the Polish side decided to implement a minimum programme to appropriate Volhynia and Podlasie, which were annexed to the Crown by royal charter on March 5.

At the sessions of the Sejm, the people of Volhynia had ardently supported the idea of joining the Kyiv territory to Poland, as they wanted to preserve the traditional system of relations with their neighbors. The Polish side found "evidence" that Kyiv, and then Bratslav Region had belonged to the Crown. Thus, the theory was built, according to which all Rus' were subject to Polish kings for a long time as a result of the voluntary recognition of their power.[6] Those statements echoed the all-Rus' claims of the Moscow lords who laid claims to the Ukrainian lands, first of all, to Kyiv.[7]

According to the Act of July 1, 1569, Lithuania and Poland were united, and in the following years they had to be ruled by a single elected ruler, who was crowned in Cracow as the Polish king and the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Lithuania had lost the right to its own sejms and foreign relations, and it also had lost political significance, although it still existed as a state. Separate administrative

5 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 140.

6 Bilous N. Liublinska uniia 1569 r.: istoriohrafichni pohliady ta interpretatsii (do 440-richchia Liublinskoi unii). Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal. 2010. № 1. PP. 65–83; Starchenko N. Liublinska uniia yak resurs formuvannia kontseptu politychnoho „narodu ruskoho" (1569–1648 rr.). Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal. 2019. № 2. PP. 4–45; Yakovenko N. „Skilky istorykiv–stilky unii (z nahody 440-littia Liublinskoi unii)." Ukrainskyi humanitarnyi ohliad. № 14 (2009): 9–32; Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 140.

7 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 140.

and financial systems, the army, legislation, and governments became a sign of statehood.[8]

Separate discussions between Lithuanians and Poles concerned Ukrainian lands. The "return" of Ukrainian lands to Poland became part of an additional Act of the union dated August 11, 1569, according to which the Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kyiv regions finally merged with the Crown.

The demands put forward by the Rus' nobility at the Lublin Sejm were the minimal ones: preservation of status privileges, freedom of religion, use of Rus' language in official records.[9]

"...the Polish political system with its open and flexible feature had a future. However, the deviation from this model and the rejection of religious tolerance at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century led to a deep crisis of the Polish-Lithuanian state."[10]



Lublin Castle (modern photo).
The place where the Union of Lublin was signed in 1569.

8 Ostafiichuk V. Istoriia Ukrainy: suchasne bachennia : navch. posib. 4-te vyd., vypr. Kyiv : Znannia-Pres, 2008. PP. 79–82.

9 Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... P. 141.

10 Pelenskyi Ya. — tsyt. v: Istoriia Ukrainy: nove bachennia... PP. 141–142.

After the Union of Lublin, which finally put Lithuania under Polish influence, the Jesuits were called to Vilna in 1569. Although they aimed to fight Protestantism, they soon finished it and turned their attention to the Orthodox. The state of the Orthodox Church at the time created favorable conditions for the Jesuits' activities. Bishops and nobility started thinking about accepting the union.

From the end of the 16th century, the period of counter-reformation began in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with the active support of King Sigismund Vasa (1587–1632). The rights of non-Catholics were decisively restricted. The construction of the Protestant and then the Orthodox churches was prohibited. The Orthodox Church and the Orthodox population experienced persecution.[11]

As part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, there was an ecclesiastical hierarchy for Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands of the Crown headed by the Metropolitan of Kyiv and nine bishops. Orthodox bishops were appointed by the Polish king, to whom they were also subject in the judicial aspect. Unlike the Catholic bishops, they did not have seats in the Sejm. The Orthodox Church and religion were persecuted. However, at the end of the 16th century, some Orthodox hierarchs had the idea to unite Orthodoxy with Catholicism, to create a Uniate Church subordinated to the papacy.[12]

The conclusion of the Union of Lublin led to the strengthening of the nobility, whose property status was enshrined in the Lithuanian Charter of 1588. The local Ukrainian gentry was equalized in legal documents of the last third of the 16th century with the Polish gentry. Social and political changes in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of this period also led to religious confrontation, mainly among Orthodox and Catholics.

11 Bidnov V., Antonovych D. Ukrainska tserkva // Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... PP. 197–221.

12 Tyshchyk B. Polshcha : istoriia derzhavnosti i prava (X — pochatok XXI st.). Lviv : Svit, 2012. PP. 65–66.

5. THE UKRAINIAN CHURCH AFTER THE UNION OF BREST

At the end of the 16th century, the event that split the Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples — the Union of Brest — took place. Researchers V. Bidnov and D. Antonovych believe that historians are divided into two groups in their assessment of this event: some connect the Union of Brest with the political motives of those times, the other ones — with confusion in the Orthodox Church. Both views should be considered one-sided ones. Such a complex phenomenon as the Union of Brest was caused by many reasons, both of the internal — church-related ones, and the external. Researchers indicate that it goes here about historical circumstances, social and economic conditions, the direction of state policy, the cultural and educational state of the Orthodox hierarchy — all these factors along with the specific features of that period and the attitudes of the dominant factors of the Polish-Lithuanian state after the Union of Lublin caused the union of the church.[1]

In particular, it is believed that the spread of the union idea by post-Tridentine Catholicism was caused by the missionary activities of the Jesuits in Eastern Europe. It should also be noted that Rome's attempts to convert Orthodox Muscovy to Catholicism in the 80s of the 16th century failed. This was compounded by the humiliated position of Orthodoxy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth compared to the dominant Catholic Church. One should not dismiss the fact that the church life of the Kyiv Metropolitanate experienced crisis times, such as moral decline and low educational level of the clergy. Researcher L. Tymoshenko argues that in the second half of the 16th century, the

1 Bidnov V., Antonovych D. Ukrainska tserkva // Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 206.

life of the Ukrainian-Belarusian church was characterized by openness to the confessional and cultural influence of the West, the intervention of Patriarch Jeremiah II of Constantinople in the affairs of the metropolis in 1588–1589, the church reform programs of the late 80s and early 90s of the 16th century and unsuccessful attempts to reject them, the conflict between church brotherhoods and bishops and conflicts within the hierarchy, and the favourable international political situation at the end of the century.[2]

Under the influence of the Latin hierarchy, the union was supported by Lutsk-Ostrozian bishop Kyrylo Terletskyi and Lviv bishop Gedeon Balaban.

Gedeon Balaban was inconsistent in accepting the union. The Volodymyr-Berestei bishop Hipatius Potius, however, turned out to be an ideological supporter of the union. The afore-mentioned bishops actively supported the union conclusion. It is believed that the Metropolitan of Kyiv Mykhailo Rogoza and other bishops were passive people.[3]



Kyrylo Terletskyi was a figure of the Orthodox and later the Uniate Church, one of the initiators and leaders of the Union of Brest in 1596.

In 1595, Kyrylo Terletskyi and Ipatiy Potiy went to Rome and agreed to the union on behalf of the Orthodox Church. Such an act was not unequivocally

2 Tymoshenko L. Beresteiska tserkovna uniia 1596 roku // Naukove tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka : entsyklopediia. Kyiv ; Lviv : NTSh, Instytut entsyklopedychnykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy, 2015.

3 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 206.

accepted by the Orthodox clergy. A significant number of the priests protested against this measure.



Mykhailo Rohosa was a figure of the Orthodox and later the Rus' Union Church in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the 1st Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galicia, and All Rus, who also went down in history for his participation in the Union of Brest as one of its organizers.



Gideon Balaban — in 1576–1607 (nominally from 1569) — Bishop of Lviv and Halych and Kamianets, from 1597 — Exarch of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Having secured the Lviv episcopal see in 1576, he succeeded in freeing this see from the protectorate of the Latin archbishop of Lviv.

Supporters of the union gathered in Brest in October 1596 to solemnly announce the union with Rome. Orthodox bishops Gedeon Balaban (from Lviv), Mykhailo Kopystyanskyi (from Przemyśl), many representatives of black and white clergy, brotherhoods, and others arrived here. The Orthodox Christians formed their council under the chairmanship of the Patriarchal Exarch, Archimandrite Nicephorus. Thus, two councils took place in Brest at the same time — the Uniate council (consisting only of the higher clergy) and the Orthodox council, the resolutions of which were completely opposite.



Rus (Voloska, Assumption) Church in Lviv (late 16th century). The church's architectural ensemble included the Church, the Chapel of the Three Saints, and the Korniakta Bell Tower (Chapel of the Three Saints).

King Sigismund III was on the side of the Uniates, recognized their resolution and declared the union with Rome a legitimate fact. The protests and the resolution of the Orthodox Christians were ignored.[4]

4 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 206.



Rus' Church and the Korniakt Bell Tower

The Uniate Council gathered 9 clergy Uniates: Metropolitan M. Rohoza, Bishop I. Potiy, K. Terletsky, G. Zagoruisky, Y. Gogol, and D. Zbiruisky, representing six dioceses of the metropolis (Metropolitan, Volodymyr-Berestey, Lutsk-Ostroh, Polotsk, Pinsk-Turiv, and Kholm). The council was also attended by three archimandrites: Minsk, Bratslav, and Lavryshiv. There were also nine Roman Catholics: three bishops — Bishop B. Maciejowski of Lutsk, Bishop D. Solikowski of Lviv, and Bishop S. Homolinski of Kholm; four Jesuit monks — P. Skarga, M. Liaterna, K. Nagai, and Yu. Rab; two Greeks from Rome — P. Arcudius and Yu. Moschetti. There were few secular representatives at the council — six people: the Vilna voivode M. K. Radziwill, the Chancellor

of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania L. Sapieha, the Brest starosta D. Haletski, the Kamianets castellan J. Pretwicz, Prince [kniaz`] J. Shuiski, and the instigator Kalynski. This part of the council represented the most influential Latinized magnates of the GDL.



Hypatius Potius was a Uniate Metropolitan of Kyiv (1599–1613) and a polemical writer. He was the founder of the Brest Brotherhood (1590–1591), a seminary for monks at the Holy Trinity Monastery in Vilne, and a school at the Holy Dormition Cathedral Church in Volodymyr (1609). The Union of Brest intensified religious controversy. He was the author of polemical treatises and sermons. His works were characterized by humanistic content, and he was particularly interested in human psychology and spirituality.

The Council, led by Metropolitan M. Rohoza, adopted four decrees: on October 8, a declaration on the transition to the union was adopted; on October 9, two separate decrees on the excommunication of Kyiv-Pechersk Archimandrite N. Tur and the excommunication of Bishop G. Balaban; on October 10, Bishop M. Kopystyanskyi and Bishop G. Balaban, who did not accept the union, and the Orthodox clergy were separately removed from power.[5]

5 Tymoshenko L. Beresteiska tserkovna uniia 1596 roku... P. 535.

The main document of the Union Council was the Charter of the Union of Brest, which was based on the declarative recognition of the Florentine idea of church unity. The document substantiates the motives of the union: not willing to remain under pagan bondage and contribute to the "schismatic" policy of the patriarchs, as well as preventing the devastation of churches and the spread of heresies, and striving for the salvation of human souls, the metropolitan and bishops began to unite with Rome. The document is a declaration of the solemn proclamation of the union, so it is filled with the pathos of nobility and holiness of the deed, as well as responsibility for human destinies before God. Similar to other decisions of the Union Council, it does not even mention the specific terms of the union, which had been adopted by the Rus' hierarchy the day before and handed over to the Polish authorities and the Pope.



Piotr Skarga was a Jesuit, religious polemicist, hagiographer, and court preacher of Polish king Sigismund III Vasa. Despite his critical attitude toward Orthodoxy, which was reflected in two editions of his polemical treatise On the Unity of the Church of God, he was a true inspiration for the religious renaissance of the first half of the seventeenth century in Ukraine.

The Uniate Council considered the issue of a new Gregorian calendar and the establishment of a seminary. However, they were not reflected in special decrees. It is believed that it was M. Rohoza who was the leader of the Council of

Brest, as only he could firmly oppose the Orthodox as Metropolitan of the entire Kyivan Church. The hosts of the Union Council were still Roman Catholics (they were the majority at the council), including Jesuits led by P. Skarga. On the last day of the Council's work, Sunday, October 20 (10), 1596, a solemn liturgy was held in the St. Nicholas church, where P. Skarga preached a sermon on the unity of the church, happy harmony, and Christ's peace.[6]

Relying on the king's favour and the support of the Catholic clergy, the Uniate bishops slowly took over church and monastery estates, created cadres of the clergy subordinate to them, and gradually gained supporters among the bourgeoisie and peasantry.



Meletius Smotrytskyi was a polemic writer and philologist, church hierarch, cultural and educational figure. In 1610, he published a polemical work in Polish, Trenos, or the Lament of the Eastern Church, in Vilna under the pseudonym Theophilus Ortologus. In his publications of this time, he not only polemicized with his opponents, defending the confessional rights of the Orthodox, but also reflected in a new (confessionally rather unbiased) way on the national identity of the "Rus' people."

6 Tymoshenko L. Beresteiska tserkovna uniia 1596 roku... P. 535.

The spread of the union provoked riots and protests. An assassination attempt was prepared against Metropolitan Hypatius Potius, which ended with several fingers being cut off. In 1623, the Orthodox burghers walled up the Uniate Archbishop Josophat Kuntsevych in Vitebsk. Uprisings also took place in other cities.

Another type of confrontation was the polemical struggle that took place in literature. The best literary forces were on the side of the Orthodox, who created the "Apocrypha" by Christopher Filalet, "Trenos" by Meletius Smotrytsky, and "Palinodia" by Zachary Kopystensky. Polemical works were published by brotherhoods.

The Uniate literary tradition was associated with the work of the Jesuit Petro Skarga. It was he who proposed that the Orthodox Church recognize the primacy of the Apostolic Capital while preserving the Eastern rite. This idea was argued in P. Skarga's work "O jedności Kościola Bożego pod jednym pasterzem" (1577), dedicated to the Orthodoxy protector Prince [kniaz`] I.-K. Ostrozky. In particular, P. Skarga emphasised the crisis in Orthodox church life and the need for reforms through the conclusion of a union. In the 1580s and 1590s, the idea of a regional union of churches was proposed by the papal legate A. Posevino, who optimistically viewed it as a means of converting the entire Orthodox East.[7]

Polemic discussions about the Uniate and Orthodox religious traditions lasted for a century.

There were also confrontations at the level of law, in particular, the functioning of the Sejm. In 1609, the Orthodox legally dissociated themselves from the Uniate hierarchy, and in 1632–1634, the Orthodox achieved their own, recognized state and administrative hierarchy, headed by Kyiv Metropolitan Petro Mohyla. The dioceses of Lutsk, Lviv, Przemysl, Kholm, and the newly formed Belarusian diocese were under his jurisdiction.[8]

The Cossacks were particularly vigorous in defending the Orthodox tradition. The confrontation with the Uniates in Kyiv resulted in the latter securing only the Vydubytsky Monastery, while the Lavra remained in the hands of the Orthodox.

Thanks to Hetman Petro Sahaidachny and the Cossacks, Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem restored the Orthodox hierarchy in 1620. Metropolitan Yov Boretsky was appointed as the head of the church.

7 Tymoshenko L. Beresteiska tserkovna uniia 1596 roku... P. 535.

8 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 207.



Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi was the hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. He defended the rights of the Orthodox Church. In 1620, Petro Sahaidachny joined the Kyiv (Epiphany) Brotherhood with the entire Zaporizhzhia army.

Nuncio Torres testifies that the Cossacks prevented the spread of the Union by their actions. In particular, in 1632, they sent a deputation to the Sejm, which established the rights of the Orthodox Church. The Cossack uprisings of the 1630s took place under the slogans of defending the Orthodox tradition. The Treaty of Zboriv of 1649 stated that there were no Uniate parishes in the lands under the Hetman's jurisdiction. I. Vyhovsky's 1658 Treaty of Hadiach with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth also did not recognize the church union. In subsequent years, Cossack delegations to the Polish government defended the Orthodox faith. V. Bidnov and D. Antonovych state that Hetman Petro Doroshenko's delegation to the Ostroh Commission of 1670 strongly opposed the Union. Even in the 18th century, the Cossacks destroyed everything that reminded them of the Union. The actions of the Haidamaks were similar.[9]

9 Bidnov V., Antonovych D. Ukrainska tserkva // Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 206.



Yov Boretsky — Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galicia and All Rus' (1620–1631)

Geopolitical changes in the mid-17th century, which led to the territorial division of Ukrainian lands between Muscovy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Turkey, led to a new status for the Orthodox Church. Moscow achieved its influence on church affairs. In 1685, Moscow's representatives, with the help of the Turkish government, obtained from Patriarch Dionysius IV of Constantinople the consent for the Kyiv Metropolis to become canonically dependent on the Moscow Patriarch, who ordained former Orthodox Lutsk Bishop Gideon Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky as Kyiv Metropolitan. In addition, Moscow received a legal basis to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and to manage church affairs here.[10]

Changes in the church life of the Ukrainian lands began in the late 17th century, when most of the nobility, under the influence of political and socio-economic circumstances, switched to the Latin Church after 1654. Orthodox brotherhoods declined, and the Cossacks, having played a historical role, lost their importance. Then, the Orthodox Church, left without its leaders, lost its

10 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 208.

hierarchy. The majority of the population with the western Ukrainian lands joined the Union.



Metropolitan Sylvester Kosov was a prefect of the Kyiv Collegium, Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galicia, and All Rus' (1647–1657). He was an irreconcilable opponent of Ukraine's union with Moscow and condemned the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654. He was particularly vocal in his opposition to the possible subordination of the Kyiv Metropolis to the Moscow Patriarchate. He defended the right to subordinate it to the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The difficult situation in Orthodoxy was also due to the fact that, after 1654, part of the Kyiv Metropolis was within the Moscow state, and part remained in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Metropolitans Sylvester Kosov (1647–1657), Dionysius Balaban (1657–1663), and Joseph Nelubovych-Tukalsky (1664–1675) recognized Poland as their reference point. These metropolitans had less and less influence on church-religious relations on the Left-bank Ukraine.[11]

11 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 208.

The Councils of Brest, which showed the split of Ukrainian-Belarusian Christianity, initiated the struggle between Rus' and Rus', which was based on the problems of forming a national church. As a result, there was a rise in national-confessional consciousness, and that influenced the legitimization of the sacred right to strengthen the Cossacks. The Orthodox Council of Brest in 1596 undoubtedly saved Ukrainian-Belarusian Orthodoxy, which flourished in the era of P. Mohyla. The Uniate Council established a religious and church tradition that was based on Western models and eventually contributed to the establishment of Greek Catholicism as one of the national denominations of Ukrainians. In this way, Ukraine came closer to religiously modernized Europe in the early modern era.

6. UKRAINIAN CHURCH UNDER THE RULE OF MOSCOW

As a result of Russia's colonization policy, Ukraine gradually lost its statehood and, together with it, its church independence. According to the Andrusiv Armistice of 1667 and then the "Eternal Peace" with Poland in 1686, the Left Bank became part of Russia, while the Right Bank remained part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, except for the city of Kyiv and its district, which was under the rule of the Moscow Tsar.[1]

Long before the Andrusiv Armistice and the "Eternal Peace," the Kyiv Metropolis began to lose its autonomy and fall under the rule of the Moscow Patriarch. Hetman Ivan Samoilovych (1672–1687) became a convenient executor of Moscow's plans. He was a supporter of the unification of the two churches. After the death of the archimandrite of the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery, Innokentiy Gisel (November 18, 1683). The Hetman informed the tsar of the archimandrite's death and asked the Moscow Patriarch for his blessing to install a new one. However, this attempt failed because the Kyivan clergy did not behave as Samoilovych had hoped. The election was held by free votes, and Varlaam Yasynsky was elected archimandrite. In February 1685, Hetman Samoilovych was ordered by Moscow to break ties with the Patriarch of Tsargorod and to send the future Kyiv Metropolitan to Moscow for ordination. On July 8, 1685, Bishop Gedeon Sviatopolk-Chetvertynskyi of Lutsk (1685–1690) was elected Metropolitan of Kyiv at a council in Kyiv.

1 Sliusarenko V. Ukraina v konteksti Andrusivskoho peremyria 1667 r. Hurzhiivski istorychni chytannia, 2017, №12: PP. 90–93.; Chukhlib T. Vidpovid Ukrainskoho hetmanatu na rosiisko-polski domovlenosti v Andrusovi 1667 r. Ukraina v Tsentralno-Skhidnii Yevropi, 2003.

Representatives of the Ukrainian clergy sent protests to Samoilovich, in which they exposed the illegality of the decision to transfer the Kyiv Metropolis to Moscow, denied the correctness of the election of the new metropolitan, and expressed concern that the Ukrainian Church would lose its rights if it came under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarch. In the same year, Samoilovych sent letters to Patriarch Joachim and Tsars Ivan and Peter informing them of the council in Kyiv. The letters reported on the election of the metropolitan, a request to approve this decision and to grant certain privileges to the Kyiv Metropolis. On November 8, 1685, Metropolitan Gedeon was consecrated in the Assumption Cathedral in Moscow, during which he swore an oath to the Moscow Patriarch.[2]

In order to resolve the canonical controversies that resulted from the above-mentioned events, a delegation was sent to Constantinople in 1686 to obtain consent to the transition of the Kyiv Metropolis to the Russian Church. However, the new Patriarch of Constantinople, Dionysius, and Patriarch Dositheus of Jerusalem were indignant about this request.

In December, the newly ordained metropolitan received letters of commendation from Tsars Ivan, Peter, Princess [kniagynia] Sophia, and the patriarch. The patriarchal charter actually stated that Gedeon was to have the position of an ordinary metropolitan of the Moscow Church. Joachim ordered him to wear a white cloak "for the sake of unity with other Russian metropolitans," and also named Gideon "Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halychyna, and Little Rus'," whereas before the title of Kyiv metropolitans had been "all Rus'." This was one of the first steps in taking away the rights of Ukrainian metropolitans. In general, it should be said that the Ukrainian Church was granted the status of broad autonomy, under the conditions set forth in the royal charters addressed to Metropolitan Gideon on December 15, 1685; to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych on November 28, 1686; and the "Eternal Peace" of 1686. All these state acts defined the status of the Kyivan metropolitans with certain provisions, among which the following were important: (1) The Kyiv Metropolis was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarch. (2) The Kyivan Metropolitan is freely elected according to the old customs; he receives the blessing and installation from the Moscow

2 Istoriia Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini u XIX stolitti, Khram sv. Velykomuchenyka Dymytriia Solunskoho, data zvernennia 10 chervnia 2025.http://hram.in.ua/biblioteka/istoriia/192-book192/2212-title2674

Patriarch and remains a metropolitan for life. (3) All the previous ranks and institutions of the Kyiv Metropolis remain subordinate to him: dioceses, monasteries, churches, and abbeys. (4) The previous power of the courts of the Kyiv Metropolitan, his honor and authority are hidden. (5) The Brotherhood School of the Kyiv Metropolis and free education in it remain; the metropolitan retains the right to have a printing house. (6) The Kyiv Metropolis is considered superior to others in the Moscow Patriarchate.[3]



Hetman Ivan Samoilovych. During his hetmanship, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which recognized the supremacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, was subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate (1686).

However, as it turned out later, all these rights were a temporary policy of the tsarist government. The resolutions of the Moscow tsars regarding the autonomy of the Kyiv Metropolis were not observed but rather completely violated.

3 Istoriia Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini u XIX stolitti, Khram sv. Velykomuchenyka Dymytriia Solunskoho, data zvernennia 10 chervnia 2025.http://hram.in.ua/biblioteka/istoriia/192-book192/2212-title2674

Thus, the ecclesiastical autonomy of the Ukrainian people was buried much earlier than the political autonomy because from 1686 onward, the autonomous rights of the Kyiv Metropolis were more of a mirage than a reality.[4]

The last act of the tragedy of the Ukrainian Church was the consent of the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1686 to transfer it to the Patriarch of Moscow. Patriarch Joachim of Moscow issued a letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople, in which he wrote that he had "fulfilled the desire of the Ukrainian people" by installing Gedeon as metropolitan. So that nothing would happen to Gideon on the long journey to Constantinople, he, Joachim, ordained him in Moscow.

There were changes in the orientation of the church itself. Particularly, at the time of the transition of the Kyiv Metropolis to the Moscow Patriarchate, it owned the following dioceses: Kyiv, Chernihiv, Lutsk, Lviv, and Przemysl. From the end of the 16th century, Kyivan metropolitans began to lose dioceses under their control, and from the middle of the 17th century, this process accelerated as the Chernihiv and Smolensk dioceses were created. In 1687, Moscow, by granting the rights of stavropegia, withdrew the Kyiv-Mezyhiria Monastery from the metropolitan's authority. The following year, in 1688, the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery was taken away. In 1691–1712, some right-bank dioceses joined the union, and only the Mstislav-Belarusian diocese was formally connected to the Kyiv Metropolis, but since 1728 it was directly subordinated to the Holy Synod. The Metropolitan of Kyiv was only allowed to have a coadjutor bishop who resided in Pereyaslav. No one talked about the return of the former regional government; only the vast diocese and external liturgical attributes of the Kyiv Metropolitan reminded us of it.[5]

As part of signing the "Eternal Peace" between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the paragraphs regarding the status of the Orthodox Church were also signed. The ninth item of this peace gave the tsarist government the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to defend the Orthodox from oppression by the Uniates. In fact, the Orthodox population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was placed

4 Wojcik Z. The Orthodox Church and the Polish Reason of State in the Seventeen Centry. Le origni e lo sviluppo della Cristiana Slavo-Bizantina. Roma, 1992. PP. 425–435.

5 Istoriia Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini u XIX stolitti, Khram sv. Velykomuchenyka Dymytriia Solunskoho, data zvernennia 10 chervnia 2025.http://hram.in.ua/biblioteka/istoriia/192-book192/2212-title2674

under the protectorate of the Moscow Tsar. It should be noted that although the Sejm approved this condition in 1689, it was not until 1710 that Moscow immediately began to use its right. Researchers claim that examples of such interference by Moscow in the affairs of the Orthodox of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth can be seen throughout the 18th century. According to the treatises of 1768 and 1775, this right of Russia was significantly strengthened. Orthodox parishes and monasteries in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were subject to the Kyiv Metropolitan, and he, in turn, until 1720, was subject to the Moscow Patriarch and the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne, and then to the Russian Holy Synod.[6] Only one Orthodox diocese remained within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth — the Belarusian one, whose bishops were appointed from St. Petersburg with the consent of the Polish king. All other Orthodox monasteries and churches outside the Belarusian diocese were subject to the Kyiv metropolitan, and he transferred a significant part of them to his coadjutor, the Orthodox bishop, who became an archbishop in 1733. The church dependence of the citizens of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on a foreign hierarchy brought various inconveniences to the Orthodox themselves and was an unacceptable phenomenon from the point of view of the interests of the state. However, for a long time, the Polish government did nothing to put an end to such abnormality.[7]

Only the Great Sejm (1788–1792) drew attention to it. Orthodoxy was to enjoy equal rights with Catholicism and the Union, be freed from dependence on the Russian Church, have its own hierarchy, and create an autocephalous church. The Orthodox people were to develop their own organization of church and religious life, and for this purpose in June 1791, a special congress of Orthodox clergy and laity was convened in Pinsk. This "Pinsk Congregation" developed a plan for radical changes in the position of the Orthodox Church.[8]

However, this reform of the Orthodox Church was not implemented since it was prevented by the second and third divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1793, Volhynia, Podolia, and the Kyiv region became part of the Russian Empire. The church tradition here was such that during the 18th century

6 Bidnov V., Antonovych D. Ukrainska tserkva // Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Antonovycha... P. 208.

7 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... PP. 208–209.

8 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 209.

the Uniates strengthened their position. If at the end of the 16th century there were ten thousand Orthodox parishes in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, then at the end of the 18th century there were only hundreds of them.[9] However, another process took place — the conversion of the peasantry to Orthodoxy.

9 Ukrainska kultura : lektsii za redaktsiieiu Dmytra Antonovycha... P. 209.

7. THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE 18TH — BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURIES

In the last quarter of the 18th century, significant territorial changes occurred in the south and west of the Russian Empire, associated with the three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) and the Russian-Turkish wars (1768–1774, 1781–1791). Accordingly, the administrative-territorial system of Ukrainian lands was restructured, leading to the redistribution of parishes between the newly created dioceses. In 1796, the Kyiv province was formed, which was now completely located on the Right Bank. Therefore, following the order of the Holy Synod of September 7, 1797, the Kyiv diocese consisted only of its right-bank parishes and lands that had passed from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Russian Empire.

The metropolitanate included 12 counties: Kyiv, Bohuslav, Vasylkiv, and the annexed Makhniv. Lypovets, Pyatigorsk, and Skvir from Podolsk province; Radomyshl from Volyn province; Katerynopil', Uman', Cherkasy, and Chyhyryn from Novorossiysk province. The counties of the Left Bank were transferred to the reformed Pereyaslav diocese.

According to the county division of the provinces, the metropolitanate was redistributed. In each county town, a Spiritual Board was formed. Thus, church administrative bodies came under the control of the secular administration. A clear church-administrative structure was being rebuilt, which contributed to the strengthening of the control and police functions of the Church over parishes in the spiritual sphere, in the fight against freethinking, heresy, and sectarianism. The inconvenience of the new situation was that the tsarist government wanted to see the Church only as an obedient executor of its will and gradually

transformed it into an ordinary state institution, thus erecting a wall between the clergy and parishioners. The only benefit of the administration of the Orthodox Church in the Kyiv region was the end of the lordly abuses of churches and priests.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the state power took the course towards strengthening the church as part of the state-bureaucratic system. The legal status of the church was determined by state legislation. In particular, the law on succession to the throne of 1797, where the emperor was declared the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. The law stated that the emperor was the "supreme defender and guardian of the dogmas" of the church, the "guardian of Orthodoxy," and the church itself was proclaimed "sovereign and primary."[1] The next decree of 1799 further led to the etatism of the church: eparchial boundaries were brought in line with the boundaries of the provinces, and the division of eparchies and protoparchies had to be consistent with the division of the province into counties; the religious staff was renewed, and state finances for the maintenance of the clergy were significantly increased; in 1804, the clergy was exempted from poll tax; later, in 1821, the clergy were exempted from paying for quarterage, as well as from сщгтен duties and military service; for "necessary and decent maintenance" the clergy were additionally allocated lands and various estates.[2] The social and financial status of the clergy was determined by several other decrees that were adopted at the beginning and in the middle of the 19th century. In particular, in 1798, a special decree was adopted regarding the cultivation of church land. Land cultivation was entirely entrusted to the parishioners. Researchers of the problem A. M. Kolodny and P. L. Yarotsky note a new system of moral encouragement of the hierarchy and clergy—this is an award such as orders. During this period (1801), corporal punishment for the clergy was abolished; by a decree of 1825, in accordance with the apostolic rules, the clergy was forbidden to engage in "commercial trade." However, already by

1 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navch. posibnyk / za redaktsiieiu profesoriv A. Kolodnoho i P. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Znannia, 1999. P. 231.

2 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navch. posibnyk / za redaktsiieiu profesoriv A. Kolodnoho i P. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Znannia, 1999. P. 231.

the decree of 1869, the children of Orthodox clergy were given the opportunity to ensure their existence "in all spheres of secular activity."[3]

All these measures were aimed at bringing the clergy closer in social and legal status to the nobility. The clergy was to play a significant role in the administrative structure of the Russian Empire.



Theophan Prokopovych was a theologian, writer, poet, mathematician, philosopher, rector of the Kyiv Academy (1710–1716), and archbishop of Velyknovhorod and Velykolutsk. In 1716, he became close to the royal court.

Analyzing the content of publishing activities and the creation of book collections in church institutions, the academician of the NAS of Ukraine and the

3 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navch. posibnyk / za redaktsiieiu profesoriv A. Kolodnoho i P. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Znannia, 1999. PP. 231–232.

National Polish Academy Yaroslav Isayevich pinpointed the intellectual section in religious circles. This is about the range of educational interests of church figures and a description of the library of Feofan Prokopovych. After moving to St. Petersburg, his library gained fame as the best in the state, in particular, richer than the imperial one.

The monastery library of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra also dates back to the 18th century. The scientific interests of the monks are also evidenced by the book collections of other monasteries. In particular, Yaroslav Isaevich notes that on the occasion of the abolition of the Manyave Skete — the last Orthodox monastery in Halychyna — by the Austrian authorities, the treasurer of this monastery, Palladius Kamenovsky, in September 1785 compiled a list of 126 books from the Skete library.



The Maniava Skete is an Orthodox monastery founded by Job Knyahynytskyi and Ivan Vyshenskyi in 1606 near the village of Maniava (modern photo).

Of course, a place of honor belonged here to liturgical texts and books, such as the "Apocrypha" by Filaret and the works of Antony Radyvilovsky, Dmytro Tuptal-Rostovsky, and other Ukrainian authors. Although the monastery was a pillar of Orthodoxy, notes Yaroslav Isaevich, it also had numerous publications

from Western European printing houses—in Latin, the "Natural History" by Pliny the Elder in 37 books, and the Catholic "Annals" of church history by Baronius. Christian Wolf's philosophy course, then Parisian Greek and Latin editions of the works of Basil the Great, John Chrysostom, and Cyril of Alexandria, and on the other hand, the works of Catholic theologians. Thus, Orthodox monastic libraries did not shy away from Catholic and even Protestant publications.[4]



Kyiv Cave Monastery. Construction began as a cave monastery in 1051.

4 Isaievych Ya. Ukrainske knyhovydannia: vytoky, rozvytok, problemy. Lviv : Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NAN Ukrainy, 2002. PP. 373–374.

The highest body of church administration in the Russian Empire was the Holy Synod. It was an institution that, in addition to regulating the spiritual life of the church, also determined the church records in the dioceses, considered and implemented various laws, resolutions, and decrees and exercised control over their implementation. In addition, the Holy Synod also performed censorship functions.

The researcher of the problem, Yu. S. Kondratiuk, notes that all draft laws related to the spiritual area were created by the Synod in its structural units or special commissions, were considered and formed by the councils, and were submitted for approval directly to the emperor through the chief prosecutor. Such acts were issued in the form of laws, statutes, regulations, institutions, and definitions of the Holy Synod. They were promulgated in the religious world by decrees, which were printed in the collection of government resolutions and orders and in its official printed publications. After that, they were placed in the "Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire," and some in the "Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire" in the corresponding volumes. Explanatory rules, instructions to institutions and officials, and guidelines based on the above-mentioned approved legal acts were the subject of the autonomy of the Synod's legislative activity and its subordinate institutions.[5]

An important church structure at the level of governance of the diocese was the spiritual consistory, which functioned under the direct leadership of the Synod and the diocesan bishop, and performed administrative and judicial functions within the territory entrusted to it. The execution of orders was carried out through subordinate positions and persons: spiritual boards, deacons, priests, etc. Within the counties, there were their own church governance bodies—spiritual boards.

Created at the end of the 18th century, the Volyn diocese went through all stages of the formation of governing bodies, which were finally formed in the second half of the 19th century. At the initial stage, its activities had features related to local specifics, in particular, to the social, everyday, and religious traditions of the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The adaptation of the clergy to new conditions occurred approximately in the second quarter of the

5 Kondratiuk Yu. Pravoslavni instytutsii ta dukhovenstvo yak subiekty formuvannia tserkovnoparafiialnoho dilovodstva Volynskoi yeparkhii naprykintsi XVIII — na pochatku XX stolit : avtoref. dys. ... kand. istor. nauk. Ostroh, 2008. P. 9.

19th century, when the old-world priests were replaced by a generation brought up in new conditions. This is significantly related to the clearer functioning of the administrative and clerical system of the diocese. Individual violations and deviations from the norms are mostly subjective. The study of the activities of the administrative bodies of the Volyn diocese indicates that by the middle of the 19th century, it had become a full-fledged component of the established bureaucratic mechanism of the Russian Orthodox Church.[6]

Certain changes in the religious life of Ukraine in the 19th century were associated with the activity of dissenters (Old Believers). This was a group of religious traditionalists who did not accept the reforms in the Russian Orthodox Church in the mid-17th century. To avoid repression by the official church and government, they fled to Ukraine, mainly to the Starodubsk and Chernihiv regions, where they established dissenter settlements in remote, deserted forested areas. Thus, permanent Russian colonies emerged in the north of the Hetmanate, which, along with the economic development of this territory, significantly changed the ethnic composition of its population and, accordingly, brought changes in religious life. In the second half of the 18th century, many dissenters moved to the Black Sea region, to the territory of the future Kherson and Tavria provinces. Old Believer asceticism influenced the formation of frugality and a specific work ethic similar to the Protestant one among the followers of this religious movement. The Old Believers also established their settlements at the mouth of the Danube, where they were called Lipovans, and even in Austrian Bukovyna (the settlement of Bila Krynytsia). The Old Believers lived separately from the local population, which allowed them to preserve their traditional way of life, worldview, and Russian national consciousness. In the early 20th century, there were about 170 thousand Old Believers in the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire. Other religious sects, such as Dukhobors, Gorgons, and Molokans, moved to the territory of southern Ukraine from the central Russian provinces in the 19th century, either on their own initiative or under the coercion of the authorities.[7]

6 Kondratiuk Yu. Pravoslavni instytutsii ta dukhovenstvo yak subiekty formuvannia tserkovnoparafiialnoho dilovodstva Volynskoi yeparkhii naprykintsi XVIII — na pochatku XX stolit : avtoref. dys. ... kand. istor. nauk. Ostroh, 2008. P. 10.

7 Sukhyy O. Etnichnyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy. Rosiiany v Ukraini: sfery prysutnosti, politychni pozytsii, mainovyi status, formy hromadskoi aktyvnosti // Arkusha O., Kondratiuk

The situation of Orthodox parishes in the 19th century was determined by the Kyiv diocese. The number of parishes was almost constant throughout the 19th century. Despite the population growth, the tsarist government rarely gave permission for the formation of new church units in rural areas, and from the second half of the 19th century, it took measures to reduce small parishes, which caused great protests among the religious people. In 1797, the reformed Kyiv diocese had 1327 churches. There were 1344 people in the priest and protopope positions, in addition to the fact that 11 priests were in the deacon's position and there were 126 clergymen on the staff. There were 646 deacons, but only 174 of them were in deacon's positions. The number of psalm readers was 1197, and the number of sextons was 1008. The total number of priests and clergy was 3890. In 1859, there were 1334 full-time priests in the Kyiv diocese and 87 priests as non-permanent staff. The number of churches reached 1330, including 1165 rural churches. In 1878, there were 1421 churches in the Kyiv diocese, including 1314 parish churches, among which there were 1224 wooden, 196 stone, and 1 iron church. There were 1259 registered parishes. There were 1355 priests, including archpriests, 165 deacons, and 1588 psalm readers and acolytes. With the introduction of the new states in the early 19th century, state allocations for the maintenance of the clergy increased significantly. A series of decrees extended the rights and privileges of the priests and clergymen. All these and other measures of the Russian autocracy were aimed not only at making the Church part of the state apparatus but also at bringing the clergy closer to the nobility in legal and social status and at raising its authority and capabilities as an important ideological lever in the Russian Empire.[8]

The Russians began to be appointed as priests in urban and large rural parishes. Emperor Nicholas I even proposed to relocate the Ukrainian clergy from the Right Bank to Russia and replace them with Russian clergy. From the middle of the 19th century, when there were no more old priests who held on to ancient Ukrainian traditions, rural and urban parishes began to receive students from new schools: seminaries and academies. Having gone through a russified

K., Mudryi M., Sukhyy O. Chas narodiv. Istoriia Ukrainy XIX stolittia : navch. posib. / za zah. red. M. Mudroho. Lviv : LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2016. PP. 125–126.

8 Istoriia Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini u XIX stolitti, Khram sv. Velykomuchenyka Dymytriia Solunskoho, data zvernennia 10 chervnia 2025.http://hram.in.ua/biblioteka/istoriia/192-book192/2212-title2674

theological school, they became detached from the vernacular language, looked down on it and the Ukrainian elements, and disregarded folk ritual and culture.

There were also changes in the management of dioceses. One of the components of diocesan administration was the institution of deans. Each church district, which was located within a particular county, was divided into smaller church-administrative districts, which were managed by deans. If the district had more than 15 churches, an assistant to the dean was appointed who performed the duties of the dean in his absence from the district, when the dean was away on business or during illness. In addition to deans over parish churches, there were also deans over monasteries, who were mostly appointed from among the abbots of male monasteries.

To strengthen the supervision of the behavior and activities of the parish clergy, a new management level was created in 1868 — the Dean's Council, which included the dean, his assistant, and a representative of the district clergy.[9] The Dean's Council was to oversee the behavior and the ability to continue the ministry of all clergymen and priests of the deanery, as well as to monitor the implementation of all instructions of the diocesan leadership in the deanery, and raise funds for educational institutions. In addition, the deanery councils considered and, in some cases, resolved various kinds of complaints among the clergy and complaints from parishioners against the local clergy.

In the 19th century, the signs of the former Ukrainian statehood were destroyed, and the highest church structures were denationalized, but this in turn led to the emergence of a powerful force of opposition of the nation—in the church, literature, education, and art.[10]

Moscow officials began to refer to the Ukrainian territories as either "Little Rus'," "Southern Rus'," or "Southwestern Krai." Ukrainian terminology was eliminated entirely.

9 Istoriia Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini u XIX stolitti, Khram sv. Velykomuchenyka Dymytriia Solunskoho, data zvernennia 10 chervnia 2025.http://hram.in.ua/biblioteka/istoriia/192-book192/2212-title2674

10 Faida O. Vizantynistyka v Kyivskii Dukhovnii Akademii v 1819–1919 rr. : avtoref. dys. ... kand. ist. nauk. Lviv : LNU im. I. Franka, 2006. 20 pages. Istoriia Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraini u XIX stolitti, Khram sv. Velykomuchenyka Dymytriia Solunskoho, data zvernennia 10 chervnia 2025.http://hram.in.ua/biblioteka/istoriia/192-book192/2212-title2674

8. MOVEMENT FOR THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH

The movement for autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine has a long historical tradition. It began in the princely era and ended at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. A milestone was the activity of the Lviv Stavropegic Brotherhood at the end of the 16th century, the spiritual work of Yov Boretsky, Petro Mohyla, and others in the 17th century, and the national movement of the 19th century, which was opposed by official Russia, which adopted prohibitive acts regarding the Ukrainian language: The Valuyev Circular (1863) and the Ems Ukase (1876). The decrees also prohibited the printing of the Bible in Ukrainian.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the main Ukrainian national ideas were defined, which were associated with the demands for building a sovereign independent state. In Halychyna, this was associated with the dissemination in the 1890s of Julian Baczynski's book "Ukraïna irredenta"[1] and in Naddnipri-anschyna, Mykola Mikhnovsky's "Independent Ukraine." The political aspirations that manifested themselves in the desire for independence were reflected in the entire national and cultural process, including the position of the Orthodox Church.

The idea of church autocephaly for Ukrainians had a long historical tradition in which certain stages can be identified. It is believed that the movement for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dates back to the times of Kyivan Rus' and was expressed in subsequent historical periods. The desire of

1 Sukhyy O. Halychyna: mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom. Narysy istorii XIX — pochatku XX st. 2-he vyd., dop. Lviv : LNU imeni I. Franka ; Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevy-cha NAN Ukrainy, 1999. P. 104.

Kyivan Prince [kniaz`] Yaroslav the Wise to elect Hilarion to the metropolitan see, which was contrary to the position of the church authorities in Constantinople, can be considered as the first such step for autocephaly. Researchers believe that the princes [kniazi] decision to canonize Borys and Hlib in 1072 was also a milestone in the achievement of autocephaly. The next stage of the autocephaly movement is associated with Prince [kniaz`] Iziaslav Mstyslavovych, who in 1147 at the Council of Bishops tried to transfer the metropolitan see to Klyment Smoliatych, contrary to the Constantinople view. However, all these measures to obtain autocephaly at that time proved to be in vain.[2]



Petro Mohyla was a church, cultural and educational figure, theologian, Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galicia and All Rus (from 1633), exarch of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

The next period of the struggle for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church was associated with the strengthening of ties between the Cossacks and the Orthodox clergy in the early 17th century. Under the hetmanship of Petro Sahaidachnyi, who declared his position by including the entire Zaporizhzhia Army in the Kyivan Brotherhood, the higher church hierarchy, which had been virtually lost in 1596, was fully restored. The Cossacks took under their protection Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem, who, with the appropriate authority from the Patriarch of Constantinople, secretly ordained Metropolitan Yov Boretsky

2 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo... P. 206.

of Kyiv, five bishops, and the Archbishop of Polotsk. This gave rise to a new literary controversy and increased tensions in interfaith relations.

The hope for the revival of religious freedom in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was associated with King Władysław, who was inclined to religious tolerance. He set up an independent commission that drafted "The Articles for the Reassuarance of the Ruthenian People," which were approved at the coronation sejm in 1633. This act legalized the existence of the Orthodox Church and returned some of its property to it. The hierarchy was renewed. A prominent church and cultural figure Petro Mohyla was elected as the metropolitan at the Sejm.[3]

The next stage in the movement for Ukrainian autocephaly was even more difficult. This was due to the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate, and after 1654, the role of the Kyiv Metropolis began to diminish.

Analyzing the Orthodox discourse during the period of the Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654, historian Serhiy Plohiy notes that with the beginning of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising, the newly declared Cossack state was increasingly drawn into a system of international relations marked by religious distinctions and traditions of religious interstate unions. In particular, he writes that by rebelling against the Catholic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Cossacks almost automatically turned the Catholic countries of Europe into their enemies and, conversely, found potential allies in non-Catholic countries: Muslim (Crimea and the Ottoman Empire) and Protestant (Transylvania, although dependent on Istanbul; Sweden, which was formidable to its neighbors, and even distant England[4]).

The cited author notes that from the perspective of the then practice of international relations, the most natural niche for Khmelnytsky and the Hetmanate was the Orthodox one. This explains why Khmelnytsky paid special attention

3 Rusyna O. Ukrainski zemli u skladi Lytvy ta Polshchi // Istoriia Ukrainy: Nove bachennia : u 2 t. / O. Hurzhii, Ya. Isaievych, M. Kotliar ta in. ; pid red. V. Smoliia. Kyiv : Ukraina, 1995. PP. 145–146.

4 Plokhii S. Pereiaslav 1654: pravoslavnyi dyskurs ta politychna kultura // Pereiaslavska Rada 1654 roku (istoriohrafiia ta doslidzhennia) / redkol. P. Sokhan, Ya. Dashkevych, I. Hyrych ta in. Kyiv : Smoloskyp, 2003. P. 775. Serhii Plokhy is a renowned Ukrainian-American historian specializing in the history of Eastern Europe and Ukraine. He is a professor at Harvard University and the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard.

to Moldova from the very beginning of the uprising, first thinking of taking the Moldovan throne himself, and later forcing Lupul to give his daughter Rosanda in marriage to his son Timosh, since this marriage brought Khmelnytsky closer not only to the Orthodox branch of the Moldovan rulers but also to the Protestant branch of the Radziwill family.[5]



Bohdan Khmelnytsky was a politician, commander, and diplomat, a leader of the national liberation struggle of 1648–1657, the creator of the Ukrainian Cossack state and its first hetman. He defended the rights of the Orthodox Church.

The main potential ally of Cossack politicians in the Orthodox world was the powerful and traditionally anti-Polish Russia. S. Plohyi argues that Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising shifted relations between Moscow and the Cossacks in

5 Plokhii S. Pereiaslav 1654: pravoslavnyi dyskurs ta politychna kultura... P. 777.

a different direction, where for the first time religious motives played an important role. The scholar states that depending on the successes or failures of the uprising, the issue of Moscow's support became more or less important in the Cossack-Moscow dialogue, but the religious theme always remained present. As a rule, it never dominated these relations but almost always reflected the dynamics of Cossack-Moscow negotiations.[6]

S. Plohyi writes about the religious factor in the relations between the Cossacks and Moscow: the road to Pereyaslav for Ukrainian and Moscow elites was paved with religious and political alliances and unions during the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648, where the role of the religious factor can hardly be overestimated. Orthodox discourse and religious arguments played an important role in justifying the Ukrainian-Russian alliance before and during the Pereyaslav Council, which in January 1654 approved the establishment of the Moscow protectorate over the Zaporizhzhia Army on the Ukrainian side. The journey of the tsarist Cossacks, led by boyar Vasyl Buturlin, through the lands of Ukraine up to Pereyaslav was in fact a triumphant display of Orthodoxy.[7] According to S. Plohiy, in practice, it looked like: "In almost every large locality, the envoys went to church and participated in the solemn service of God. The unity of Moscow and Kyivan Orthodoxy was demonstrated by Moscow ambassadors in Ukraine until 1654, when they freely attended and prayed in Cossack churches. Now, it was officially confirmed by a group of Moscow clergymen included in Buturlin's embassy to take an oath from the local population of Ukraine. The Moscow priests, led by Archimandrite Prokhor, participated in joint religious processions with the Ukrainian clergy, as they did on the day of the Epiphany on January 6, 1654, where they carried the icon of the Savior given by the tsar. They also happily concelebrated with the Pereyaslav Protopop Hryhorii and the local clergy."[8]

Roman Yakemchuk, a professor at the University of Louvain (Belgium), says that the alliance with Orthodox Moscow was finalized on January 8, 1654, by Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, with severe political consequences. In the city of Pereyaslav, a joint assembly of Khodak elders and nobility decided to adopt an alliance treaty with Russia, which effectively established a Russian protectorate over Ukraine and recognized its administrative autonomy, certain

6 Plokhii S. Pereiaslav 1654: pravoslavnyi dyskurs ta politychna kultura... P. 777.

7 Plokhii S. Pereiaslav 1654: pravoslavnyi dyskurs ta politychna kultura... P. 777.

8 Plokhii S. Pereiaslav 1654: pravoslavnyi dyskurs ta politychna kultura... P. 778.

rights, and privileges. Thus, Yakemchuk notes, by swearing allegiance to Tsar Alexei I, the father of Peter the Great, Ukrainians entered the political orbit of their powerful northern neighbor. Ukrainian lands east of the Dnipro River were placed under Russian influence, while those to the west of it remained under Polish rule. Using the Pereyaslav Agreement, Russia illegally restricted the autonomy it had originally recognized for Ukrainians, and the latter rebelled and tried to regain their independence: Hetman Mazepa was convinced "that the time has come for Ukraine to become an independent state."[9]

The diminishing role of Kyiv as a religious center led to the growing role of the Russian Orthodox Church, especially after Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate in 1721 and established the Holy Synod, when the church became an instrument of the Russian autocracy's Russification policy.

Since then, the Ukrainian episcopate, at the behest of Moscow, has joined the process of restoring the specific national features of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. This is evidenced by the fact that Ukrainian churches proclaimed anathema to Hetman Ivan Mazepa.



Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (1659–1817). Initially founded by Metropolitan Petro Mohyla as the Kyiv Brotherhood College, in the second half of the seventeenth century, it received the status of an academy. During its existence, it was one of the largest and most prominent educational centers in Eastern Europe.

9 Yakemchuk R. Nezalezhnist Ukrainy / perekl. z frants. Hanna Bubniak. Roman Bubniak ; nauk. red. prof. Oleksii Sukhyy. Lviv : PAIS, 2018. P. 15.

The researchers note that after the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, the mutual influence of Russian and Ukrainian Orthodoxy increased. Until the 18th century, most bishops, teachers of religious institutions, and simply educated clergy were of Ukrainian origin, mostly graduates of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. For example, the duties of the Moscow Patriarchate from 1700 to 1721 were performed by a Ukrainian, the son of Halychyna nobles, Metropolitan S. Yavorsky of Ryazan and Murom. One of the saints canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church in the 18th century was the son of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's army sotnik (lieutenant), who went down in history as St. Demetrius of Rostov.

During the 18th century, Ukrainian church leaders defined the rules of liturgical, religious, and educational practice. All this confirmed the unification of Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy at that time. The only significant center of Orthodox thought in Ukraine was the Kyiv Theological Academy, founded in 1819.[10]

Another attempt to Ukrainize the Ukrainian church was the preparation of the Morachevsky Bible for publication. This project, when the Holy Scriptures were translated into Ukrainian, was not realized as the Holy Synod imposed a ban on Ukrainian liturgical books. The ban was regulated by the Valuev Circular of 1863.

Attempts to Ukrainize Orthodoxy began in the mid-19th century: they were related to the language of worship, rites, and traditions, and from the beginning of the 20th century, they touched on the organizational aspect, the structure of church governance.

In 1903, the London Bible Society published a complete translation of the Bible into Ukrainian by P. Kulish, I. Puliy, and I. Nechuy-Levytsky.

The movement for the proclamation of autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church intensified as a result of the Russian Revolution of 1905–1907, when the Russian Orthodox Church was experiencing an internal crisis. There were numerous calls for national renewal and democratization of church life. However, the movement for the independence of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not gain widespread momentum until the February Revolution of 1917. In March 1917, pastoral meetings created an initiative body for the

10 Faida O. Vizantynistyka v Kyivskii Dukhovnii Akademii v 1819–1919 rr. : avtoref. dys. ... kand. ist. nauk. Lviv : LNU im. I. Franka, 2006. 20 pages.

separation of Ukrainian dioceses from the Russian Orthodox Church, the Executive Committee of Clergy and Laity, which declared its loyalty to the Provisional Government and supported the Central Rada. In some parishes, the believers demanded that Russian priests be replaced by Ukrainians and that Ukraine be granted church autonomy.[11]


СЬВЯТЕ ПИСЬМО
СТАРОГО І НОВОГО ЗАВІТУ.
МОВОЮ РУСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЮ.
У ВІДНІ.
ВИДАНІЄ БРИТАНСЬКОГО І ЗАГРАНИЧНОГО БИБЛІЙНОГО ТОВАРИСТВА.
1904.

The Bible was translated into Ukrainian by Panteleimon Kulish, Ivan Puluy, and Ivan Nechuy-Levytsky.

In December 1917, the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council was formed, which proclaimed itself the highest church authority in Ukraine until the All-Ukrainian Church Council was convened. It met in October 1921 and proclaimed the formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and elected its leadership. It was attended by 500 representatives of the clergy. Metropolitan Mykhailo, the Exarch of Ukraine, and all Orthodox bishops were invited to the Council.[12]

Since the Council was convened against the resolutions of the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council of 1918, which was dominated by representatives of the autonomy, and without the approval of the higher church hierarchy, none of the bishops participated in its work. The Exarch of Ukraine, Metropolitan Mykhailo of Kyiv, although he attended the meeting, refused to recognize the decision of the convened Council as legitimate and refused to name a bishop to lead the

11 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo... P. 208.

12 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo... P. 208.

Autocephalous Orthodox Church. At that time, the Council recognized the act of 1686 on the subordination of the Ukrainian Church to the Moscow Patriarchate as invalid and approved the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It was noted that the autocephalous church was apolitical, the use of the Ukrainian language in worship was declared, and the conciliarity of the UAOC was proclaimed.

The Council proposed the idea of establishing the World Catholic Apostolic Orthodox Christian Church, where each church of a particular nation would not be subordinated to the church of another nation народу.[13]

The Council ordained Vasyl Lypkivsky as the first hierarch and Nestor Sharaivsky as the archbishop of Kyiv. In 1921, an active process of church formation began, covering the territories of Vinnytsia, Dnipro, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Khmelnytsky regions.



Vasyl Lypkivsky, the first Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, revived in 1921

This process was preceded by the activities of the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council, which convened the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council in Kyiv in October 1921, with the goal of proclaiming the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The council was held in St. Sophia Church and was

13 Yartys A., Vaskiv A. Relihiieznavstvo... PP. 208–209.

attended by 500 delegates from all over Ukraine. These were not only priests, but also representatives of the national church movement and public figures. Among them were Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivsky, Archpriest Nestor Sharaivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, and others. At the initial stage of the Council's activities, the decision was made to appeal to the bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine to name the first bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. However, no such agreement was reached, as representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the patriarchal exarch, Metropolitan Mikhail Yermakov, stood on the principle that the church should be "one and only," which means — Russian. Representatives of the Ukrainian Council resorted to a different measure — they decided to ordain national hierarchs by the entire church assembly. In this way, Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivsky was ordained to the episcopal rank and elected Metropolitan of Kyiv and all of Ukraine. Archpriest Nestor Sharaevsky and four other participants with the Council were also ordained bishops. At the same time, the participants of the Council noted that this method of bishops' ordination should be considered an exception, and in the future, the rite of ordination should be performed with the participation of two or more bishops. Thus, the participants with the Council stated that the latter principle of ordination is in line with the canons of the Ecumenical Orthodox Church.[14]

Researchers A. M. Kolodny and P. L. Yarotsky believe that in matters of internal organization, the Council of 1921 embarked on the path of radical reforms, adopting canons that in some significant aspects differed from or even contradicted the principles of the Ecumenical Orthodox Church: the episcopal autocratic structure of the church, which was formed under the influence of the Russian state-monarchical system, was adopted, and was to be changed by a council of representatives of the entire Orthodox population; the act of 1686 on the transition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate was declared invalid and immoral; and the Ukrainian language of that time was introduced in the church service instead of Church Slavonic.

14 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navch. posibnyk / za redaktsiieiu profesoriv A. Kolodnoho i P. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Znannia, 1999. P. 287.

The formation of the UAOC led to the fact that within three years of its activity it already had 30 bishops, more than 1500 priests and deacons. The UAOC had 1100 parishes.[15]

There is an opinion among researchers that at the initial stage of the Ukrainian church's activity, the Soviet authorities were tolerant of it. They probably wanted to use the newly formed church to weaken the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The UAOC was recognized and supported by the so-called "renewed" Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow in 1923. The strengthening of the national Orthodox Church in Ukraine was facilitated by the fact that in 1924, the Ecumenical Patriarch granted legal autocephaly to a part of the Kyiv Metropolis — the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. However, the very next year, Soviet punitive authorities began to accuse the UAOC of counterrevolution. The authorities facilitated the split of the UAOC and the separation of the "Active Church of the Cross." In 1929, the Soviet authorities linked the UAOC to the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, thus liquidating the best Ukrainian forces. The leadership of the church was forced to hold the Third All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council of the UAOC in January 1930, where it announced the "self-dissolution" of the national church.

This caused discontent and protests by the laity. Therefore, in December of the same year, a council was held to restore the leadership of the church and its structure. Metropolitan Ivan (Pavlovsky) was elected head of the church structure, and the church administration was moved to Kharkiv.[16] The authorities temporarily allowed the restoration of the national church, but changed its name: "Ukrainian Orthodox Church" (without "autocephalous"). Accordingly, the authorities limited the number of bishops, priests, and parishes that were subordinate to it. Persecution of representatives of the Ukrainian national church began. A significant number of priests were martyred. All of them were recognized as "Ukrainian new martyrs and confessors of the 20th century." In 1936, Metropolitan Ivan Pavlovsky, bishops, and priests who were still free were arrested. This event is seen as the end of the existence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Soviet Ukraine.

15 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navch. posibnyk / za redaktsiieiu profesoriv A. Kolodnoho i P. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Znannia, 1999. P. 288.

16 Hlukhenkyi A. Arkhiiepyskop Ivan Pavlovskyi yak budivnychyi Ukrainskoi avtokefalnoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy na Chernihivshchyni. Siverianskyi litopys, 2021.



St. Michael's Golden-Domed Cathedral (1937). Destroyed by the Stalinist authorities



St. Michael's Golden-Domed Cathedral (modern view); Restored after Stalin's destruction.

9. ORTHODOX CHURCH IN INTERWAR POLAND

The establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Ukraine in 1919 led to the fact that a significant number of politicians, public and church leaders began to seek refuge in Poland, particularly in Volyn and Halychyna.

Ivan Ivanovych Ohienko (Metropolitan Hilarion), a Ukrainian scholar, bishop of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (from 1940), and head of the Ukranian Orthodox Church of Canada (UOCC) (from 1951), found political refuge in the Second Polish Republic. I. I. Ohienko was a significant political, public, and church figure whose scientific interests were related to linguistics, lexicography, and the study of church history.



Ivan Ohienko — Bishop of Cholm and Podlasie, Metropolitan of Cholm and Podlasie, Metropolitan of Winnipeg, Primate of the UGCC

During the national revolution of 1917, I. Ohienko was a member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists and later became a professor at the

Department of History of Ukrainian Culture at the Kyiv Ukrainian State University. In January 1918, at the All-Ukrainian Church Council in Kyiv, he delivered a report entitled "The Revival of the Ukrainian Church." The main theses expressed in this speech by I. I. Ohienko resulted in the argumentation of the rights to independence of the Ukrainian Church.

In the government of the UPR, I. Ohienko became Minister of Public Education, promoted regulations on teaching in primary, secondary, and higher education institutions in the Ukrainian language and the use of different languages in schools of national minorities.

In September 1919, I. I. Ohienko joined the All-Ukrainian Church Council and was appointed Minister of the Ministry of Cults (renamed by him as the Ministry of Confessions). Under his leadership, the publication of the "Bulletin of the Ministry of Confessions of the UPR" was launched, and from October 1921 to April 1922, he was the head of the publishing house "Ukrainian Autocephalous Church" (published leaflets and brochures).[1]

The Bolshevik seizure of the last capital city, Kamianets-Podilskyi, in November 1920 forced I. Ohienko to emigrate to Poland. He lived in the city of Tarnów, where he was engaged in publishing activities and founded the publishing house of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. He collaborated with Ukrainian emigrant centres; in 1921, he became a member of the Council of the Republic and, from 1924 on, Minister of Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Exile. In 1922, he moved to Lviv and later to Vynnyky. During the Lviv period, he came into contact with local intellectuals such as Professor Ivan Kalynovych, Ivan Lypa, and Mykola Hnatyshak. He worked on translations and publications of religious works in Ukrainian: he worked on the translation of the New Testament; in 1922 in Lviv he published a translation from the Greek Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom; in 1937 in Lviv he published the New Testament based on translations from the Ancient Greek and modern Greek languages. He taught at the Lviv Teachers' Seminary. In 1926–1932, he was a professor of Church Slavonic at the Studio of Orthodox Theology at the University of Warsaw; he also collaborated with the University of Brno (Czechoslovakia). He was the editor of the Warsaw editions of "The Native Language"

1 Ilarion (Ohiienko), Vikipediia — Vilna entsyklopediia, data zvernennia 15 chervnia 2025. https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Іларіон_(Огієнко)#Біографія

(1933–1939) and "Our Culture" (1935–1937). He spoke out against the Russification policy of the then leadership of Soviet Ukraine.[2]

During his stay in Warsaw, I. I. Ohienko was in contact with representatives of the Polish Orthodox Church. In October 1940, he was tonsured into monasticism in the Yablochyn St. Onuphryi Monastery by Metropolitan Dionysius (Valedynskyi), Primate of the Polish Orthodox Church, Archbishop Savatii of Prague, and Bishop Timothy (Schroeter) of Lublin.[3]

In 1943, he founded a higher theological school in Kholm, which became an Orthodox center. In March 1944, Hilarion was elevated to the rank of Metropolitan of Kholm and Podlasie. However, during the war, the Metropolitan's church activities were complicated. In 1944, he emigrated to Slovakia, then to Switzerland, and in 1947 to Canada.[4]

The activities of Ukrainian Orthodox pastors in Poland take place in difficult conditions caused by revisionism — the Catholic Church's desire to revalidate estates and sacred objects owned by the Orthodox Church after the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This process took place in several stages: in 1919–1920, 400 cultural buildings were taken away from the Orthodox in the eastern provinces of Poland; in 1929, through lawsuits, 724 Orthodox churches and a number of monasteries were returned to the Roman Catholic Church (although the Supreme Court of Poland rejected the claims of Roman Catholic bishops on November 20, 1933, and returned a small part of the property to the Orthodox); in 1937–1938 in Kholm region, Podlasie, and Volyn, there was a campaign to convert the Orthodox population to Catholicism, and a number of Orthodox churches were destroyed.[5]

Certain changes in the attitude toward the Orthodox were associated with the activities of voivode Henryk Józefski.

2 Ilarion (Ohiienko), Vikipediia — Vilna entsyklopediia, data zvernennia 15 chervnia 2025. https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Іларіон_(Огієнко)#Біографія

3 Perekhid u chernetstvo buv zumovlenyi takozh i tym, shcho u 1937 r. pomerla yoho druzhyna Dominika Danylivna.

4 Narodyvsia Ivan Ohiienko, istoryk i pysmennyk, movoznavets, vydavets, pedahoh, hromadskyi, politychnyi i tserkovnyi diiach, Natsionalna biblioteka Ukrainy imeni V. Vernadskoho, data zvernennia 10 travnia 2025. http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/node/4570

5 Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : navch. posibnyk / za redaktsiieiu profesoriv A. Kolodnoho i P. Yarotskoho. Kyiv : Znannia, 1999. PP. 290–292.

Historian M. M. Kucherepa draws attention to the fact that an important factor in the "Volyn policy" of Voivode Henryk Józefski was the program of Ukrainization of the Orthodox Church in Volyn. It was assumed that its implementation in the region would return the Ukrainian population to the tradition of the union, lead to the replacement of the Russian national bishops, and give the church a Ukrainian character.[6]

Appointed Minister of the Interior of Poland on December 29, 1929, Henryk Józefski managed to prepare a draft document that formed the basis of the Decree of the President of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of May 30, 1930, convening the Local Council of the Orthodox Church in Poland. After the Decree was issued, a commission of the government and the metropolis began its work, which culminated in the drafting of the Law "On the Attitude of the State to the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church."[7] This law was adopted on November 18, 1938.



Henryk Józefski — initiator of Polish-Ukrainian understanding in Volyn

M. M. Kucherepa notes that an important step in changing the Ukrainian church with the support of Henryk Józefski was the establishment of the Metropolitan Petro Mohyla Society in Lutsk in 1931. The support of the Ukrainian Church led to the fact that as of November 1, 1935, 124 churches in the Volyn diocese had services in Ukrainian, 40 churches had Ukrainian services alternating

6 Kucherepa M. «Ridkisnyi pomizh poliakiv typ dzhentelmena» // Yuzevskyi H. Zamist shchodennyka / per. Yulii Vaseiko ; vstup. st. Mykoly Kucherepy ; pisliaslovo Mareka Zapora ; za zah. i nauk. red. Mykoly Kucherepy. Lutsk : Vezha-Druk, 2017. P. 31.

7 Kucherepa M. «Ridkisnyi pomizh poliakiv typ dzhentelmena»... P. 32.

with Church Slavonic, 99 churches had the Gospel, the Apostle, Credo, Our Father read in Ukrainian, and 126 churches had services in the Ukrainian tradition from time to time.[8]

The situation of the Orthodox Church in Volhynia changed with the deterioration of Ukrainian-Polish relations on the eve of World War II. This also affected the functioning of churches.



Holy Trinity Cathedral in Lutsk (modern photo)

8 Kucherepa M. «Ridkisnyi pomizh poliakiv typ dzhentelmena»... P. 32.

Soon, the process of the Ukrainian church in Volyn stopped, and religious affairs became purely political. In addition to the Volyn Ukrainian Union (VUO), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalsits (OUN), Ukranian National and Democratic Union (UNDO), Ukrainian Socialist and Radical Party (USRP), and other parties began to actively interfere in them. Polish politicians, the military, and the Roman Catholic Church did not stand aside, launching the so-called "revision of souls" or the forced re-baptism of Orthodox Christians. The reason for this was a change in Polish domestic policy.[9]

"Orthodoxy in Poland should be only Polish, which corresponds to its canonical and legal foundations, the spirit of the Orthodox Church. It was during the interwar 20th century that this idea was implemented forever..."

Already during the period of preparation and after the appearance of the appeal of the President of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to convene an Orthodox Council, changes took place in the minds of the Orthodox people. Volynians began to realize that Orthodoxy is not a "homeless foundling" that Moscow takes care of from outside Poland, not a hostile to Poland foreigner inherited by history, and not the last body that cannot cause a positive attitude among Poles and Catholics. They began to realize that Orthodoxy should not be persecuted by Catholic Poland, it is not its enemy, and it has domestic civil law, like everything else in Poland.

The situation was changing dramatically. Not only in Volyn, another obstacle to Polish-Ukrainian brotherhood was removed. One should keep in mind that despite the Polish-Ukrainian kinship and the closeness of Polish-Ukrainian traditions in the lands of Dnipro, Poland emphasized its Catholic position toward the Orthodox world. This reduced the chances of reaching an understanding with Ukraine.

This situation was not short-lived; it gradually took root in people's minds. Moscow did everything to make Poland perceived as a threat, a nightmare. In the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, this was a very strong trump card in Moscow's hands, which it lost after the proclamation of the Autocephalous Polish Orthodox Church.[10] Since then, Poland has

9 Kucherepa M. «Ridkisnyi pomizh poliakiv typ dzhentelmena»... PP. 32–33.

10 The Orthodox Church in Poland received independence (autocephaly) in accordance with the „Patriarchal and Synodal-Canonical Tomos of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of

cooperated with Orthodoxy and deprived Moscow of the role of its representative in Polish life.

Granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in the revived Poland has undoubtedly become an event of historical importance."[11]

Constantinople" dated November 13, 1924, for the recognition of the Orthodox Church in Poland as autocephalous, issued by Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory VII.

11 Yuzevskyi Henryk. Zamist shchodennyka (2) [...] (pereklad Yulii Vaseiko). Pravoslavia. 70 // Yuzevskyi H. Zamist shchodennyka / per. Yulii Vaseiko ; vstup. st. Mykoly Kucherepy ; pisliaslovo Mareka Zapora ; za zah. i nauk. red. Mykoly Kucherepy. Lutsk : Vezha-Druk, 2017. PP. 46–47.

10. THE ORTHODOX CHURCH UNDER SOVIET RULE (THE LATE 1930S–EARLY 1940S)

At the initial stage of its existence, the UAOC declared its loyalty to the Soviet government. Despite this, it was persecuted by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVS) for its Ukrainian patriotic position. Various obstacles were created to prevent the registration of its charter, and various accusations were falsified about the involvement of the church leadership and individual priests in nationalist associations. During the NKVS-inspired campaign against the so-called Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, a significant number of clergy were arrested in 1929. In these circumstances, the Third All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council in January 1930 announced the self-dissolution of the UAOC.

In the second half of the 20th century, the UAOC resumed its activities outside Ukraine in the diaspora in North America and Western Europe. The diaspora church was subordinated to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Several associations of the UAOC were created in the United States, Canada, England, Australia, and some countries of Latin America and Western Europe.

After the western Ukrainian territories became part of the USSR in September 1939, the new Bolshevik government paid special attention to anti-religious propaganda. When Volyn was part of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it was the place where the process of Ukrainization of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church began. Such figures as Arsen Rychynskyi, Ivan Vlasovskyi, Stepan Skrypnyk, and others were involved in the process. On their initiative, in 1927, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Congress was held in Lutsk, which adopted a broad program of Ukrainization of church life in Volyn. The second aspect of the Orthodox Church's activities in Volyn was the revival of brotherhood on

a national basis. There were the Lutsk Holy Cross Brotherhood and the Metropolitan Petro Mohyla Society.[1]



Stepan Skrypnyk — 1st Holy Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine, 2nd Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine, Metropolitan of Kyiv, 3rd First Hierarch of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Diaspora, 4th Metropolitan of the UOC of Canada, 5th Metropolitan of the UOC of the USA

By 1939, 1.5 million Orthodox Christians lived in western Ukraine, mostly in Volyn (according to the 1931 Polish census). The Soviet rule in the region brought lots of anti-religious literature and numerous lectures on this topic. Anti-religious propaganda in educational institutions, especially in schools, where it became an integral part of the educational process, was much more actively

1 The Metropolitan Peter Mohyla Society was founded in 1931 in Lutsk with the aim of spreading religious education and Orthodox consciousness based on the conciliarity of the ancient Ukrainian Church and named after Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Kucherepa M., Visyn V. Volyn: 1939–1941 rr. : navch. posib. Lutsk : Volynska oblasna drukarnia, 2005. P. 96.

pursued. An offensive was also launched against church organizations and clergy. On the basis of the Declaration of the People's Assembly, all church lands were nationalized. The land was transferred to collective farms, landless peasants, and those who owned small land plots. The church buildings and priests' houses were mainly confiscated for Soviet institutions, i.e. the offices of village committees, clubs, etc. The taxes imposed on parish churches and clergy by the financial departments were particularly high.[2]

In the first half of 1940, the Moscow Patriarchate began a large-scale campaign to subjugate the dioceses of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus that had recently become part of the USSR. Archbishop Sergius Voskresensky was sent here with the task of persuading Orthodox bishops to submit to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, to renounce the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Autocephalous Church in the former Poland, headed by Metropolitan Dionysius.

There were five hierarchs in western Ukraine: Archbishops Oleksandr and Oleksiy, and bishops Anatoliy (Martsenko), Simon (Ivanivsky), and Polycarp (Sikorsky). To these five, Patriarch Sergius appointed a sixth archbishop, Mykola Yanushevych, granting him the title of Archbishop of Volyn and Lutsk and Exarch of the Moscow Patriarchate for the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. The following year, he was elevated to the rank of Metropolitan of Volyn with his seat in Lutsk.

Researchers M. M. Kucherepa and V. V. Visyn argue that his appointment was not due to the needs of the church, but to a purely political necessity. They also note that the Metropolitan was housed in the same building as the NKVS, and the Metropolitan's office was adjacent to the NKVS room.[3]

In 1941, the hierarchs of the western Ukrainian lands were forced to go to Moscow and make statements of allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate. Only Archbishop Oleksandr of Polissya and Bishop Polikarp of Lutsk refused to do it. For refusing to submit to Moscow, on May 30, 1941, Patriarch Sergius removed Archbishop Oleksandr from the Polissia diocese and put him in a "state of rest." Archbishop Oleksandr refused to accept this order, as he stated in the city. He faced imminent arrest, from which he was saved by the war.[4]

2 Kucherepa M., Visyn V. Volyn: 1939–1941 rr... PP. 97–98.

3 Kucherepa M., Visyn V. Volyn: 1939–1941 rr... PP. 99–100.

4 Kucherepa M., Visyn V. Volyn: 1939–1941 rr... P. 100.

Despite the integration of the Orthodox Church in Volyn into the Russian Orthodox Church, the consequences of the anti-religious campaign during this period remained modest.

The liberation of the territory of Ukraine from Nazi troops opened a new page in the religious life of believers of various denominations and faiths, including the Orthodox. During the second half of the 20th century, the vectors of spiritual development of the Ukrainian SSR were determined primarily by the control of the totalitarian regime, historical and geopolitical heritage, and regional ethno-confessional peculiarities.[5]

The growing proportion of Russians among other nationalities in the republic contributed to the strengthening of the position of the Moscow Patriarchate, especially its conservative part, the Ukrainian Exarchate, which did not reject the possibility of a constructive dialogue with the authorities. In the second half of the 1940s, the USSR's state and party leadership made certain concessions to the church, recognizing the existence of a system of church institutions and partially allowing them to expand their spheres of activity.

During the second half of the 1940s and 1950s, profound processes in church and religious life took place in the western region of the Ukrainian SSR, namely, Rivne, Volyn, Ternopil, Lviv, Stanislav (Ivano-Frankivsk), Drohobych, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi regions. By 1944, it was characterized by the presence of several Christian churches opposed to the Stalinist regime. Using a policy of manipulation and provoking a conflict of interest, Moscow is trying to one by one get rid of church institutions that can publicly compete with communist ideology.[6]

Between 1944 and 1946, the Stalinist regime managed to eliminate one of the major ideological competitors in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, which was the Roman Catholic Church. This was due to the mass departure of Poles to the Polish People's Republic.

Another "problem" that the Soviet party authorities were solving was the presence of supporters of Ukrainian autocephaly and autonomy, namely, in

5 Yarmolenko M. Rehionalni osoblyvosti etnokulturnykh protsesiv v Ukraini u radiansku i postradiansku doby : monohrafiia / NAN Ukrainy, Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha ; Odeska natsionalna morska akademiia. Lviv, 2012. P. 57.

6 Yarmolenko M. Rehionalni osoblyvosti etnokulturnykh protsesiv v Ukraini u radiansku i postradiansku doby... P. 58.

Volyn. Researcher M. I. Yarmolenko argues that by the fall of 1939, the region had a well-established religious life under the jurisdiction of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. In addition to nearly seven hundred parishes, there were also monasteries, among which the Pochayiv Lavra was recognized as the leading one.[7]



Holy Dormition Pochayiv Lavra (modern photo)

In September 1939, the Sovietization of the western region of Ukraine began, which lasted until the beginning of the German occupation in 1941. The Orthodox Church was significantly weakened during the Soviet period. During the German occupation, there was a structural renewal. The conservative part of the Orthodox clergy united around Metropolitan Oleksii (Hromadskyi) and formed the Autonomous Church in prayerful unity with the Moscow Patriarchate, while the nationally conscious part joined Metropolitan Polycarp (Sikorsky) and formed the Autocephalous Church in canonical connection with the head of the Autocephalous Church in the General Province, Metropolitan Dionysii (Valedynskyi). For two years, bishops and priests from Volyn formed

7 An Orthodox monastery in Pochaiv, Kremenets District, Ternopil Region, with the status of a lavra. Controlled by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). The largest Orthodox shrine in western Ukraine. For a long time, it was a Basilian monastery. The Pochaiv Theological Seminary is located on the territory of the lavra.

Yarmolenko M. Rehionalni osoblyvosti etnokulturnykh protsesiv v Ukraini u radiansku i postradiansku doby... P. 60.

the personnel core of the church revival in Ukraine, both of the Autocephalous and Autonomous Churches. In 1942, a separate bishop of the Autocephalous Church with the title of Dubno vicar, Viacheslav (Lisicki), was ordained for the spiritual care of the Orthodox Czechs of Volyn, with his residence in the village of Kvasyliv Czech. Before the approach of the German-Soviet front, in early 1944, Bishop Viacheslav emigrated to the West, where he soon became a member of the episcopate of the Russian Church Abroad.[8]

The establishment of Soviet power in Volyn after and during the final stages of World War II led to the incorporation of Volynians into the Russian Orthodox Church. This process took place very quickly and, according to researcher M. I. Yarmolenko, it was caused not only by the activities of Soviet special services and agents who supervised the transition of the faithful to Moscow's positions, but also by the instinct for self-preservation and strong pro-Russian sentiments among the clergy of the Volyn and Rivne regions, and the Stalin regime's repression of Ukrainians.[9]

Bishop Pitirim (Svyrydov) of Kursk persuaded the clergy of the Autocephalous and Autonomous Churches to accept the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. M. I. Yarmolenko notes that as of July 1, 1944, out of 313 Orthodox communities in the Rivne region, 30 recognized themselves as autocephalous, 25 had a renewed (apparently autonomous) orientation, and 258 declared themselves to be an integral part of the ROC (presumably, some clergy, taking advantage of the uncertainty of wartime, provided incorrect information about jurisdiction to avoid political repression), but already in early 1945 the reports of the Commissioner in the Volyn region do not mention the existence of communities of other jurisdictions than the patriarchal one.[10]

8 Yarmolenko M. Rehionalni osoblyvosti etnokulturnykh protsesiv v Ukraini u radiansku i postradiansku doby... P. 60.

9 Yarmolenko M. Rehionalni osoblyvosti etnokulturnykh protsesiv v Ukraini u radiansku i postradiansku doby... PP. 60–61.

10 Orthodox religious figure in the Russian Empire and the USSR. Metropolitan of the Orthodox Church in the USSR; from 1943 — bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. Representative of the Exarch of Ukraine of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Volyn region. He played a key role in the NKVD operation to liquidate the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Volhynia during World War II.

The postwar period in Volyn was characterized by the fact that Soviet authorities actively closed churches. An artificial shortage of priestly personnel was created, and the tax burden made it impossible for the community of one parish to maintain a priest. Monastic congregations suffered a tangible blow from the Soviet and party administrations, which was associated with the closure of monasteries.

During the Second World War, Ukraine experienced changes caused by the USSR's state policy toward religion and cults. In times of military threat, even the communist authorities showed tolerant behaviour towards the church. However, this process did not last long.



Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky (1865–1944) was a church, cultural, and public figure, Metropolitan of Halych, Archbishop of Lviv, and Bishop of Kamianets-Podilskyi. Doctor of Law, Theology, and Philosophy. Full member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

With the entry of Soviet troops into the western territory of Ukraine, the question of the existence of the Greek Catholic Church arose, which the communist regime saw as a threat. The authority of the UGCC Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, parish priests, and monks among the local Western Ukrainian

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population contradicted the ideological dogmas of the Soviet regime. The communist leaders were also concerned about the fact that the UGCC was subordinated to the Pope and the Vatican.

The Kremlin leaders thought that the Russian (in the original "Russ") Church, which was dominant in the lands of Soviet Ukraine, was supposed to dominate the newly created western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. On March 17, 1945, J. Stalin signed the "Plan of Measures on Separating the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church from the Vatican and Joining it to the Russian Orthodox Church."[11] According to this plan, the Moscow Patriarch and the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church were directly involved in the implementation of this campaign.

The process of liquidating the UGCC was decided at the highest administrative level in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. In particular, this was evidenced by the following documents: "Letter of the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church to N. Khrushchev on the plan of measures aimed at the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church" (April 20, 1945); "Letter of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR N. Khrushchev to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Joseph Stalin on measures aimed at the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine" (December 27, 1945); "Letter of the People's Commissar for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR Savchenko to N. Khrushchev on the strengthening of the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine" (May 20, 1945); "Report of the Lviv Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to Comrade N. Khrushchev on the work done to reunite the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church in the Lviv region."[12]

The accession of the UGCC to the Russian Orthodox Church was to be decided by the so-called Lviv Church Council. Under the direct pressure of the authorities, a meeting was convened in Lviv on March 8–10, 1946, to which 214

11 Palinchak M., Kapitan L., Mehela R., Pupena V. Istorychni ta kanonichni aspekty otrymannia Tomosu v Ukraini / M. Palinchak, L. Kapitan, R. Mehela, V. Pupena // Rehionalni studii / redkol.: M. Palinchak (holov. red.), Yu. Ostapets, V. Bokoch ta in. — Uzhhorod : Vydavnychyi dim „Helvetyka", — 2020. — Vyp. 21. — PP. 82–88.

12 Palinchak M., Kapitan L., Mehela R., Pupena V. Istorychni ta kanonichni aspekty otrymannia Tomosu v Ukraini / M. Palinchak, L. Kapitan, R. Mehela, V. Pupena // Rehionalni studii / redkol.: M. Palinchak (holov. red.), Yu. Ostapets, V. Bokoch ta in. — Uzhhorod : Vydavnychyi dim „Helvetyka", — 2020. — Vyp. 21. — PP. 82–88.

pre-selected priests and 19 laymen arrived in advance. The content of the "work" of the Council was to urgently resolve two main issues: the severance of ties with Rome and the transfer of the church to the authority of the Moscow Patriarch. From the point of view of the canon law of both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the Council, as well as the Synod of the Orthodox Church, were completely illegal acts. Not a single Catholic bishop was present at the Synod, as they were all imprisoned. The ROC had no right to convene the Synod of the still existing UGCC. But for the Moscow Patriarchate and the Soviet regime, the issue of legality did not matter, since they had no respect for canon law. The Lviv Council of 1946 was a tragic milestone in the history of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine.[13]



Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj was a church leader, philanthropist, patriarch of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (1975–1984), cardinal (1965). Full (1930) and honorary (1964) member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, full member of the Tiberius Academy in Rome (1965), honorary doctor of the Ukrainian Free University (1969) and a number of universities in North America, member of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas (1989). Doctor of Theology (1918), Professor (1922). In 1945–1963 he was a prisoner of Stalin's camps.

13 Kontsur-Karabinovych N. Lvivskyi sobor 1946 roku ochyma svitovoi spilnoty. Skhid, 2015, №7, PP. 21–24; Palinchak M., Kapitan L., Mehela R., Pupena V. Istorychni ta kanonichni aspekty otrymannia Tomosu v Ukraini / M. Palinchak, L. Kapitan, R. Mehela, V. Pupena // Rehionalni studii / redkol.: M. Palinchak (holov. red.), Yu. Ostapets, V. Bokoch ta in. — Uzhhorod : Vydavnychyi dim „Helvetyka", — 2020. — Vyp. 21. — PP. 82–88.

Officially, the authorities claimed that this council was eliminating the decisions of the Union of Brest in 1596. In fact, the NKVS used this measure to fight the national movement and the clergy. The mass terror lasted from 1944 to 1946. Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj of the UGCC was sentenced by a secret court in Kyiv in March 1946 to long-term imprisonment in Stalin's camps.



Transfiguration Church in Lviv (modern photo)

The initiator of the Council, Gabriel Kostelnyk, became the new head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the region and was appointed to the post of administrator of the Lviv Archdiocese.[14]

Until the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church remained dominant in the Ukrainian SSR and in the western regions of the republic.

Changes came during Gorbachev's perestroika and were associated with the movement of the faithful for the restoration of the UGCC and UAOC, which took place in 1989–1990. However, in the western region of the country, the liquidation of the decisions of the so-called Lviv Church Council did not mean that all the faithful would transfer to the UGCC. Interdenominational confrontation began, and aiming to eliminate it, for example, the Lviv Regional Council on May 5, 1990 adopted a resolution "On Religious Denominations in the Lviv Region," and later adopted "Temporary Rules for Determining Denominational Affiliation."[15] Some cases were even resolved in court.

Head of the Department for Religious and Nationality Affairs of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine A. Yurash presented a map of religious denominations in the western region (published in 2013): 1582 church communities of the UGCC in the Lviv region accounted for 923 structures of Orthodox churches (69 — UOC-Moscow Patriarchate, 465 — UOC-Kyiv Patriarchate, 387 — UAOC and 2 independent communities, i.e. 63% of Greek Catholic communities and 37% of Orthodox ones. The percentage of Orthodox organizations is slightly increasing in Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions, where Kremenets, Shumsk, Lanovtsy, and part of Zbarazh district (Vyshnivetsk area)[16] ethnographically belong to the Volyn area with traditional Orthodox influence.[17]

14 Lvivskyi sobor 1946, Vikipediia — Vilna entsyklopediia, data zvernennia 15 travnia 2025. https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Львівський_собор_1946

15 Borutskyi Yu. Lvivska oblasna rada 25 rokiv tomu vidrodyla relihiini svobody. Ch.1., Vholos, data zvernennia 13 chervnia 2025. https://vgolos.ua/news/lvivska-oblrada-25-rokiv-tomu-vidrodyla-religijni-svobody-chastyna-1_183081.html

16 Podano za administratyvnym podilom, yakyi buv aktualnym dlia toho chasu.

17 Yurash A. Istorychni koreni ta sotsiolohichni vymiry suchasnoi polikonfesiinosti ukraintsiv Lvova i Halychyny // Istoriia relihii v Ukraini : naukovyi shchorichnyk / uporiad. O. Kyrychuk, M. Omelchuk, I. Orlevych. Lviv : Instytut relihiieznavstva — filiia Lvivskoho muzeiu istorii relihii ; Lohos, 2013. P. 25.

11. UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

The newly formed Ukrainian state sought to develop relations with religious denominations on new democratic principles. The dynamics of change in the religious area were associated with the opening of new churches and an increase in the number of parishes. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was proclaimed, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was legalized, and in the fall of 1989, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church — the Kyiv Patriarchate, which had been banned in the 1930s, was restored. A number of other religious associations were also legalized.[1]

In 1989, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) was revived. The church leadership called for the revival of autocephalous traditions throughout Ukraine. Taking advantage of the nationalist sentiments of western Ukrainians, wrote Greek Catholic Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk, the ideologues of the UAOC emphasized the priority of "their" Church, independent of Moscow and Rome, and interpreted the union as a betrayal of the "national cause" or an exclusively "regional phenomenon." It was the UAOC, not the

1 Stotskyi Ya. Derzhava i relihiia v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy: konfesiini transformatsii v konteksti derzhavnoi polityky 1944–1964 rokiv : monohrafiia. Kyiv : FADA.LTD, 2008. P. 6 ; Bondarenko V., Yelenskyi V. Tserkva y ukrainske suspilstvo: na novomu etapi // Liudyna i svit. 1992. № 3. PP. 19–23 ; Suchasna relihiina sytuatsiia v Ukraini: etap, tendentsii, prohnozy; / NAN Ukrainy ; In-t filosofii ; red. kol. H. Kosukha, V. Yelenskyi, A. Kolodnyi. Kyiv, 1994. Ch. 1. 176 pages ; Zhyliuk S. Bez apolohetyky. Vytoky onovlennia pravoslavnoi tserkvy v Ukraini. Zhytomyr : Polissia, 2000. 164 pages ; Pashchenko V. Pravoslavna tserkva v totalitarnii derzhavi: Ukraina 1940-kh — pochatku 1990-kh rokiv. Poltava : ASMI, 2005. 630 pages.

Moscow Patriarchate, that became the main competitor of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in 1990–1991 in the so-called "interconfessional conflicts" over churches and in the struggle for the sympathies of the faithful.[2]

In the western region, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was reviving, and its hierarchy was trying to attract the attention of believers to its denomination. The movement for autocephaly began at the parish of Saints Peter and Paul in Lviv (August 19, 1989) and was initiated by Volodymyr Yarema (1993 — Patriarch Dimitri). These ideas were also developed by the then Orthodox bishop, Bishop Nikodim.[3]



There was a choir at the church in Novyky, with Halyna Zavadska, Maria Sukha, Yulia Khoma, and others as active participants.

Some researchers argue that the revival of the UGCC and the UAOC was parallel. However, in the 1990s, their cooperation did not work out. On this occasion, the then chairman of the Lviv Regional Council, Vyacheslav Chornovil, noted: «It is a pity that the UAOC immediately took such a harsh stance towards

2 Bublyk T. Rol arkhiiepyskova Volodymyra Sterniuka v lehalizatsii UHKTs u 1988–1991 rokakh // Istoriia relihii v Ukraini. Naukovyi shchorichnyk. 2011 rik. Knyha 1. Lviv: Lohos, 2011. PP. 703–704.

3 Marchuk V. Hreko-katolytska tserkva v suspilnomu rozvytku Ukrainy: vidnovlennia i ofitsiine vyznachennia na perelomi 80–90 rr. KhKh st. // Skhid. — 2002. — P. 108; Yurash A. Ukrainske pravoslavia do i pislia patriarkha Dymyriia // Postup. — 2000. — 6 travnia.

the UGCC, and it is doubly unfortunate that they both chose confrontation instead of reasonable discussion».[4]

The transition to autocephalous positions depended on local religious communities, church activists, and, of course, the positions of priests. An example of such a transition is the parish in the Ternopil region, consisting of three rural settlements: Dobrovody, Novyky, and Chumali, which made the transition to autocephaly in 1990 and is now part of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). During a difficult period of interfaith relations, the parish priest, Father Volodymyr (Borys), opted for tolerant relations among believers and the dominance of Christian traditions in the region.[5] The current stage of the parish's development is associated with the revival and development of national religious rites and holidays. Father Volodymyr initiated the activities of church choirs and their performances not only in the church but also in rural communities.



The OCU church in Dobrovody (photo by Andriy Pyrizhok)

4 Chornovil V. Ideia yednosti dlia mene absoliutna // Vidrodzhennia. — 1990. — № 10. — P. 10.

5 Nasha tserkva khram dushi. Istoryko-kraieznavchyi narys / za red. M. Nazar. Ternopil: t-vo «Prosvita», 2019. 39 pages (The Church of St. Paraskeva in the village of Dobrovody transitioned to autocephaly on May 1, 1990; and on December 15, 2018, it became part of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) — p. 7 in the aforementioned publication).



The OCU church in Novyky (photo by Olena Chorna)

In Ukraine, a legal framework for state-church relations was established, regulated by the Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations," adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on April 23, 1991. The law granted religious organizations the right to engage in educational, charitable, manufacturing, and other socially useful activities.[6]

The general democratic movement was accompanied by national and cultural challenges that led to the creation of the Ukrainian Church. These changes began in early 1989 and were associated with the formation of the "Institutional Committee for the Revival of the UAOC." At the same time, the initiator of the church changes was the first hierarch of the UAOC, Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), who

6 Sukhyy O. Relihiini protsesy na Lvivshchyni v kintsi 1980-ykh — 1990-ykh rr.: suspilno-politychna sfera ta mizhkonfesiini vidnosyny. Lviv : PAIS, 2016. P. 4.

was in the United States. Mstislav was considered the locum tenens of the Kyiv Metropolitan See, and at the same time he was the Metropolitan of the UOC in the United States.



The OCU church in Chumali (photo by Olena Chorna)

Mstyslav issued an "Appeal to the reverend clergy and devout faithful in the homeland and throughout the world." In this "Appeal..." he convinced the laity of the legality and canonicity of his locum tenens on the Kyiv Metropolitan See, called on the faithful to take action aimed at reviving the UAOC in Ukraine, and in his other letters he approved the transfer of the UAOC parishes in Ukraine under the archpastoral care of Ecumenical Patriarch Demetrius I.[7]

7 Hordiienko D., Klos V., Mytsyk Yu., Prelovska I. Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy. Kharkiv : Folio, 2019. P. 131.

A new stage in the development of Orthodoxy in Ukraine was the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council, which took place in June 1990. Bishop John (Bondarchuk) presided over the council, and Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) (1898–1993), who served as locum tenens in 1990–1993, was elected the first Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine in absentia at this forum. Mstyslav's enthronement took place in November 1990, but since he continued to live in exile in the United States, by decision of the Council, Bishop John (Bondarchuk) was appointed head of the Kyiv Patriarchate.[8]



Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) has been a bishop of the UOC since 1966, and in 1992–2014 he was its Primate, Metropolitan of Kyiv, and All Ukraine (according to the Russian Orthodox Church). He was the chairman and member of the Synod of the UOC (MP), a permanent member of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, and a member of the Presidium of the Inter-Conciliar Presence of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Significant changes in the status of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine took place during the collapse of the USSR. The former Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Church became the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which gained

8 Zahynuv v avtomobilnii katastrofi pry zahadkovykh obstavynakh.

autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate while remaining canonically subordinate to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus'. The church was administered by the Synod of the UOC-MP, headed by the Metropolitan.

In November 1991, the Local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church appealed to the Moscow Patriarchate with a request to grant the UOC full autocephaly. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church did not give a specific answer to this initiative. Instead, the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church, regarding the granting of autocephaly to the UOC, decided to remove the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), from the position of exarch and stripped him of his title of metropolitan. Under these circumstances, in May 1992, the Moscow Patriarchate held a Council of Bishops (in the absence of Filaret) in Kharkiv, at which Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) was elected primate of the UOC.



His Holiness Patriarch Filaret of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine is a Ukrainian Orthodox bishop, Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) in 1995–2018, and since December 15, 2018, he has held the title of Honorary Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Filaret died on 20 March 2026. He was buried on 22 March at St Volodymyr's Cathedral in Kyiv.

Accordingly, representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church who supported Filaret held a unification council in Kyiv in June 1992 and spoke out in favor of the complete independence and canonicity of the UAOC. The council established the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate.

However, the decision of this council was not supported by some priests and laity of the UAOC. Events then unfolded as follows. After the death of the head of the UAOC, Metropolitan Mstyslav, Volodymyr Yarema (Dimitri) was elected

metropolitan at the UAOC council in 1994. The UAOC had 1,200 parishes in Ukraine, 110 of which were in Halychyna.



Dymytrii (Yarema) — Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Bishop of Pereiaslav and Sicheslav (1993), 3rd Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine (1993–2000).

In the circumstances that arose in the 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church strongly opposed the UAOC. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church did not show solidarity with it for long, none of the existing autocephalous churches recognized its canonicity, and the Patriarch of Constantinople did not support it either. Ukrainian autocephaly in the 1990s–2020s was fundamentally non-monolithic.



Volodymyr (Romaniuk) — Archbishop of Bila Tserkva (1991–1993), Archbishop of Lviv and Sokal (1993), Holy Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine (1993–1995).

Two centers of autocephaly emerged — Kyiv and Lviv. In eastern Ukraine, the urban population, especially the intelligentsia, was more sympathetic to autocephaly. A term was even coined to describe them — secular believers. Supporters of autocephaly fully recognize Orthodox doctrine. The only disagreements between them concerned who should head the church, where its center should be, and what language should be used in worship.

In October 1995, the Council of the UOC-KP elected Metropolitan Filaret, who had the title of Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine, as head of the church. The church had 3,508 religious organizations, 34 monasteries, 16 theological educational institutions, 23 missions, 1,086 Sunday schools, and 25 periodicals. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which was under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, had more than 10,400 communities of believers, 151 monasteries, 15 theological educational institutions, 95 periodicals, 3,746 Sunday schools, and 36 brotherhoods.

During this period, disputes between Filaret and Patriarch Volodymyr (Romanyuk) intensified.

Filaret gradually took power into his own hands, knowing about the patriarch's poor health. Not everyone was satisfied with this situation. Bishops began to side with Patriarch Dmytriy (Yarema). Volodymyr also turned to him. After another meeting, they agreed to relinquish their patriarchal powers in the event of the unification of the Orthodox churches of Ukraine. But this did not happen. On July 14, 1995, under mysterious circumstances, Patriarch Volodymyr (Romanyuk) died.

The patriarch's burial greatly exacerbated the religious situation in Ukraine. The UOC-KP, represented by Metropolitan Filaret and his entourage, set the goal of gaining recognition, emphasizing the fact that the UOC-KP is the main national Church, which, together with the state, is fighting for independence. The Kyiv Patriarchate took a negative position towards the UOC because the Ukrainian authorities accused it not only of church activities but also of political activities. This situation prompted the Ukrainian government on August 22 to appeal to the heads of churches, clergy, and believers in Ukraine with a call to "defend against attempts to manipulate the Church for personal and general goals."[9]

9 Neliubov O. Stanovyshche pravoslavnoi tserkvy v nezalezhnii Ukraini // Visnyk Derzhavnoi akademii kerivnykh kadriv kultury i mystetstv : nauk. zhurnal. Kyiv : Milenium, 2007. № 1. PP. 98–100.

Opposition to Filaret intensified. On September 10, 1995, a meeting of the dioceses of the UOC-KP of Western Ukraine was held in Rohatyn. They appealed to Filaret with a demand to refuse to run for the patriarchal throne. The meeting was outraged by the announcement of the unwillingness to establish communication with the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate with the aim of uniting the three branches of Orthodoxy in Ukraine into a single local Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

However, in October, the Council of the UOC-KP was held, which delegated a single candidate for the post of patriarch. It was Metropolitan Filaret. Filaret's entourage, in order to ensure a positive decision in the vote at the Local Council, managed to prevent the delegates from the UAOC with their statement to the UOC-KP from being admitted.[10] By a secret ballot on October 20 in St. Volodymyr's Cathedral — the Local Council of the Kyiv Patriarchate — Filaret was elected Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine. Some bishops who did not share the views of the new patriarch left the UOC-KP.

Conflicts arising from the confrontation within the Orthodox churches of Ukraine reached the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Following an appeal by 65 members of the Verkhovna Rada on March 5, 2001, the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine protested against the illegal registration of the UOC-KP. According to the protest, the act of registration of the UOC-KP was suspended.[11] However, the confrontation between Orthodox hierarchs continued in the following years.

In the first decade of the 21st century, religious denominations were established in certain regions.[12] In the western regions of Ukraine, these are the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate.

10 Neliubov O. Stanovyshche pravoslavnoi tserkvy v nezalezhnii Ukraini // Visnyk Derzhavnoi akademii kerivnykh kadriv kultury i mystetstv : nauk. zhurnal. Kyiv : Milenium, 2007. № 1. P. 100.

11 Neliubov O. Stanovyshche pravoslavnoi tserkvy v nezalezhnii Ukraini // Visnyk Derzhavnoi akademii kerivnykh kadriv kultury i mystetstv : nauk. zhurnal. Kyiv : Milenium, 2007. № 1. P. 100.

12 Kolodnyi A. Konfesiina karta Ukrainy: konfesiini ta rehionalni zrizy // Ukrainske relihiieznavstvo. 2008. № 46. PP. 23–47 ; Yoho zh: Relihiina merezha Ukrainy v yii problemakh i perspektyvakh // Ukrainske relihiieznavstvo. 2016. № 65. PP. 55–62.

There is a noticeable spread of parishes of the UOC-KP and the UAOC in the western and central regions and, at the same time, a small number in the southern and eastern regions of the country, where the pro-Russian UOC dominates.

Thus, as of 2011, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP) was the largest among Orthodox Churches, with a network comprising 67.5 percent of the country's Orthodox communities. The vast majority — 5,833 communities (47.3 percent) — are located in the North-Central region, with the largest number operating in the Vinnytsia (975) and Khmelnytskyi (929) regions. Over the past three years (2009–2011), the number of religious communities of the UOC-MP has increased by 801 (6.9 percent). The Church is governed by the Metropolis of the UOC-MP and 46 diocesan administrations. Today, the church has 12,340 parishes (9,922 clergy), 191 monasteries (4,625 monks), 14 missions, 34 brotherhoods, and 20 theological educational institutions (4,765 students). The life and activities of the UOC-MP are covered by 110 religious periodicals.

In its turn, the UOC-KP ranks second in the country after the UOC-MP in terms of the number of religious communities in its network. Over the past three years, the Church has expanded its network in all regions of the country. While at the beginning of 2009, it had 4,128 parishes; by January 1, 2012, their number had increased by 354 (8.6 percent). During 2009–2011, the growth of religious communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate amounted to 354 units, or 8.6 percent.[13]

The UAOC has a strong presence in the western regions of Ukraine. As of 2016, the UAOC had 1,239 religious organizations, 61% of which were located in the three western regions of Ukraine. Church sermons in the UAOC were conducted by 709 priests. There were 380 students in eight theological educational institutions of the church. At the beginning of 2017, it had 305 Sunday schools and 13 monasteries. The UAOC Church publishes 12 media outlets. As mentioned above, the largest number of autocephalous organizations are located in the western regions (Lviv — 393, Ivano-Frankivsk — 149, Ternopil — 210), and

13 Zaporozhets V. Dynamika rozvytku merezhi UAPTs, UPTs KP ta UPTs u nezalezhnii Ukraini (1991–2017 rr.): zakonomirnosti ta tendentsii // Naukovyi chasopys Natsionalnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni M. P. Drahomanova. Seriia 7: Relihiieznavstvo. Kulturolohiia. Filosofiia : [zb. nauk. pr.]. Kyiv : Vyd-vo NPU imeni M. Drahomanova. 2018. Vyp. 39(52). P. 7.

they are also numerically significant in the Khmelnytskyi (80) and Cherkasy (65) regions. During the recent primacy in the Church of Metropolitan Mefodiy, there was active opposition due to his personal whims to the unification of the UAOC with the UOC-KP. The next head of the Church, Metropolitan Makariy, also showed no desire to create a United Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The unification of the UOC-KP and the UAOC was opposed by those bishops and priests from the latter who had transferred from the Kyiv Patriarchate. In recent years, the Church has been replenished with bishops and, consequently, parishes from other Orthodox Churches, including those from Transcarpathia. The Archbishop of Kharkiv and Poltava, with the parishes under his jurisdiction, separated from the UAOC to form the UAOC-Renewed. Thirty organizations of the Renewed are scattered across seven regions of Ukraine, with the largest number in Poltava (13) and Luhansk (6) regions.[14]



Metropolitan Makariy is a bishop of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan of Lviv, and a permanent member of the Synod. 4th Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine (2015–2018).

14 Zaporozhets V. Dynamika rozvytku merezhi UAPTs, UPTs KP ta UPTs u nezalezhnii Ukraini (1991–2017 rr.): zakonomirnosti ta tendentsii // Naukovyi chasopys Natsionalnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni M. P. Drahomanova. Seriia 7: Relihiieznavstvo. Kulturolohiia. Filosofiia : [zb. nauk. pr.]. Kyiv : Vyd-vo NPU imeni M. Drahomanova. 2018. Vyp. 39(52). P. 8.

Researcher V. A. Zaporozhets claims that by 2018, the following changes had taken place in Ukrainian Orthodoxy (referring to the period from 1991 to 2017):

- The UOC increased its membership by almost 2.5 times. This was due not only to the existing influence and number of parishes of this religious organization before 1991, but also to significant support from the state authorities;
- The network of religious communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate increased more than threefold. This rapid development was associated with the presence of pro-Ukrainian forces in the leadership of state and local authorities, as well as various historical events in the modern period (the Orange Revolution, Euromaidan, ATO, etc.);
- the dynamics of the development of the UAOC religious network are quite ambiguous in this context. Firstly, it has not grown since our country gained sovereignty, and secondly, it has lost its religious communities due to internal conflicts, with parishes transferring to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate or the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (renewed).[15]

An important event in the religious life of Ukraine took place on June 23–27, 2001, when Pope John Paul II visited Ukraine at the invitation of the President of Ukraine and the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. John Paul II's visit to Ukraine was an important event in the religious and socio-cultural life of the country.

The main obstacle to the papal visit to Ukraine was the tough stance on this issue taken by the Russian Orthodox Church and its Ukrainian branch, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.[16]

John Paul II's decision to visit Ukraine meant that the most prominent spiritual leader of the West had decided to ignore Moscow's claims to Ukraine as an area of its "exclusive influence." The Pope's sermons and speeches during his

15 Zaporozhets V. Dynamika rozvytku merezhi UAPTs, UPTs KP ta UPTs u nezalezhnii Ukraini (1991–2017 rr.): zakonomirnosti ta tendentsii // Naukovyi chasopys Natsionalnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni M. P. Drahomanova. Seriia 7: Relihiieznavstvo. Kulturolohiia. Filosofiia : [zb. nauk. pr.]. Kyiv : Vyd-vo NPU imeni M. Drahomanova. 2018. Vyp. 39(52). P. 9.

16 Sukhyy O. Relihiini protsesy na Lvivshchyni v kintsi 1980-ykh — 1990-ykh rr.: suspilno-politychna sfera ta mizhkonfesiini vidnosyny. Lviv : PAIS, 2016. P. 9.

visit to Ukraine demonstrated his full support for an independent Ukraine and its preservation and development as an independent state.[17]



Pope John Paul II. On June 23–27, 2001, he met with the laity of Kyiv, Lviv, and other cities of Ukraine.

However, Russian influence on religious processes in Ukraine was growing. On the eve of Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Russian official structures took numerous actions that showed that Russia sought to become a superpower, restore an imperial-type formation, impose its will, its understanding of good and evil, in short, its Moscow philosophy of life on the whole world. Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus' delivered an "advanced speech" at the opening of the Assembly of the "Russian World" in 2010, setting out the so-called "momentous tasks": ensuring for the "Russian world" "the role of a powerful player on the world arena"; "preserving the values and way of life that our ancestors cherished and, guided by which, they created, in particular, great Russia"; and "becoming a strong player in international global politics." These provisions clearly contradicted the spirit of Christianity. In Kirill's interpretation, the "Russian world" is, first and foremost, a common "civilizational space" built on three

17 Zinchenko A. Novitnia istoriia relihiinykh spilnot v Ukraini : navch. pos. dlia stud. spets. «istoriia». Kyiv : Kyiv. un-t im. B. Hrinchenka, 2001. PP. 349–350.

pillars: (1) Orthodox Christianity; (2) Russian culture and especially language; (3) "common historical memory" and common views on "social development."[18]

During this period, the influence of the Russian government and church structures on the Orthodox Church in Ukraine intensified. However, Ukraine underwent radical socio-political changes, marked by uprisings of the people — the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity — which affected religious processes in the country. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was most closely associated with the Moscow Patriarchate; therefore, due to the political situation in the country, its leadership denied any connection with the Russian Orthodox Church, considering that it existed only as a liturgical tradition of the "mother church."[19]

In the context of the hybrid war with the Russian Federation, the movement for the creation of a single local Orthodox Church gained momentum in Ukrainian society.

The processes became more pronounced during the presidency of P. Poroshenko, who repeatedly addressed the issue of forming a single local Orthodox Church of Ukraine throughout 2016 (during meetings with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, primates of local Orthodox churches, representatives of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, and Patriarch Filaret).[20]

In March 2016, the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, had a meeting with the Archbishop of Constantinople — Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in Turkey, where the prospects for the creation of a Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine were discussed at the official level. The next step was the "Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to His Holiness Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople and New Rome, Ecumenical Patriarch, regarding the granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine" (resolution (On the Appeal, 2016) was supported by 245 Members of Parliament). In the appeal, the

18 Palinchak M., Kapitan L., Mehela R., Pupena V. Istorychni ta kanonichni aspekty otrymannia Tomosu v Ukraini / M. Palinchak, L. Kapitan, R. Mehela, V. Pupena // Rehionalni studii / redkol.: M. Palinchak (holov. red.), Yu. Ostapets, V. Bokoch ta in. — Uzhhorod : Vydavnychyi dim „Helvetyka", — 2020. — Vyp. 21. — PP. 82–88.

19 Tserkvu nazyvaly «Pravoslavna tserkva Ukrainy» — PTsU, a ne «Pravoslavna tserkva Ukrainy Moskovskoho patriarkhatu» — PTsU MP.

20 Kyrydon A. Tomos pro nadannia avtokefalii Pravoslavnii tserkvi Ukrainy: arkhitektonika protsesu // Umanska starovyna. 2019. № 6. http://usj.udpu.edu.ua/article/view/190039

MPs asked the Ecumenical Patriarch to take "an active part in overcoming the consequences of the church schism by convening, under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, an All-Ukrainian Unification Council that would resolve all contentious issues and unite Ukrainian Orthodoxy." In addition, the Council asked Constantinople to "issue a Tomos of autocephaly for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine." The MPs also appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch with a request to cancel the 1686 tomos on the annexation of the Kyiv Metropolis of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to the Moscow Patriarchate (on the transfer of the Kyiv Metropolis from the Constantinople jurisdiction to Moscow).[21]

In April 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko appealed to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (Appeal of the President of Ukraine, 2018) with a request to grant a tomos of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and announced his intention to create a single local church. The appeal of the president was supported by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (On Support for the Appeal, 2018) (268 deputies).



Epifaniy is the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine since December 15, 2018, and Head of the Department for External Church Relations of the OCU.

On October 11, 2018, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul:

- confirmed its previous decision to continue the process of granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian church;

21 Kyrydon A. Tomos pro nadannia avtokefalii Pravoslavnii tserkvi Ukrainy: arkhitektonika protsesu // Umanska starovyna. 2019. № 6. http://usj.udpu.edu.ua/article/view/190039

- revoked its synodal letter of 1686 entrusting the Moscow Patriarch with the duty of ordaining the metropolitans of Kyiv, who were ecclesiastically subordinate to Constantinople, which the Russian Church interpreted as a transfer of the Kyiv Metropolis to Moscow;
- reinstated the episcopal or priestly rank and ecclesiastical communion with world Orthodoxy of the leaders of the unrecognized Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Filaret (Denysenko), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Makariy (Maletych), and the clergy and believers subordinate to them;
- announced the restoration of its stauropegia (representation) in Kyiv.[22]



Tomos of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine

After a long preparatory stage, on December 15, 2018, a unification council was held in Kyiv, attended by hierarchs and believers of the UOC-KP and the UAOC, as well as two bishops from the UOC (MP) (Metropolitans Simeon

22 Kyrydon A. Tomos pro nadannia avtokefalii Pravoslavnii tserkvi Ukrainy: arkhitektonika protsesu // Umanska starovyna. 2019. № 6. http://usj.udpu.edu.ua/article/view/190039

and Olexander of the Moscow Patriarchate of the UOC), where the creation of a single local Orthodox Church — the Orthodox Church of Ukraine — was announced. The primate of the newly created church became Metropolitan Epifaniy (Serhiy Dumenko) of Kyiv and All Ukraine, previously the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne of the UOC-KP.[23]



His All-Holiness, Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome,
and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I

23 Kyrydon A. Tomos pro nadannia avtokefalii Pravoslavnii tserkvi Ukrainy: arkhitektonika protsesu // Umanska starovyna. 2019. № 6. http://usj.udpu.edu.ua/article/view/190039

On January 5, 2019, in Istanbul, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew signed a tomos granting independent status to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The scroll of the tomos of autocephaly for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was prepared (handwritten) by the most famous Athos artist and calligrapher, Lucas, from the Xenophontos Monastery on Mount Athos.

On January 6, 2019, a historic event took place in Istanbul (in the Cathedral of St. George the Victorious, which is the residence of the Patriarch of Constantinople). Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew solemnly presented the Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epiphanius, with the "Patriarchal and Synodal Tomos of Autocephaly for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine."

The receipt of the Tomos and the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was truly an epoch-making event not only in the history of church life but also in the state and global dimensions.

12. ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY IN UKRAINE AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH AND 21ST CENTURIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL DISCOURSE

12.1. IN ANTICIPATION OF INDEPENDENCE

In this section, we will limit ourselves to individual events and their socio-humanitarian interpretation based on statistical data and individual expert and sociological studies, which testify to the wide range of nation-building processes and the struggle of Ukrainian society for its own national local Orthodox Church. It should be noted that in the context of post-communist transformations and the acquisition of statehood by the republics of the former USSR, the process of institutionalising the national Orthodox tradition had certain peculiarities. Ukraine, which suffered from the totalitarian legacy of the past and fought for its own path of spiritual development, was no exception. There is ample evidence of this in the widespread publicity of the dissident political movement in the 1980s, the efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to defend their native language and faith, the activities of the „Helsinki" group, and the desire to preserve their faith, above all in the form of the banned Greek Catholic faith. In this context, it is worth mentioning the so-called movement and large group of supporters of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and Transcarpathia, the so-called „crypto-Uniates" (secret, hidden supporters of Greek Catholicism), who attended Orthodox churches but retained a specific Catholic mentality and insisted on traditional forms of worship and rituals.



Cathedral of the Holy and Equal-to-the-Apostles Grand Duke Volodymyr,
a church of the UOC-KP

Despite the totalitarian oppression and persecution suffered by ordinary Ukrainian believers, on the eve of Gorbachev's reforms, Ukraine was by no means a religious desert, as there were officially about 4,000 Orthodox communities and 9 of the 16 monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church, more than 1,100 communities of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Christians of the Evangelical faith (Pentecostals), Seventh-day Adventists, about 100 Roman Catholics (40% of them Hungarian communities in Transcarpathia), 80 Reformed Christians, and 14 Jews. Almost 7, ,000 clergymen were officially registered in the republic (38.8% of their number in the USSR).[1] However, unregistered, usually illegal communities remained outside the official statistics, in particular Greek Catholics and Jehovah's Witnesses, which were banned in the USSR. The number of communities more than doubled in just a year or two. However, this number was grossly insufficient to meet the basic religious needs of the population.

1 Yelenskyi V. Relihiia i «perebudova. Liudyna i svit. 2000. №11–12. P. 11.

Believers constantly, sometimes for decades, fought for the right to register their communities, suffering pressure from the dominant communist ideology, which placed at the centre of its influence a long-standing tradition of „fighting religion": overcoming religiosity, reducing the number of religious communities and believers, and diminishing religious observance. V. Shcherbytsky, who headed the Communist Party of Ukraine from 1972 to 1989, also took an orthodox position on religious issues. Party officials of the republic repeatedly expressed concern about the disproportionately high share of religious communities in Ukraine on a national scale and their determination to change the situation.

Orthodox Christianity has deep roots in Ukraine, and its spirit permeates the national culture, consciousness and traditions of a significant part of the Ukrainian people. The Orthodox tradition was dominant in the former Soviet Union. Ukraine undoubtedly played the most prominent role in this regard. This is evidenced by the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 50% of all religious organisations operating in the former USSR were concentrated in Ukraine. In Russia, the figure was 25%, and 25% in the other 13 states. This steady growth trend in the religious network is characteristic of Ukraine.[2]

Ukraine's independence accelerated and changed the map of religious processes and strengthened its influence on all spheres of state building. We see three important periods in the development of the Orthodox tradition. The first period was the structuring of religious processes and the formation of Ukrainian religious identity. In terms of time, it lasted from the early 1990s to the 2000s. The second period was the struggle of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for its independence and autonomy (autocephaly). This period was marked by granting the Tomos (2018). The third period is the functioning of the church's autocephaly under new conditions, which largely covered the period of the Russian-Ukrainian war and continues to this day.

2 Kozlovskyi I. Pislia rozpadu SRSR polovyna usikh yoho relihiinykh orhanizatsii buly v Ukraini — naukovets, URL: https://ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2761437-pisla-rozpadu-srsr-polovina-usih-jogo-religijnih-organizacij-buli-v-ukraini-naukovec.html (16.08.2019).

12.2. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ORTHODOX FACTOR ON THE STRUCTURING OF RELIGIOUS AND CONFESSIONAL PROCESSES AND THE FORMATION OF UKRAINIAN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY (1991–2000)

The early 1990s were marked by the development of religious pluralism in Ukraine and a new rethinking of the significance of the Orthodox factor for the development of Ukrainian statehood. As of 1991, there were already 26 denominations and over 10,800 religious organisations in Ukraine.[3] During this period, the issue of the Orthodox Church became a matter of national importance. The absence of a local Orthodox Church in Ukraine, on the one hand, hindered the achievement of internal social harmony and stability, but on the other hand, undermined the international prestige of our country. The emergence of three Orthodox churches in Ukraine: the UAOC, the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP, each representing different factions of the Orthodox community, further complicated the spiritual, cultural and political landscape at the time, as the political elites, depending on which voters they represented, fought for the favour of one or another branch of Orthodoxy.

If we look at the church history of that time,[4] in August 1989, Lviv priest Volodymyr Yarema announced his withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church together with his parish. The initiative was supported by dozens of others. Already in October, the restoration of the UAOC was announced and the ordination of bishops not subordinate to Moscow began. For example, by beginning of 1990, about 200 Galician parishes had joined the UAOC. In June, Kyiv joined the process. On 5–6 June 1990, an All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council was held here with the participation of 700 priests and 20 bishops.

3 Relihiia v Ukraini. URL: https://vue.gov.ua/%D0%A0%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B3%D1%96%D1%8F_%D0%B2_%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%96 (25.05.2024).

4 Dyv. det.: Borotba ukrainskoi tserkvy za avtokefaliiu na pochatku 90-kh rokiv. URL: https://5.ua/suspilstvo/borotba-ukrainskoi-tserkvy-za-avtokefaliiu-na-pochatku-90kh-rokiv-181240.html (16.11.2018); Istoriia pravoslavnoi tserkvy v Ukraini: Zbirka naukovykh prats. Kyiv: Chetverta khvylia, 1997. 292 pages.

It confirmed the creation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and elected the Patriarch of Kyiv. Mstislav Skrypnyk[5] became the patriarch. The Church Statute was also adopted. Metropolitan Mstislav himself was absent from this Council and did not immediately accept his election as Patriarch. Metropolitan Ivan (Bodnarchuk) became the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne in Kyiv.[6] The democratisation of political life in Ukraine contributed to the fact that in the autumn of 1990, Metropolitan Mstislav (Skrypnyk) of the UAOC was able to visit Ukraine. On 18 November 1990, his enthronement as Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine took place in St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.

The revived UAOC considered itself the successor to the Ukrainian Church, which emerged in the 1920s and was destroyed by the Soviet authorities. However, these events of the early 1990s in Ukraine were clearly not significant for Constantinople (and the then Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios I). On the other hand, the process of proclaiming the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the Local Council of 1990 took place without agreement at the pan-Orthodox level. The Russian Orthodox Church launched a campaign to discredit the UAOC, calling it schismatic, self-consecrated and uncanonical. Despite this, on 2 October 1990, the authorities of the Ukrainian SSR officially registered the UAOC.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church faced challenges in the early 1990s as it sought recognition and autonomy within the Orthodox community. The issue of Ukrainian autocephaly was not regulated by Orthodox canons and was self-proclaimed, which led to tensions within the Orthodox Church. The desire for independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the newly independent Ukraine was seen by its supporters as justified and historically inevitable, highlighting the complex interaction between religion, politics and

5 In 1918, as a layman, he volunteered for the cavalry regiment of the Ukrainian People's Republic. He took part in battles against Russian occupiers. He was awarded the rank of ensign. In 1920–1921, he was Simon Petliura's personal aide-de-camp. In the 1940s, he became a hierarch of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. He was arrested by the Gestapo. After World War II, he headed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States. He did not lead the UAOC for long. He died in 1993 in Canada.

6 IIstoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy — Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu. Relihiino-informatsiina sluzhba Ukrainy. URL: https://risu.ua/istoriya-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-kijivskogo-patriarhatu_n52322 (16.11.2011).

national identity. In addition, after his brief stay in Ukraine, Patriarch Mstislav returned to the United States. He appointed Bishop Anthony (Masendych) of Rivne as his deputy, to manage the affairs of the Patriarchate in Kyiv. He was later elevated to Metropolitan of Pereyaslav and Sicheslav. Thus, the absence of the head of the UAOC from the country, as well as a series of internal misunderstandings and conflicts within the Ukrainian part of the UAOC in 1990–1991, led to confrontation between different groups and bishops within the church. This made it impossible for the church to clearly define its structure and normalise church life.[7]



Intercession Cathedral ("Armenian" church) in Ivano-Frankivsk (modern photo)

Considering the processes of national and religious revival in Ukraine, seeking to limit the spread of the UAOC and to preserve its presence in Ukraine by all means, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) carried out a partial reorganisation of its territorial structures. By decision of the Bishops'

7 Ukrainska Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva. Relihiino-informatsiina sluzhba Ukrainy. URL: https://risu.ua/ukrajinska-avtokefalna-pravoslavna-cerkva_n33544 (20.06.2011).

Council of the ROC (25–27 October 1990), the name "Ukrainian Exarchate" (a structural unit of the ROC on the territory of Ukraine) was abolished, and the status of the unit was elevated to autonomy. As a result, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate) was established, whose primate was given the title „His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine." The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was granted greater autonomy in its administration but remained subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. On 25–27 November 1990, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church adopted the Statute of the UOC, which states: „The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is united with the Local Orthodox Churches through the Russian Orthodox Church" (Section 1, paragraph 3). The UOC remained a territorial structural entity of the ROC, with elements of local self-government. The head of the UOC became the former Ukrainian exarch of the ROC, Filaret (Denisenko).[8]

Metropolitan Filaret[9] demanded greater independence, but in 1992 he was removed from office. In October 1992, a new Orthodox Council was established in Kyiv with the participation of Filaret's supporters, creating the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Since then, there have been three Orthodox churches in Ukraine: the UAOC, the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate, and the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate. Among them, the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate had canonical status, meaning it was recognised as legitimate by other Orthodox churches around the world.

8 Kyrydon A. Pravoslavna tserkva Ukrainy // Velyka ukrainska entsyklopediia. URL: https://vue.gov.ua/Православна церква України (дата звернення: 24.05.2024)

9 After Ukraine gained independence, Metropolitan Filaret became an advocate of the thesis: „An independent Ukraine needs an independent Church." In November 1991, the Local Council of the UOC appealed to the Moscow Patriarchate with a request to grant the church canonical independence. In April 1992, the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church not only rejected this request but also considered it a schism, excommunicated Metropolitan Filaret and demanded his removal. At the Council of Bishops of the UOC in Kharkiv (May 1992), which took place under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Filaret was accused of „sins incompatible with the ministry of the Primate of the UOC" and schismatic activity, and was removed from office. Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) became the head of the UOC.

In June 1992, Metropolitan Volodymyr (Romaniuk) of the UAOC[10] proposed to Filaret that the church structures be united. At a joint council of the UAOC and the UOC on 25–26 June 1992, a decision was made to withdraw the communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (which supported the idea of independence for the Church) from the Russian Orthodox Church and to establish an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church — the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). Mstislav (Skrypnyk) was elected Primate of the Church with the title of Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine. The Church declared itself the successor to the Kyiv Metropolis. However, during the church-building process, tendencies towards division intensified: part of the clergy and believers of the UAOC did not recognise the new union and split off. After the death of Patriarch Mstislav (1993), the Local Council elected Patriarch Dimitri (Yarema) as head of the UAOC (enthroned on 14 October 1993). In turn, the Council of the UOC-KP elected Metropolitan Volodymyr (Romaniuk) . as Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-UkraineHe did not remain Patriarch of Kyiv for long. In 1995, he suffered several heart attacks and died after another attack. On 18 July 1995, supporters of the Kyiv Patriarchate attempted to bury their leader on the grounds of St. Sophia Cathedral. They were prevented from doing so by representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The funeral procession turned into a bloody massacre, which went down in history as Black Tuesday. After bloody clashes with security forces, the patriarch's body was buried at the entrance to St. Sophia Cathedral. This event exacerbated disputes within the UOC-KP over the election of a new patriarch. The main contenders were Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko) of Kyiv and Metropolitan Andriy (Abramchuk) of Halych. Despite serious opposition to Filaret's candidacy, he was elected patriarch at the Local Council of the UOC-KP in October 1995 (enthroned on 22 October 1995).[11] A significant number of communities that did not accept the new patriarch left the church and joined the UAOC. While

10 Volodymyr Romaniuk is a long-time Soviet prisoner and dissident. He was first arrested in 1944 for belonging to an organisation of Ukrainian nationalists. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison camps. He was arrested again in 1972 for anti-Soviet propaganda. He was sentenced to seven years in prison and three years in exile. Volodymyr Romaniuk baptised Vyacheslav Chornovil. In prison, he declared his conversion to the Autocephalous Church.

11 Kyrydon A. Pravoslavna tserkva Ukrainy // Velyka ukrainska entsyklopediia. URL: https://vue.gov.ua/Православна церква України (дата звернення: 24.05.2024)

at the beginning of 1995, the UOC-MP was supported by 6 000 communities of believers, the UOC-KP had 1,753 communities, and the UAOC united 616 Orthodox communities. After the elections, 593 communities that had left the UOC-KP joined the UAOC.[12] However, over time, Vladyka managed to gradually consolidate and strengthen the church.

The emergence of three Orthodox churches on the religious map of Ukraine intensified interfaith conflicts within the country. The historical roots of the conflict lie primarily in the long-standing division of the Ukrainian people between different confessions. A significant reason for the sharp escalation of inter-church conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the spontaneous beginning of religious revival, the sharp redistribution of spheres of influence among churches, exacerbated by the varying pace of democratisation in the religious and church spheres.[13] Some of the problems arose through the fault of religious organisations, their leaders, officials, influential politicians, political parties, movements, and public organisations. Among the Orthodox themselves, these conflicts were not only ideological and religious in nature but also political, which was due from the outset to the direct influence of Russia (the Russian Orthodox Church[14]) on the governance and activities of the UOC-MP. This is pointed out by S. Kagamlik, who speaks of the lack of effective agreements on the creation of a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which was linked to the different views of each side on the principles of the unification process (which of the current

12 Dianova N. Istoriia relihii ta tserkvy v Ukraini v natsionalnomu ta yevropeiskomu kontekstakh : navch. posib. Odesa : Odes. nats. un-t im. I. I. Mechnykova, 2019. P. 236. (252 pages).

13 Herheliuk M. Kanonichni ta ekleziolohichni zasady avtokefalnoho ustroiu tserkov u strukturi Vselenskoho Pravoslavia: istorychnyi kontekst [Tekst] : Dys. kand. ist. nauk: 09.00.11, Nats. un-t «Ostroz. akad.». Ostroh, 2014. P. 139. (200 pages.) URL: https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Herheliuk_Mykola/Kanonichni_ta_ekleziolohichni_zasady_avtokefalnoho_ustroiu_tserkov_u_strukturi_Vselenskoho_pravoslav.pdf?

14 Russian Orthodoxy, represented by the Russian Orthodox Church, as an instrument of great power politics, carries projects that have nothing to do with faith and are based primarily on the Kremlin's ambitious plans to rebuild the empire, at least within the borders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The priority tasks of the ROC clergy are not to fulfil their pastoral duties but to promote the ideology (doctrine) of the "Russian world," which aims to theoretically justify and practically help reincarnate Russia as an imperial superpower within the borders of 1914.

Orthodox Churches would become the basis for such a union) and different, even radically opposing, understanding of canonicity. In particular, the leadership of the UOC-MP believed that such a unification was possible precisely on their basis as the most representative religious structure in Ukraine, according to the results of sociological studies. The model for this „unification" consisted of appealing to the UOC-KP: „repent and join us." Moreover, according to the concept of the current head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, the idea of the „Russian world," which today is exclusively anti-Ukrainian, was to be the basis of church unity.[15] In the global context, there was a clear division of Orthodoxy in Ukraine into pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian structures. The pro-Ukrainian trend prevailed in June 1992, when some communities that supported the idea of an „independent Church in an independent state" left the jurisdiction of the UOC and united in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate, which proclaimed itself the successor to the Kyiv Metropolis. However, the collapse of the temporary union between the UOC-KP and the UAOC marked the final jurisdictional split of the Orthodox community into three church structures. As a result, the religious situation in Ukraine remained one of the most complex among all post-Soviet countries.

Until mid-1992, with a few exceptions, the Orthodox and Greek Catholics were the main opponents, but then things got way worse, especially over property (conflicts around religious buildings), and relations between the Orthodox got really tense. As V. Voynalovich notes, „the involvement of increasingly serious church resources in the inter-Orthodox conflict led to its total nature. Unlike the parties to the Orthodox-Greek Catholic conflict, who did not seek the complete destruction of the opposing church, the parties to the inter-Orthodox conflict were unwilling to accept the very fact of each other's existence and each sought to eliminate the other".[16] Therefore, as V. Voinalovich concludes, „the inter-Orthodox conflict took on an irrational character from the very beginning and became increasingly dangerous. Moreover, unlike the Orthodox-Greek Catholic conflict, which was limited to four regions (Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv,

15 Kahamlyk S. Mizhkonfesiine protystoiannia v suchasnii Ukraini: formy vyiavu ta shliakhy protydii. Ukrainoznavchyi almanakh. 2020. Vyp. 27. P. 96. (PP. 94–99).

16 Voinalovych V. Suchasne ukrainske pravoslavia: stari i novi vyklyky. Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy. 2018. Vyp. 3–4. P. 162. (PP. 141–192).

and Ternopil), the inter-Orthodox conflict had every chance of spreading, if not to the whole country, then at least to a very significant part of it."[17] This was one of the factors that prevented the Orthodox Church in Ukraine at that time from establishing itself in an autocephalous status that would have been recognised by the Orthodox world.

During the period under review, political processes and power structures had a significant impact on the institutionalisation of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. As M. Revutsky points out, a major problem in the 1990s was the mutual influence of religion and state policy.[18] Relations between the authorities and the Orthodox Church were complicated, as the authorities were faced with a choice between relying on a state-controlled church to regulate the entire system of state-church communications. Therefore, to regulate relations between state authorities and religious organisations in the context of democratisation of society, the Law of Ukraine „On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations" was adopted on 23 April 1991. The Law[19] defined the basic principles of state-church relations, which generally corresponded to the fundamental principles of the functioning of religion and the church in developed countries: separation of church and state and of school and church, secular nature of the state, proclamation of equality of religions before the law and equality of citizens regardless of their attitude to religion, introduction of registration of statutes (provisions) of religious organisations to enable them to acquire legal personality, non-interference of the state in the activities of religious organisations, a policy of returning religious buildings and property nationalised in the past to religious organisations, the existence of a special authorised body of state executive power to promote the implementation of state policy on religion and the church, and control over compliance with current legislation on religion and the church. In

17 Ibid. P. 162.

18 Revutskyi M. Pravoslavna tserkva v Ukraini v 90-kh rr. XX st.: problemy instytutsiinoho rozvytku. Ukrainske pravoslavia u konteksti vitchyznianoi istorii ta suspilnykh transformatsii (pamiati mytropolytiv Vasylia (Lypkivskoho) ta Ioana (Bodnarchuka): Materialy Vseukrainskoi naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii. Ternopil, 2014. P. 116.

19 Zakon Ukrainy «Pro svobodu sovisti ta relihiini orhanizatsii». Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. 1991. № 25. P. 283.

turn, the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk,[20] as a former member of the Communist Party, sought to implement a policy of support for one of the churches — initially the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and then the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate, which was to be the sole representative of all Ukrainian Orthodoxy and, in essence, embody the state church. This gave rise to a number of conflicts within the Orthodox (religious) community itself. Thus, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, not wanting to be absorbed by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate, held its own council after the death of Patriarch Mstislav and elected a new patriarch, Dimitri (Yarema). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate also convened a council, at which Volodymyr (Romaniuk) was elected patriarch and Metropolitan Filaret was elected his deputy. After these councils, the confrontation in the Orthodox community intensified even more. It even reached the point where the Ukrainian authorities ignored the UAOC, belittled its ecclesiastical status in every possible way, and reduced the institutional structure of the Church in official statistical reports to „religious communities called autocephalous."

The open support of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate by the authorities significantly politicised the religious issue and demonstrated the imbalance in the country's religious life and a departure from the above-declared principles of separation of church and state. During the presidency of L. Kravchuk, a number of significant mistakes were made in state policy towards the church. This is pointed out in particular by O. Bilous, who systematically lists the following mistakes made by the authorities at that time:

- excessive politicisation of society, the authorities and the church, attempts to use religion as a political tool;
- lack of a scientifically sound concept of state-church relations and poor choice of priorities in the religious and church sphere, interference by the state and political forces in church affairs, actions by the authorities based on sympathy for some churches and antipathy towards others;

20 L. Kravchuk also initiated the use of religion as a political electoral technology (on the eve of the 1991 presidential elections, on the initiative of L. Kravchuk, who at that time was the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and a candidate for the post of President of Ukraine, an All-Ukrainian Interreligious Forum was held in Kyiv, attended by representatives of all 16 confessions existing in Ukraine).

- lack of a unified approach by government structures and various political forces to resolving religious issues;
- significant influence of the Soviet model of state-church relations on religious and church life in Ukraine;
- insufficient use of past experience and lessons in religious and church policy;
- the authorities' haste in obtaining autocephaly for the church;
- state support for Metropolitan Filaret, a hierarch compromised in church circles;
- the absence of a realistic forecast of the possible consequences of state policy in the religious and ecclesiastical sphere and the proclamation of autocephaly in the proposed manner.[21]

The coming to power of the next President of Ukraine, L. Kuchma, in 1994 was marked by attempts to resolve existing conflicts by abandoning the idea of creating a state and unified national church, which later resulted in the aforementioned events of 18 July 1995. during the mass beating of participants in the funeral procession of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) by law enforcement officers on St. Sophia Square in Kyiv, which caused a significant international outcry. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate was particularly dissatisfied with the actions of the authorities, which essentially deprived it of state support at the highest level. Its representatives blamed the President of Ukraine and the authorities for what they called anti-Ukrainian or pro-Russian church policy.

During this period, the religious landscape became significantly more complex (between 1988 and 1995, the number of religious denominations increased almost fourfold), with the growth rate of religious networks being the highest in Europe. Among the manifestations of religious activity, there were also cases of antisocial and destructive activities by neo-religious groups (the Great White Brotherhood of YSMALOS, 1994).[22]

21 Bilous O. Etnokonfesiina polityka v Ukraini v 90-kh rokakh KhKh stolittia: rehionalni osoblyvosti i zakonomirnosti. Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy. 2017. Vyp. 1. PP. 256–257. (PP. 251–264).

22 Relihiia v Ukraini. URL: https://vue.gov.ua/%D0%A0%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B3%D1%96%D1%8F_%D0%B2_%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%96 (25.05.2024).

Subsequently, the authorities attempted to reduce interfaith tensions by establishing the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations in 1996, which had the status of an interfaith consultative advisory body and included 14 Christian churches. It was intended to serve as a platform for establishing interfaith contacts. An important event in the further development of relations between the state and the church was the signing, on 21 July 1997, in the presence of President L. Kuchma, of the Memorandum of Christian Confessions of Ukraine on the Rejection of Force in Interfaith Relations. The memorandum was intended to ensure the rejection of force in interfaith relations and reduce ideological confrontation. High hopes for the normalisation of relations between the Church and the state, the easing of conflict and confrontation in the religious sphere, and the improvement of interfaith relations, especially between Christian churches, were pinned on the celebration of the 2000th anniversary of the Nativity of Christ, which was marked at both the church and state levels.

The formation of dialogue platforms in the country contributed to a certain extent to reducing the number of acute interfaith conflicts in the late 1990s. Thus, between 1995 and 1999, the growth rate of religious communities gradually declined to 6–8% per year. The de-escalation of tensions was evidenced by a decrease in the number of settlements with cases of open confrontation between believers of different faiths (from over 1,500 in the early 1990s to about 300 in 1996, soon to 97 settlements in the Ternopil, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, and Zakarpattia regions), and a several-fold decrease in recorded violations of legislation on freedom of conscience (from over 500 cases in 1992–1993 to 127 in 1998).[23]

The reduction in religious conflicts was also facilitated by the intensive construction of places of worship and an increase in the number of religious organisations (communities) in Ukraine. While in 1991 there were only 9,944 religious organisations in Ukraine, by 1992 there were already 12,962 (an increase of 30%). Accordingly, in 1993, there were 15,017 religious organisations (an increase of 16%). A high growth rate was also recorded in 1995, when the number of religious organisations reached 16,984, an increase of 13.5%. Although such high growth rates were not observed in the following years, the growth trend remained stable: 1996 — 18,111 organisations (an increase of 6.8%), 1997 — 19,110 (an increase of 5.5%), 1998 — 20,408 (an increase of 6.8%), 1999 — 21,843 (an increase of 7%),

23 Ibid.

2000 — 23,543 (an increase of 7.8%), 2001 — 25,405 (an increase of 7.9%). As of 2010, there were 35,184 religious organisations operating in Ukraine (an increase of 25.4% compared to 2000).[24] Despite the fact that the growth of the religious network is currently taking place in the Centre, North and South, the Western region remained the centre of church and religious life in the country at the beginning of the 21st century. At the beginning of 2000, there were 10.1 communities per 10,000 people in the Western region (the highest number was in the Ternopil region — 13.1; the lowest was in the Ivano-Frankivsk region — 8.1). In the centre, there were 5.4 communities (the highest number in the Khmelnytskyi region — 8.7; the lowest was in the Kirovohrad region — 3.2). In the Northern region, there were 4.2 (the highest number was in Zhytomyr region — 6.4; the lowest — in Kyiv city — 1.7). In the South, there were 3.0 (the highest number was in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea — 4.0; the lowest — in Sevastopol city — 1.5). In the East, there were 1.9 communities per 10,000 population (the highest in Zaporizhia region — 2.6; the lowest in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv regions — 1.5).[25] Thus, the difference between the West and East of Ukraine in 2000 was more than 50% according to this indicator.

In regional terms, according to statistical reports of the State Committee for Nationalities and Religions under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for 1999 (as of 1 January 2000) and 2007 (as of 1 January 2008), conducted by N. Kochan,[26] certain differences in the religious and denominational preferences of believers were noted. Thus, according to statistical analysis, *the western region* has traditionally been associated with Greek Catholicism. The UGCC was numerically dominant in the Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions, where Greek Catholic communities accounted for 55.1% of their total network. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church held a dominant position in Volyn (47.3% of the total number of communities), Zakarpattia (36.5%) and Rivne (44.8%) regions; Protestant communities ranked second with 28.3%, 35.5% and 30.2%,

24 Soliar I., Krasivskyi O. Transformatsiia derzhavno-tserkovnykh vidnosyn v Ukraini (1989–2021). P. 62. URL: http://baltijapublishing.lv/omp/index.php/bp/catalog/download/232/6092/12717-1?inline=1

25 Tserkva i suspilstvo v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn. Analitychna dopovid UTsEPD im. O. Razumkova. Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona. 2000. № 10. P. 27.

26 Dyv.: Kochan N. Relihiinist v Ukraini: rehionalnyi vymir. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats «Politolohichni studii». 2010. Vyp. 1. PP. 197–208.

respectively. In the Chernivtsi region, Protestant communities were in the majority with 42%, while the UOC came second with 39.8%. In the western region, the share of Orthodox communities decreased from 51.5% to 35.4% between 1992 and 1999. Almost two-thirds of the UOC communities were displaced from Galicia during the first few years after the legalisation of the UGCC. Instead, newly formed Orthodox churches — the UOC-KP and the UAOC, which position themselves as "national" — spread in the region: in 2008, the former had 42.9% of the total number of communities in the Western region, while the latter had 70.8%. In *the centre,* the share of UOC communities was 54.7% of the religious network. In 2008, almost a third of all UOC communities operated in the centre, with the largest number concentrated in the Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi regions. Protestant organisations ranked second in the region with 26.4%. Roman Catholic communities have a significant presence in the region, most of which are concentrated in the Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi regions, traditional areas of residence of the Polish minority (39.7%). In *the Northern region,* almost half of religious communities belonged to the UOC (49.8%); various Protestant communities ranked second (26.7%). The presence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (13.6%) was also noticeable in the region. *In the Southern region*, 46% of religious communities belonged to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 27.2% to Protestant denominations, and 11.7% to Muslim organisations. The South was home to 86% of the country's Muslim communities, as well as the largest number of religious communities of national minorities. In the Eastern region, 45.8% of the religious network belonged to the UOC, 39.2% to Protestant communities (the highest percentage in the region). A distinctive feature of the eastern region is its openness to new religious movements (neo-Christian, neo-Orientalist, neo-pagan).

The growth in the number of religious communities was accompanied during this period by an increase in the level of religiosity among the population of Ukraine. For example, in 1991, 48% of respondents identified themselves as religious, in 1994 — 60%, in 1997 — 61%, and in 2000 — 80%.[27] Subsequently (during 2010–2020), the proportion of believers among adult Ukrainian citizens averaged 70%. The growth in the number of believers during the stressful period

27 Osoblyvosti relihiinoho i tserkovno-relihiinoho samovyznachennia hromadian Ukrainy: tendentsii 2000–2020 rr. (Informatsiini materialy). Tsentr Razumkova. Kyiv, 2020. P. 3 (110 pages).

of 2013–2014 was significant: 2013 — 67%; 2014 — 76%.[28] The proportion of non-believers, "convinced atheists," and those indifferent to questions of faith remained insignificant: the former accounted for 5–6%, the latter 2–4%, and the third group 5–7%.[29] Thus, the vast majority of the Ukrainian population identified themselves as religious (whereas in Soviet times, only a minority associated themselves with religion).[30]

At the time of Ukraine's independence, some foreign research agencies estimated that about 39% of Ukrainians identified themselves as Orthodox Christians (Pew Research Center, 2017).[31] By the end of the 1990s, this figure had risen to 57.53% (with 21.95% of Ukrainians identifying themselves as Greek Catholic, 5.31% as Roman Catholic, 10.34% with Protestantism, and about 4.86% as simply Christian). As we can see, in the 1990s, the majority of Ukrainians who regularly attended church services identified themselves as Orthodox. On the other hand, despite its diversity, the Orthodox factor revealed an interesting pattern, which V. Yelensky draws attention to: „Studies conducted in Ukraine consistently recorded a paradoxical, at first glance, phenomenon: despite the fact that the UOC, in unity with the Moscow Patriarchate, has 2.3 times more communities than both Ukrainian Orthodox Churches that have declared themselves independent, many more respondents declare their affiliation with the UOC-KP than with the UOC in unity with the Moscow Patriarchate. This is confirmed by studies conducted over several years by various sociological services: between 25% and 32% of respondents report their affiliation with the UOC-KP, between 7% and 12% with the UOC in unity with the Moscow Patriarchate, and

28 Kyrydon A. Markery pravoslavnoho seredovyshcha Ukrainy: relihiino-konfesiina identychnist (1990–2021). Istoriia relihii v Ukraini. 2021. Vyp. 31. P. 206 (PP. 201–213).

29 Osoblyvosti relihiinoho i tserkovno-relihiinoho samovyznachennia hromadian Ukrainy: tendentsii 2000–2020 rr. (Informatsiini materialy). Tsentr Razumkova. Kyiv, 2020. P. 3

30 The level of religious self-identification according to monitoring surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine since 1994 was 46.3%, 50.3% in 1996, 51.2% in 1998, and 53.3% in 2000.

31 Relihiia ta natsionalna prynalezhnist u Tsentralnii ta Skhidnii Yevropi. 10.05.2017. P. 7. URL: https://pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/05/CEUP-Overview-Russian-FOR-WEB.pdf

between 0.5% and 2% with the UAOC.[32] For those familiar with the realities of religious life in Ukraine, there can be only one interpretation of these results. By declaring affiliation with the Kyiv Patriarchate rather than the Moscow Patriarchate, a person declares their identity, which has a Ukrainian vector.

The influence of Orthodox Christianityon all spheres of public life at the end of the 20th century was so significant that it not only accounted for over 53% of the entire religious network in Ukraine but also became an irreversible process of nation building, which became particularly important in the political events that engulfed the country at the beginning of the new millennium. It was a time of tense interfaith (interchurch) relations and conflicts, the influence of government structures on the activities of the church, the restoration of the UAOC on a national-territorial basis, the formation of the UOC-KP, and the struggle against the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the UOC-MP. The split into three independent, hostile churches, each claiming to be the sole representative of Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine, led to a religious crisis unprecedented in the history of our country. The way out of this crisis turned out to be a long political process, involving compromises and the defence of independence and Ukrainian identity by armed means in the face of Russian aggression, starting in 2014.

12.3. THE STRUGGLE OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH FOR ECCLESIASTICAL AUTOCEPHALY (2001–2018)

The beginning of the new millennium was marked for the Ukrainian state by the further development of transformational processes and the rejection of the consequences of totalitarian ideology, when everything national, culture, religion, observance of folk traditions, and its own path of development were considered undesirable and harmful. The processes in the sphere of spiritual life were also ambiguous and required systematic study. The first large-scale study of the level and characteristics of religiosity among Ukrainian citizens and their understanding of the role of religion and the Church in the lives of individuals,

32 Yelenskyi V. Relihiia i suchasnyi natsionalnyi rozvytok. Relihiia i natsiia v suspilnomu zhytti Ukrainy y svitu. Za red. L. Fylypovych. Kyiv : Naukova dumka, 2006. P. 260. (286 pages).

society and the state, conducted in 2000 by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Research (now the Razumkov Centre — *authors' note*), is considered significant.[33] The study revealed a steady trend towards an increase in religious sentiment. Those who considered themselves believers in 2000 accounted for 87.9% of those surveyed. The proportion of Orthodox Christians remained around two-thirds, which gave researchers grounds to speak of the dominance of the „Orthodox factor" and became further evidence of the persistence of pro-Orthodox sentiments in the mass consciousness of Ukrainians. In this context, N. Pivovarova draws attention to the existence of an „Orthodox consensus," which was adhered to at that time by many who did not have a clearly defined worldview, could not call themselves sincere believers, but nevertheless associated themselves with the faith of their people and their parents (in essence, there was an illogical expansion of the concept of „Orthodox" in the mass consciousness, which at that time also included the concept of „believer"). In her opinion, this can be interpreted in two ways: (1) as the identification of Orthodox identity with national (ethnic) identity, since tradition is the dominant lever for religious self-determination; (2) as the flourishing of Orthodox conformism.[34] In addition, at the national level in 2000, a positive attitude towards Orthodoxy was also recorded at 77%; for example, in 2013, this figure was already 81%.[35] Attitudes towards other faiths had regional characteristics, but in no region did negative attitudes towards any faith prevail.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, spiritual life in Ukraine has been significantly influenced by political instability in Ukraine and attempts by the current authorities to essentially usurp power in the country and concentrate it in the hands of one person — the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. This intensified confrontation at all levels, especially between the presidential vertical and parliament.[36] It should be noted here that an important event in the

33 Dudar N., Shanhina L. Vira y relihiia v zhytti ukraintsiv. Natsionalna bezpeka. 2000. № 10. PP. 83–98.

34 Pyvovarova N. Relihiinist ukraintsiv: tendentsii desiatylittia. Hrani. 2014. № 5 (109). P. 77. (PP. 75–79).

35 Ibid. P. 78.

36 According to the new law, a mixed electoral system was introduced in Ukraine, whereby 50% of deputies were elected from party lists and 50% in single-member constituencies. According to the results of voting in the nationwide multi-mandate constituency with 30

political life of the country in 2000–2001 was the regrouping of political forces in the country, especially on the eve of the 2002 parliamentary elections. Consequently, during the autumn and winter of 2001, pre-election blocs were formed. However, one of the indicators of political confrontation was the All-Ukrainian referendum (16 April 2000). The newly elected president for a second term, Leonid Kuchma, sought to strengthen his personal power through a nationwide referendum „on the initiative of the people". Over 80% of voters who took part in the vote were in favour of a bicameral parliament, reducing the number of MPs from 450 to 300, getting rid of parliamentary immunity, and giving the president the right to dissolve parliament early. The implementation of the referendum's decisions put on the agenda the issue of making significant changes to the Constitution and the electoral law. However, for various reasons, primarily political, this was not done.

The period in Ukrainian history between winter and spring 2001 was marked by the biggest political crisis in the history of independent Ukraine and was held under the slogan „Ukraine without Kuchma." The political crisis was linked to the murder of opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze. During the investigation, negative phenomena began to emerge in the upper echelons of power. This was compounded by recordings made by SBU Major Mykola Melnychenko in the President's office, which allegedly indicated the involvement of senior officials in this and other high-profile crimes (the so-called „tape scandal"). The opposition decided to take advantage of the opportunity to change the government. Mass demonstrations and protests were organised, which ended in clashes with the police (9 March 2001). However, the opposition was

electoral blocs and parties, the 4% threshold was exceeded by: the Our Ukraine bloc led by V. Yushchenko (23.55%), the Communist Party of Ukraine (20.01%), the For a United Ukraine bloc (V. Lytvyn) (11.79%), the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) (7.25%), the Socialist Party of Ukraine (6.87%), and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (6.27%). At the beginning of the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the new convocation, the parties and blocs that won the elections formed their factions. The For a United Ukraine! faction included 177 deputies (the number of deputies indicated corresponds to the moment of the formation of the factions; changes occurred later), the „Our Ukraine" faction included 118 deputies, the CPU faction included 64, the SDPU(o) faction included 31, the BYuT faction included 23, the SPU faction included 22, and 12 deputies chose to remain non-factional.

unable to achieve its goals. On 26 April 2001, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine expressed its distrust of the government of V. Yushchenko (the protesters had high hopes that he would democratise all aspects of public life in the country and fight against the dominance of oligarchic clans), and on 28 April 2001, he was dismissed from office. Anatoliy Kinakh became the new Prime Minister. At the end of spring, the opposition's offensive subsided and the authorities managed to overcome the crisis. However, its authority was significantly undermined both within the country and abroad. The political crisis had a significant impact on the subsequent elections in 2002, as the authorities' disregard for the real needs of society led to social apathy and distrust of state institutions. According to opinion polls, around 30% of Ukrainian citizens did not consider any form of civic engagement necessary, not even voting in the Verkhovna Rada elections, until a certain point in time (2002). One of the reasons for this state of affairs was a feeling of powerlessness (about 90% of those surveyed said they had no influence on either central or local authorities) and the expectation of a leader („chief") who would be ready to lead the masses and change the situation in the country (about a quarter of those surveyed indicated this). the weakness of social institutions designed to act as catalysts for social activity.[37] According to the results of sociological surveys at that time, the social institutions that had the greatest influence on society were financial and industrial structures (64% of respondents), political parties (58%) and the media (30%). Next in terms of influence on society were local self-government (21%) and the church (19%). The least influence was exerted by the public (13%) and trade union organisations (9%), as well as creative organisations (3%) and interest groups (3%).[38]

The 2002 elections to the Verkhovna Rada only intensified the confrontation between the President and the parliament. In the following two years (2002–2004), L. Kuchma attempted to implement political reforms that provided for the redistribution of power between the President, the Prime Minister and the Verkhovna Rada. Powerful political forces formed around the President, seeking to retain economic and political leverage. Meanwhile, opposition forces, backed by the middle class, launched a struggle against the existing regime for

37 Vyhovska T. „Pomarancheva revoliutsiia" ta yii vplyv na hromadiansku zrilist ukrainskoho suspilstva. Universytetski naukovi zapysky. 2005. № 1–2. PP. 390–391.(PP. 389–394).

38 Voitenko T., Honcharuk O., Pryvalov Yu. Hromadianske suspilstvo v Ukraini: analiz sotsialnoho konstruiuvannia. Vidp. red.: Yu. Saienko. Kyiv: Stylos, 2002. P. 75.

the democratisation of political life. The confrontation culminated in the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. Long before the official start of the election campaign, all political forces in the country, both government and opposition, began to prepare for them. The position of President Leonid Kuchma remained unclear for a long time. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled that, according to the Constitution of Ukraine (1996), L. Kuchma was only in his first term in office, although in fact two terms had already passed. Ultimately, L. Kuchma refused to participate in the 2004 elections. The ruling party's candidate was Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Yanukovych. All means were used to create a positive image of him, from the direct use of administrative resources to the open dissemination of false information. Using his official position, V. Yanukovych took a number of populist measures. In particular, pensioners were given pension supplements and wages were increased.



Photo from Denis D. "Holy or sinful? How the Holy Dormition Sviatohirsk Lavra Became a Part of the 'Russian World'", Local History. Access mode: https://localhistory.org.ua/rubrics/building/sviata-chi-grishna-iak-sviato-uspenska-sviatogirska-lavra-stala-chastinoiu-russkogo-mira/

One of the peculiarities of the election campaign was the large number of candidates for the presidency of Ukraine — more than 20 — and widespread pre-election and election manipulation. However, the main election battle was between two candidates, V. Yanukovych and V. Yushchenko, who was the new leader around whom the opposition forces had gathered under the slogan „Our Ukraine." The presidential election took place on 31 October 2004. The votes were distributed as follows: V. Yushchenko — 39.26% of the votes, V. Yanukovych — 39.11%, O. Moroz — 5.82%, P. Symonenko — 4.97%, N. Vitrenko — 1.53%, A. Kinakh — 0.93%. The remaining candidates received fewer votes. During the elections, the Central Election Commission, headed by S. Kivalov, showed bias by failing to announce the final results of the vote for ten days. In addition, it became clear that the CEC's computer network had been subject to external interference. This distribution of votes did not produce a winner who had received more than 50% of the vote. The second round of elections was scheduled for 21 November 2004. As in the first round, the political rivals were V. Yushchenko and V. Yanukovych. A new feature of the second round was that an open televised debate was held between the two candidates for the presidency of Ukraine. The second round of voting was marred by significant fraud in favour of the candidate supported by the authorities. As a result, the data published by the Central Election Commission on the victory of V. Yanukovych differed strikingly from the exit polls, which showed V. Yushchenko as the winner. Outraged by this state of affairs, voters responded to the opposition candidate's call to defend their choice and gathered for a rally in the central square of Kyiv on the evening of 21 November.[39] The main result of the revolution was the appointment by the Supreme Court of a second round of presidential elections (not directly provided for by law). As a result of a compromise reached by the factions of the Verkhovna Rada, after the appointment of a second round of elections (V. Yushchenko won the second round. He received 51.99% of the votes, while V. Yanukovych received 44.20%). Amendments to the Constitution were adopted, which became known as the 2004 Constitutional Reform. The constitutional reform reduced the powers of the president and thus reduced the significance of the disputed presidential elections.

39 During those days, between 100,000 and 500,000 protesters from all over the country gathered on Independence Square in Kyiv. According to sociologists, between 5 and 6 million people took part in acts of civil disobedience.

The Orange Revolution was another important step in gaining and strengthening the independence of the young country. On the other hand, the Orange Revolution revealed new contradictions in religious life, as it marked the beginning of a confrontation with pro-Russian forces that supported Viktor Yanukovych, who embodied the values of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and gave it maximum preferences at the state level, both during his „revived" premiership and as the next fugitive president after Viktor Yushchenko.

In general terms, the political confrontation between V. Yushchenko and V. Yanukovych revealed two polar geopolitical trends in views on the future development of Ukraine: pro-European and pro-Ukrainian. Therefore, the UOC-MP immediately took a clear position in support of its candidate. The pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych was considered to be spiritually guided by the elder Zosima, who was known for his zeal for Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church [Slavko]. There are known facts of campaigning for Yanukovych in churches of the UOC-MP, where rumours spread about his blessing for victory in the elections from Jerusalem and Athos elders. Some hierarchs even resorted to open campaigning in support of Yanukovych, such as Metropolitan Agafangel of Odessa and Izmail, who stated: „I call on the faithful of Odessa to cast their votes in the upcoming elections for a worthy presidential candidate, Viktor Fedorovich Yanukovych. This man deserves the attention of God and the people" [Congress of Russian Organisations in Odessa supported Viktor Yanukovych]. Another well-known representative of the UOC-MP Similar cases of campaigning occurred even before the second round of elections, i.e. before the events of the Orange Revolution, which, of course, later — during the protests — put the UOC-MP in an awkward position. The deputy head of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Pavel (UOC-MP), called the participants in the rallies a „mad crowd" and declared that „there is no God in such a gallery."[40] Other Orthodox churches and some denominations in Ukraine that took a pro-European stance did not show excessive activity in promoting presidential candidates, which emphasised their loyalty to the principles and laws of democracy. As noted by Yu. Hanushchak, the participation of the UOC-KP in the events of the Orange Revolution and in the 2004 election campaign in general demonstrated that its political orientation

40 Dyv. det.: Hanushchak Yu. Rol tradytsiinykh Tserkov u transformatsiinyi protsesakh perekhodu vid totalitarnoho do demokratychnoho ustroiu v Ukrainy (1989–2005 rr.). Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu, seriia «Istoriia», 2021. Vyp. 2(45). P. 64.

positioned it as an ally of Ukraine in building a European and democratic state, and loyalty to democratic principles: the clergy encouraged voters to be active participants in state-building processes and, refraining from campaigning, called first and foremost for an analysis of the candidates' programmes.[41]

The process of increasing democratisation in all spheres of public life before and after the Orange Revolution led to a certain strengthening of the church as a social institution. Maidan opened up all opportunities for representatives of different religious denominations to be close to their believers during these fateful times for Ukraine. During the Orange Revolution, there was a surge of socio-political activity among religious organisations, which manifested their civic position. For example, every day on Maidan began with prayer, and on weekends, interfaith liturgies and prayer services were held. The protests were openly supported by Patriarch Filaret (UOC-KP), Cardinal Lubomyr Husar (UGCC), and Anatoliy Shengait, leader of the Jewish community in Kyiv.[42] It was precisely the spiritual component and the role of the leaders of the largest churches and religious associations in these public actions that ensured their absolutely peaceful nature and the absence of bloodshed during the most serious political crisis in the country's history at that time.

After these events, the next page in Ukraine's modern history was marked by the beginning of a permanent dialogue between state authorities and religious associations, based on partnership and the principle of non-interference by the state and the Church in each other's affairs. The dialogue between the state and the Church developed, starting at the level of the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister and reaching the level of regional state administrations and municipal councils. In addition to the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations, other interfaith consultative institutions also revived their activities. These include the Council of Representatives of Christian Churches of Ukraine and the Council of Evangelical Protestant Churches of Ukraine. There was a process of growing interfaith tolerance and consolidation of churches and religious organisations in the face of social challenges.

41 Ibid. P. 65.

42 Dyv.: Kostiuk D. Vplyv «pomaranchevoi revoliutsii» na rozvytok hromadianskoho suspilstva v Ukraini (2004–2013 rr). Vcheni zapysky TNU imeni V.I. Vernadskoho. Seriia: Istorychni nauky. 2018. Tom 29 (68). № 1. P. 21. (PP. 19–24).



Bishop Yevstratiy (Zorya) of Vasylkiv of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate during the Orange Revolution[43]

The Orange Revolution allowed the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations to rethink its role and become a more independent and socially active structure. Moreover, the positioning of the AUCCRO as an independent body was necessary because the liquidation of the State Committee for Religious Affairs (13 April 2005) did not mean the abolition of the „State Body of Ukraine for Religious Affairs," as its existence is provided for by current Ukrainian legislation. An important step in the new social reality was the call by churches, members of the AUCCRO, to rethink the concept of „separation of

43 Kyselov O. Diialnist Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov ta relihiinykh orhanizatsii pislia Pomaranchevoi revoliutsii. Relihiina svoboda: Mizhkonfesiinyi dialoh yak skladova stanovlennia hromadianskoho suspilstva. Naukovyi shchorichnyk. 2007. № 12. P. 185 (PP. 184–187).

Church and state" [Draft Concept of State-Confessional Relations in Ukraine, 2004] on the path to understanding the independent entities of the Church and the state, which have their own spheres of activity and can nevertheless form partnerships. The AUCCRO initiated the conclusion of a memorandum with the Ministry of Education and Science, which introduced a course in Christian ethics in schools, and since 2011, the state has recognised theology as a speciality in higher education institutions. Also important is the signing of a memorandum „On cooperation in pastoral care for servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, which laid the foundation for the development of chaplaincy in the Armed Forces, following the example of Western countries [Concept of Pastoral Care in the Armed Forces of Ukraine of 22 April 2011].

The Orange Revolution and its consequences for the national revival of Ukrainian society with renewed vigour raised the issue of the identity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which is characterised by such distinctive features as conciliarism, democracy, openness, religious tolerance, closeness to European traditions, and humanism.[44] It was these features that became the basis for the further ideological struggle for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the revival of its national ecclesiastical identity, stripped of centuries of layers associated with the influence of Russian Orthodoxy.

In the first decade of the 21st century, the most active promotion of the idea of autocephaly occurred during the time of President V. Yushchenko. The head of the Ukrainian state sought ways to unite Ukrainians within a single Orthodox Church. He made every effort to ensure that this momentous event took place during the visit of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to Kyiv on the occasion of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Kyivan Rus on 25–27 July 2008.[45] As the third president of Ukraine later recalled, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I was ready to grant the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Ukrainian

44 Krasilnikova O. Pravoslavia v Ukraini: kharakterni rysy ta osoblyvosti. Visnyk Kyivskoho natsionalnoho torhovelno-ekonomichnoho universytetu. 2017. № 2. P. 128 (PP. 119–129).

45 On the eve of the visit, on 22 July 2008, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree awarding the Ecumenical Patriarch, His Holiness Archbishop Bartholomew I of Constantinople, New Rome, with the Order of Prince [kniaz`] Yaroslav the Wise, 1st class, for his outstanding church activities aimed at raising the authority of Orthodoxy in the world.

Orthodox Church in 2008. According to him, during Bartholomew's visit to Kyiv in July 2008, he agreed to prepare a „road map" for granting autocephaly, but this was prevented by the then Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexy II, who urgently flew to Kyiv, despite not having an invitation. Alexy invited Bartholomew to dinner, during which the fate of the Tomos for Ukraine was decided.[46]

In February 2009, Metropolitan Kirill Gundyayev became head of the Russian Orthodox Church and began to actively interfere in Ukraine, looking for various pretexts. His 10-day trip to Ukraine from 27 July to 5 August 2009 was indicative of this. During this trip, he did not meet with representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. In his speeches, he traditionally called for the unity of the Orthodox churches, while calling calls for the creation of an independent Ukrainian church a political move. He emphasised that there is no document in Orthodox canon law that provides for an independent church for an independent state. He repeatedly referred to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as the local church: „Autocephaly is not a common idea at present. This is not because of some imperial intrigues on the part of Moscow, but because of our history. Kyiv is the southern capital of Russian Orthodoxy."[47]

According to experts, the visit of the head of the Russian Orthodox Church clearly demonstrated the presence in Ukraine of a significant number of people who are in spiritual unity with the Patriarch of Moscow, which, until yesterday, was not something that was acceptable to talk about. The visit revealed attempts to pass off the desired as the actual state of affairs regarding certain issues in the church life of Ukraine. Particularly, it concerned the issues of a single Orthodox Church and autocephaly. The visit and the events surrounding it showed that Orthodoxy in Ukraine is not united and is unlikely to become so in the short term.[48]

46 Yushchenko kazhe, shcho Varfolomii buv hotovyi nadaty Tomos ishche 10 rokiv tomu. Ukrinform. 16.11.2018. URL: https://ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2581552-usenko-kaze-so-varfolomij-buv-gotovij-nadati-tomos-ise-10-rokiv-tomu.html

47 Yarmoshuk T. Patriarkh Kyrylo povernuvsia do Moskvy. Naslidky zalyshylysia. Radio Svoboda. 05.08.2009. URL: https://radiosvoboda.org/a/1793387.html

48 Reshetnikov Yu. Ukraina i vizyt Patriarkha Kyryla. Ukrainska pravda. 06.08.2009. URL: https://pravda.com.ua/articles/2009/08/6/4127808/

The reality was that Ukrainian society was plunged into a whirlwind of „cross processions" under the auspices of the ideology of the „Russian world" and with the active support and coverage of a significant number of oligarchic media outlets, which were entering a new phase of political confrontation in the country. This trend intensified with the coming to power of the country's fourth president, Viktor Yanukovych (in office from 2010 until his removal from office on 22 February 2014), who was known for his sympathy towards the UOC-MP.

Manipulating the sentiments of the faithful and lulling the Ukrainian authorities into a false sense of security, the clergy of the UOC-MP from time to time made appropriate statements in the press about reconciliation, a desire for dialogue and even the same aspiration to autocephaly as the UOC-KP, but in a canonical manner, not through self-proclamation. Thus, in September 2009, the official website of the UOC-MP reported that „working groups of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the so-called ‚Kyiv Patriarchate' will hold their first joint meeting in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra on 2 October. The meeting will discuss the possibility of dialogue between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the schismatics. In 2011, the two branches of Ukrainian Orthodoxy (the UOC-KP and the UAOC) made another attempt to unite for the sake of proclaiming autocephaly, as reported by „Voice of Orthodoxy" (21 November 2011). However, this dialogue was not successful because pro-Moscow influences intervened again. The Holy Synod of the UOC-KP was forced to officially acknowledge that „the process of dialogue on unification with the UAOC, as a centralised structure, is no longer possible... It is considered useful to continue the dialogue at the diocesan and parish levels."[49]

Looking at the processes that took place in the sphere of ecclesiastical and confessional identity of Orthodoxy from the time of independence to the beginning of the second decade, sociologists identified a number of characteristic trends. Thus, since the early 1990s, there has been a steady trend towards a gradual increase in the share of UOC (KP) believers among citizens who identified themselves as Orthodox: in 2000, they accounted for 18% of Orthodox believers, and in 2013, 26%. The share of UOC (MP) believers increased significantly between 2000 and 2010 (from 14% to 35%), but then declined (to 28% in 2013).

49 Dyv. det.: Kukharchuk V. Rukh za tserkovnu avtokefaliiu v nezalezhnii Ukraini: providni tendentsii ta spetsyfika yikh vidobrazhennia u ZMI. Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriia filos.-politoloh. studii. 2021. Vyp. 37. P. 80 (PP. 74–85).

After 2013, the trend of believers leaving the UOC (MP) and the increase in the number of believers of the UOC (KP) accelerated, and in 2018, the number of believers of these churches amounted to 19% and 43% of citizens who identified themselves as Orthodox, 12% and 29%, respectively, among all respondents.[50]

As of 2013, according to a study by the Razumkov Centre, the majority (70.6%) of respondents identified themselves as Orthodox Christians, about 6% as Greek Catholics, and 1.3% as Roman Catholics. Nine per cent of respondents considered themselves „just Christians," and 11% did not identify with any religious denomination. As before, religious self-identification had quite distinct regional characteristics. Thus, the largest number of Orthodox Christians is found primarily in the centre (79%) and south (73%) of the country, Greek Catholics in the west, and Muslims in the south. Orthodox Christianity was represented in Ukraine as follows: the group of followers of the UAOC was not large, accounting for about 1% of respondents during the research period. In 2013, virtually equal shares of respondents identified themselves as members of the UOC and the UOC-KP, 20% and 18%, respectively.[51] Twenty-nine percent of respondents said they were "simply Orthodox." The small number of those who identified themselves as believers of the Russian Orthodox Church was significant — 0.5% of all respondents and 0.7% of Orthodox Christians.

At the beginning of 2013, compared to 2010, the number of citizens who identified themselves as believers decreased slightly and amounted to 67% against 71% in November 2010. There were also slightly fewer non-believers (6% compared to 8%) and more people who were undecided between belief and non-belief (15% compared to 12%). As before, the highest level of religiosity was found among residents of the western part of the country, where 86% of respondents identified themselves as believers, and the lowest in the east (59% compared to 66% in 2010). The results of a survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre between 28 February and 6 March 2013 showed that the following patterns remained unchanged:

50 Osoblyvosti relihiinoho i tserkovno-relihiinoho samovyznachennia hromadian Ukrainy: tendentsii 2000–2020 rr. (Informatsiini materialy). Tsentr Razumkova. Kyiv, 2020. 110 pages.

51 Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona. 2013. №1 (138). Kyiv: Tsentr Razumkova. PP. 18–19. URL: https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD138_2013_ukr.pdf

- *gender* (the level of religiosity among women is higher than among men: 75% and 57% (compared to 79% and 62% in 2010, respectively);
- *age* (the level of religiosity increases with age: from 62% in the youngest group to 73% in the oldest);
- *place of residence in urban/rural areas* (the level of religiosity among rural residents is higher than among urban residents: 71% and 65%, respectively);
- *education* (the level of religiosity decreases with the level of education: among people with incomplete secondary education, 76% of respondents considered themselves believers, among those with secondary and secondary specialised education — 67%, and among those with higher and incomplete higher education — 65%).[52]

The socio-demographic portrait of a believer (2013) complements the understanding of religion as a value important for human existence. The importance of religion as a life value was confirmed by 63.4% of respondents (in 2000 — 72%). For 31.0%, religion is not important (either completely or „rather unimportant"). Religion is considered an important life value primarily by Westerners — 85% versus 12% who hold the opposite view. Among Eastern Europeans, the ratio is 54% and 42%, respectively. Religion is more important for women than for men (70.7% and 54.5%, respectively); for older people aged 60 and over than for young people aged 18–29 (69.7% and 59.2%, respectively); for rural residents than for urban residents (69.2% versus 60.9%). With regard to religious practices, sociologists noted the following trends in 2013: in Ukraine, a certain socio-cultural and psychological atmosphere has already developed in which attending religious services, especially on major religious holidays (for the blessing of Easter cakes, willows, apples, honey, etc.), as well as performing the rites of baptism, marriage, funeral services, etc., has become an accepted and customary practice. Attendance at religious services was reported by those who identify themselves as believers (73.4%), those who are undecided between belief and non-belief (35.0%), and non-believers (9.0%). The practice of attending services has a distinct regional character: they are attended by 91% of residents in the west of the country and 48% in the south. Ukrainians mainly attend religious services on religious holidays (59%). It is on these days that half of those who consider themselves believers go to places of worship — 53.2% (although 39% do so much more often, including 4% more than once a week, 17% every

52 Ibid. P. 15.

week, and 18% every month), 64.1% of those undecided between faith and non-belief, and the vast majority of non-believers. It is also worth noting that more than a third (36%) of believers surveyed support the Church financially only „occasionally," 33% make donations on major holidays and pay for religious services, only 12% provide assistance „regularly," and 18% never do so. Among non-believers, the vast majority (84%) did not support the Church financially, about 15% did so „occasionally" (8%) or „on major holidays" (7%).[53]

With the coming to power in February 2010 of Ukraine's fourth president, Viktor Yanukovych, sociologists noted a certain „slowdown" in the progress achieved in relations between the authorities and the Church.[54] There was a departure from the principles of partnership in communication: despite the principles of equal treatment of all churches and religious organisations in the country declared by President Yanukovych, throughout 2010 there were no meetings between the President or other top officials and the AUCCRO, other associations of religious organisations, or representatives of individual churches and religious organisations (with the exception of the UOC[55]). The Commission on the Rights of Religious Organisations did not meet once in 2010. In July 2010, a government decree abolished the post of Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, and issues of interfaith and state-religious relations were transferred to the Deputy Prime Minister for the Euro 2012 Football Championship. Finally, at the end of 2012, without considering the positions of the religious community and the public, amendments were made to the basic Law „On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations," which significantly complicated state-confessional relations in the country. This far from complete list of actions by the current president clearly shows that the authorities do not perceive the Church as a partner in the social sphere, but have resorted to tightening control

53 Pyvovarova N. Relihiinist ukraintsiv: tendentsii desiatylittia. Hrani. 2014. № 5 (109). PP. 77–78.

54 Dyv.: Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona. 2013. №1 (138). Kyiv: Tsentr Razumkova. PP. 2–5. URL: https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD138_2013_ukr.pdf

55 Instead, throughout 2010, the President met repeatedly with the leadership of the UOC and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and also participated in events organised by the ROC. The presence of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus' in Ukraine became significantly more active: while in 2009 he made one visit to Ukraine, in 2010 there were three such visits, including one timed to coincide with the inauguration of President V. Yanukovych.

over its activities. At the same time, issues of vital importance to the Church were ignored by the authorities: establishing a normal mechanism of communication between religious organisations and the central government that would guarantee their right to be heard; granting religious organisations the right to establish educational institutions of state educational standards; returning property; ensuring equal treatment by the state of all churches and religious organisations in Ukraine; eliminating the practice of elevating certain churches and politicising confessional, cultural, linguistic, and other differences in Ukrainian society. As a result, sociological research in 2013 recorded a significant trend towards imbalance in attitudes towards churches in Ukraine, namely in favour of the UOC-MP. Citizens became increasingly convinced that the current government's attitude towards Ukrainian churches and religious organisations was not equal. Thus, only 22% of citizens (compared to 29% in 2010) agreed with the statement that „the authorities treat all religious organisations in Ukraine equally." On the other hand, almost half (49% compared to 36% in 2010) were convinced that the attitude was different, namely: „there are churches that the authorities treat better than others" (35% compared to 24% in 2010) and „the authorities elevate one church over others" (13% vs. 11%, respectively).[56] This had a significant impact on the moral authority of the Church and undermined trust in this important social institution in the mass consciousness.

The disregard for public opinion and numerous political and economic mistakes made by the current government led to a new revolutionary situation in the country. As many experts point out, the reasons for the start of the Revolution of Dignity were similar to those of the Orange Revolution: traditional systematic disregard for the needs and problems of both individual citizens and civil society as a whole, disrespect for it on the part of the authorities, the aggravation of the economic, political and social crisis, the categorical rejection by many politically active citizens of double standards in politics, etc.[57] The then President Viktor Yanukovych and his government declared that they were leading Ukraine towards the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU. However, under pressure from the Kremlin, on 21 November 2013, the then Prime Minister

56 Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona. 2013. №1 (138). Kyiv: Tsentr Razumkova. PP. 8–9. URL: https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD138_2013_ukr.pdf

57 Kyrydon A. Revoliutsiia hidnosti. Velyka ukrainska entsyklopediia. URL: https://vue.gov.ua/Революція гідності (дата звернення: 29.06.2024).

Mykola Azarov announced that the government was suspending preparations for the signing of the agreement with the EU for an indefinite period. This provoked a sharp negative reaction from the public. On the same day, people began to gather on Independence Square in Kyiv with European Union flags and national flags, demonstrating their support for Ukraine's European integration. About 1,500 people (mainly journalists, civil society activists and opposition politicians) took to Independence Square. They picketed the Presidential Administration and then returned to Independence Square and remained there overnight. On that day, the court ruled to ban the installation of tents, kiosks, and canopies during protests on Independence Square, Khreshchatyk Street, and European Square until 7 January 2014. Protests also began in other regions of Ukraine on the same day. On 30 November 2013, students were beaten by the authorities. After the bloody dispersal of EuroMaidan, numerous rallies took place in various regions of Ukraine.



Confrontation of priests during the Revolution of Dignity

On 1 December 2013, the action grew into a mass protest movement, which later developed into events known collectively as the Revolution of Dignity, resulting in the removal of Viktor Yanukovych from power. Other achievements of the Revolution of Dignity include: the preservation of Ukraine's state sovereignty; the elimination of dictatorship as a result of the repeal of „dictatorial laws"; the restoration of fundamental democratic freedoms; the elimination of Viktor Yanukovych's corrupt regime; the resumption of Ukraine's movement towards European standards of living and democratic freedoms; presenting Ukraine to the world as a country of citizens with a high sense of dignity; the growth of

patriotism and solidarity among Ukrainian citizens; overcoming fear of tyranny and repression in society; and accelerating the formation of Ukrainian political power and civil society. During this period, Ukraine experienced open pressure against its independence and territorial integrity from the Russian Federation. On 24 February 2022 , Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, which subsequently led to its annexation of Crimea and the war in the east of the country since April 2014, which began with the creation, under the guise of „popular" uprisings, of the terrorist so-called Donetsk and Luhansk „people's republics" by the Russian special services.

The events of the Revolution of Dignity and the Russian-Ukrainian war that has been ongoing since 2014 have once again raised the issue of autocephaly for Ukraine. To a large extent, this war has taken on a hybrid character, as the current Moscow authorities have sought by all possible means to discredit the ideas of the Revolution of Dignity, actively using the structures of the UOC (MP) against Ukrainian unity and the national identity of the Ukrainian people. The problem was complicated by the significant number of Orthodox denominations that identified themselves with the UOC (MP). As of 1 January 2016, the UOC (MP) had 12,660 religious organisations, accounting for 65.9% of Orthodox Christians or 35.4% of all religious organisations in the country. It retained its authority and influence largely due to its recognition by the Fullness of Orthodoxy (other Orthodox churches around the world) as the only canonical Orthodox church in Ukraine and the increase in the number of religious communities. Thus, during the first decade of the 2000s, the number of UOC communities grew by 38.9%, and the number of clergy by 33.6%; the number of monasteries increased by 58.4%, and the number of monks and nuns in them by 36.2%; the number of spiritual educational institutions increased by 33%, and the number of students by 15.8%. In terms of quantitative characteristics, the UOC (KP) is traditionally the second largest organisational religious structure in Ukraine after the UOC (MP). As of 1 January 2016, the UOC (KP) had 5,078 religious organisations, accounting for 26.4% of Orthodox Christians or 14.2% of all religious organisations in the country. At the same time, the UOC (KP) demonstrated higher rates of development of its network, primarily communities and clergy. The share of UOC (KP) organisations in the total number of Orthodox organisations increased: on 1 January 2000, it was 20.8%; on 1 January 2010, it was 24.6%; and on 1 January 2016, it was 26.4%. It should be noted that, according to estimates by the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, more than fifty communities (about 0.4%) of the UOC (MP) transferred to the UOC

(KP) within two years after the Maidan and the Revolution of Dignity. As of 1 January 2016, the UAOC had 1,218 religious organisations, accounting for 6.3% of Orthodox Christians or 3.4% of all religious organisations in the country.[58]



Remains of the Holy Iveron Church of the UOC-MP after shelling by Russian troops in the area of Donetsk airport, May 18, 2015.

The need to strengthen national security and counteract the total aggression of the Russian Federation prompted the secular authorities, represented by the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, to make every effort to grant the national Orthodox Church in Ukraine canonical status.[59] In doing so, he relied on the

58 Dyv.: Yaremchuk S. S. Osoblyvosti suchasnoi konfesiinoi struktury Ukrainy. Visnyk NTUU «KPI». Politolohiia. Sotsiolohiia. Pravo. 2015. Vyp. 3/4. PP. 91–92. (PP. 90–96).

59 Dyv. det.; Yevsieieva T. Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva (UPTs) [Elektronnyi resurs] // Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy: Ukraina—Ukraintsi. Kn. 2 / Redkol.: V. A. Smolii (holova) ta in. NAN Ukrainy. Instytut istorii Ukrainy. — K.: V-vo «Naukova dumka», 2019. — 842 pages. URL: http://history.org.ua/?termin=Ukrainska_pravoslavna_tserkva_UPTs (останній перегляд: 28.07.2024)

current Law of Ukraine „On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations," Article 30 of which encourages the authorities to „establish contacts and coordination with the relevant authorities of other states, promote the participation of religious organisations in international religious movements, forums, business contacts with international religious centres and foreign religious organisations."

On 9 April 2018, P. Poroshenko met with Patriarch Bartholomew and held talks on the prospects for Ukrainian Orthodox recognition. On 17 April, at a meeting with the heads of parliamentary factions, the president announced that he had sent a letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch requesting autocephaly for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The president's appeal was supported by 268 deputies in Resolution No. 12410-VIII of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine „On supporting the appeal of the President of Ukraine to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew on granting the Tomos[60] of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine on 19 April 2018." During May and June, most regional councils supported the president's appeal.

On 18 April, P. Poroshenko held official meetings with the primates of the Orthodox churches of Ukraine: the UOC-KP, the UAOC, and the UOC (MP), and informed them about his visit to Istanbul and his meetings with the Ecumenical Patriarch and members of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. A similar request was also made by all the bishops of the UOC-KP, the UAOC and more than 10 bishops from the UOC (MP). On 22 April 2019, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate accepted for consideration the aforementioned appeals from the President and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the primates, and began the procedures necessary to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

At the opening of the Synod of Bishops of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on 1 September 2018, Patriarch Bartholomew read reports entitled „On the right of Constantinople to unilaterally grant autocephaly" and „The right of

60 Tomos (Greek: τόμος) is a decree, edict, or circular letter issued by the head of a local Orthodox church on certain important matters of church organisation. By granting a Tomos to a part of the „mother" (archiepiscopal) church, autonomy in administration or autocephaly is officially proclaimed. The Tomos uses a more solemn and complete signature than other patriarchal decrees. After the granting of the Tomos of autocephaly, the primate of the Church is entered into the Diptych and begins to be mentioned during the Liturgy at the Great Entrance.

Constantinople to consider appeals from other churches." On 7 September 2018, Bartholomew appointed two exarchs (representatives) to Kyiv to interact with the Ukrainian authorities in preparation for the Unification Council: Archbishop Daniel of Pamphilon (USA) and Bishop Hilarion of Edmonton (Canada). On 10 September 2018, Patriarch Bartholomew sent two exarchs to Kyiv to prepare the ground for the creation of an autocephalous church.

At its meeting on 9–11 October 2018, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate confirmed the decision to grant autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine; restored the stavropegia (representation) of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Ukraine in Kyiv; accepted and considered the appeal of Filaret (Denisenko), Makariy (Maletich) and their followers, who found themselves in schism for non-dogmatic reasons, reinstated them in the episcopal rank and restored communion between their faithful and the Church; revoked the obligations of the Synodal Letter of 1686 (which granted the Moscow Patriarch the right to ordain the Metropolitan of Kyiv elected by a council of clergy and laity).

The Unification Council of Orthodox Churches (UOC-KP, UAOC, representatives of the UOC (MP)) took place on 15 December 2018 in St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. All bishops of the UOC-KP, UAOC and UOC (MP) received invitations, each with the right to bring one priest or monk and one lay person (thus, the Unification Council effectively had the status of a local council). Before it began, local councils of the UOC-KP and the UAOC were held, which decided to cease their activities as separate religious associations and unite into one Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The delegates of the council — all the hierarchs of the UOC-KP, the UAOC and two hierarchs of the UOC (MP), representatives of the clergy and lay people — unanimously established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and approved its statute (registered on 20 January 2019). By secret ballot, Epiphanius (Dumenko; prior to his election, he was rector and professor of the Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy, Metropolitan of Pereyaslav and Bila Tserkva, patriarchal vicar with the rights of a diocesan bishop of the UOC-KP) was elected as the new primate. The title of primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine.

A telling indicator of the processes leading up to the granting of the Tomos were changes in public opinion in Ukraine. In December 2018, the Razumkov Centre and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation conducted a joint sociological study. Its aim was to determine the dynamics of citizens' attitudes towards the process of establishing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The results of the survey showed that as the moment of receiving the Tomos of autocephaly

approached, the number of its supporters among Ukrainians gradually increased. In May 2018, they accounted for 31.3%, in August 2018 — 35.4%, and in December 2018 — already 43.1% (the share of opponents of the creation of a local autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not change at a statistically significant level [20% in May and 22% in December]).[61] The positive changes in the mood of the population are quite indicative. Considering the high level of trust in the Church throughout the entire period after Ukraine's independence (almost never falling below 50%), the emotional uplift of Ukrainians, their inner inspiration, and their heightened sense of pride in their country (especially among patriotic and nationally oriented circles) in connection with the proclamation of the independence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy testified to the growing authority of the Ukrainian Church in the eyes of the population.

On 5 January 2019, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and a large Ukrainian delegation, including First Deputy Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, arrived in Istanbul to receive the Tomos of Autocephaly (independence) of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and a large Ukrainian delegation arrived in Istanbul, including First Vice Prime Minister- Minister of Ukraine S. Kubiv, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A. Parubiy, and other officials and leaders of the OCU.

On 5 January 2019, at 12:41 p.m., During a service conducted in two languages, Greek and Ukrainian, at the Patriarchal Church of St. George the Victorious, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I signed the Tomos, written on parchment by Athonite artist and calligrapher Luke of the Xenophontos Monastery. The Tomos legalised the basic principles of governance and church life, obliged the church to receive myrrh from the Church of Constantinople, established the possibility for all clergy of the OCU to appeal to the Ecumenical Patriarch, confirmed the rights of the Phanar to the exarchate and stavropegia in Ukraine, called on other local Orthodox churches to recognise the OCU and refer to it as the „Holy Church of Ukraine."

On 6 January 2019, during a festive service at St. George's Church (at the residence of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul), the Tomos of Autocephaly

61 Dynamika stavlennia hromadian Ukrainy do stvorennia pomisnoi avtokefalnoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy. URL: https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/dynamika-stavlennia-gromadian-ukrainy-do-stvorennia-pomisnoi-avtokefalnoi-pravoslavnoi-tserkvy (09.01.2019).

was solemnly presented to the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epiphanius. On 7 January 2019, Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kyiv and All Ukraine and President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko presented the scroll of the Tomos at the Christmas Liturgy in St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.

On 8 January 2019, the Tomos returned to Istanbul for signing by members of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, who meet on the 9th of each month.

On 9 January, all 12 members of the Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople signed the Tomos, thus completing the procedure for granting autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

On 10 January 2019, the signed Tomos was returned to Ukraine and displayed for public viewing during a thanksgiving prayer service in Rivne, in the Pokrovsky Cathedral. The document will be kept in the Small Sophia, the refectory church of St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.

To provide legal support for the re-registration of communities of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the change of subordination, on 17 January 2019, the Law of Ukraine „On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Subordination of Religious Organisations with Legal Entity Status" was adopted. On 30 January 2019, the statute of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was registered. From that moment, the process of state re-registration of communities that decided to join the Orthodox Church of Ukraine began.

Before the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was granted autocephaly, there were 14 recognised autocephalous churches in the world. According to the Orthodox diptych (list of local churches) in the version of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (the Moscow Patriarchate has its own, different version), they are arranged in the following hierarchy: Constantinople (over 2 million believers); Alexandria (over 6.5 million); Antioch (1.37 million); Jerusalem (130,000); Russian (together with all its divisions, currently the largest, with an estimated 90 to 120 million believers; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) constitutes a significant part of it); Serbian (10 million); Romanian (16 million); Bulgarian (8 million); Georgian (4 million); Cypriot (420,000); Greek (in Greece, 8 million); Polish (500,000); Albanian (700,000); Czech and Slovak (150,000); The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the last to be established, currently ranks 15th.[62]

62 Shcho take tomos i avtokefaliia — poiasniuiemo populiarno. Radio Svoboda. 03.02.2021. URL: https://radiosvoboda.org/a/29697267.html

Granting autocephalous status to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is an event of historic significance, entirely comparable to the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. The creation of the OCU provides far-reaching guidelines for the further revival of Ukraine, as it will: serve to strengthen national security in its humanitarian dimension; it will allow a nationally oriented Orthodox Church to become a full-fledged subject of international religious life; it will contribute to the formation of a pluralistic and dialogue-based model of interfaith relations in both the global and domestic contexts; it will become a powerful generator of social mobilisation and consolidation in the future.[63]

The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church reacted sharply and negatively to the Ecumenical Patriarch's efforts to create a single local church in Ukraine, breaking off Eucharistic communion with Constantinople and appealed to the leaders of other Orthodox churches around the world not to enter into ecclesiastical communion with the new Orthodox church created in Ukraine. However, during 2019, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was recognised by the Churches of Greece, Alexandria and Constantinople.

12.4. THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF UKRAINE IN THE FATEFUL TIMES OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE (2019 TO THE PRESENT)

During this period, the OCU faced a number of challenges in its development. One of them was caused by the actions of former Patriarch Filaret, who in June 2019 announced his withdrawal from the OCU and the continuation of the UOC-KP. In July 2020, he published an open appeal to the leadership of Ukraine, asking them to „return the illegally seized state registration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate."[64] Thus, Filaret claimed the resto-

63 Tomos pro avtokefaliiu ukrainskoho pravoslavia: znachennia i vyklyky. Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen. URL: https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/gumanitarniy-rozvitok/tomos-pro-avtokefaliyu-ukrainskogo-pravoslavya-znachennya-i (23.04.2019).

64 Zvernennia Patriarkha Kyivskoho i vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta shchodo polozhennia Ukrainskoho Pravoslavia. 01.07.2020. URL: https://cerkva.info/publications/zvernennia-patriarkha-kyivskoho-i-vsiiei-rusy-ukrainy-filareta-shchodo-polozhennia-ukrainskoho-pravoslav-ia/

ration of his own church, and since the „target group" of this church and the OCU is the same, the restoration of the UOC-KP is possible only by taking away the flock from the OCU. According to religious scholars, this threat currently seems quite insignificant, but this situation will create some additional tension.[65] However, the decisive factor for the further development of the OCU is its relationship with the UOC-MP, which will take on an antagonistic character due to organisational rivalry, mental differences between representatives of Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy, and the close ties between these churches and political forces and population groups oriented towards Western or Russian civilisation.

The adoption of the Tomos and the emergence of an independent and autocephalous national Orthodox Church on the political and spiritual map of Ukraine was one of the starting points in its confrontation with the UOC-MP, which essentially became a conduit for Russian narratives. This process was exacerbated by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that has been ongoing since 2014, which clearly demonstrated the UOC-MP's ties to Moscow, which had a negative impact on the security of the Ukrainian state. On the other hand, an open struggle for Orthodox church communities and believers has begun within Ukraine because, in essence, if events develop favourably, about 30 million Ukrainian citizens will leave Russian religious influence.[66]

It should be noted that the change of church jurisdiction is carried out in accordance with Part 2 of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine „On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations," which states: „The state recognises the right of a religious community to be subordinate in canonical and organisational matters to any religious centre (administration) operating in Ukraine and abroad, and to freely change this subordination by making appropriate amendments to the statute (regulations) of the religious community."[67] In accordance with this law, religious communities have the opportunity to change their ecclesiastical jurisdiction in favour of any other religious organisation in Ukraine if a decision on such a transition is adopted at a parish meeting by at least two-thirds of the votes,

65 Parashchevin M. Relihiini skladovi osnovnykh ryzykiv funktsionuvannia ta zberezhennia ukrainskoho suspilstva. Ukrainskyi sotsium. 2020, № 3 (74). P. 55 (PP. 44–61).

66 Miller K. Borotba za tomos i viriany. Yak napruzhennia u relihiinomu pytanni vplyvaie na suspilstvo. Radio Svoboda. 09.10.2018. URL: https://radiosvoboda.org/a/29533833.html

67 Zakon Ukrainy «Pro svobodu sovisti ta relihiini orhanizatsii». Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady (VVR), 2019, № 6. P. 40. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2673-19#Text

confirmed by the signatures of the members of the religious community. A part of the community that disagrees with the decision of the majority has the right to create a new religious community and conclude an agreement with the owner on the use of the same property or religious building. In order to register a religious community, its members must submit the statutes of the new community, a copy of the decision on its establishment, its name, the election of governing bodies, a copy of the document on the right of ownership or use of the premises, and the minutes of the general meeting at which the decision to establish this religious community was adopted. The procedure for changing jurisdiction (the venue of the meeting, voting procedure, and counting of votes) is not specified in the adopted law. Under the adopted law, during the transition process, it is prohibited to take any actions that could lead to the alienation of the property of a religious organisation (sale, exchange, pledge, free transfer).

If we look at the dynamics of the transition of parishes before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 62 communities were transferred from the UOC (MP) to the UOC-KP: 23 in 2014, 22 in 2015, 5 in 2016, and 10 in 2017. After the Unification Council of Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (15 December 2018), the process of transition of church communities from the UOC-MP to the OCU significantly accelerated. Thus, in December 2018, 35 communities joined the OCU, in January 2019 — 152, in February 2019 — 234, in March 2019 — 93 (a total of 514 parishes, which is approximately 4% of the entire UOC (MP), most of which are located in Right-Bank Ukraine).

From April 2019 to February 2022, the transition process slowed down significantly, with only 50 communities joining the OCU (564 in total).[68] During the period under review, the OCU faced fierce opposition from the UOC (MP). With the support of some members of the Verkhovna Rada and local deputies who defended pro-Russian influences, primarily from the Opposition Platform — For Life party,[69] attempts were made to block this irreversible process. For example, on 18 January 2019, pro-Russian MPs from the Opposition Bloc, V. Novinsky, O. Dolzhenkov, V. Nimchenko, and 44 other MPs submitted a motion to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) regarding

68 Perekhid hromad do PTsU. Relihiino-informatsiina sluzhba. URL: https://risu.ua/perehid-gromad-do-pcu_t9732

69 Opposition Platform — For Life (abbreviated OPFL) — a pro-Russian political party with a social agenda that was banned in Ukraine and operated from 1999 to 2022.

the constitutionality of the law „On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Subordination of Religious Organisations and the Procedure for State Registration of Religious Organisations with Legal Entity Status." On 19 March, the Grand Chamber of the CC considered this issue and the Constitutional Court refused to open proceedings on the constitutionality of the law on the subordination and registration of religious organisations.[70] Use of titushki,[71] physical resistance, raider seizures, appeals to the court and delaying court decisions (the main claim of the UOC-MP was that only those whom the head of the UOC-MP named as members of the „community" could vote on the transition), lobbying for their interests among individual representatives of the authorities (using Russian money for bribery), standing guard outside churches (preventing believers from entering the church, arbitrarily closing them), isolated cases of prohibiting the funeral service for fallen soldiers in the UOC church, the activities of Russian agents, — this is far from a complete list of aggressive actions faced by the newly formed communities of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. For other equally important reasons, it is necessary to mention the mystical fear of the „prohibitions" imposed by the bishops of the UOC on priests who are transferring to the OCU, the fear that the OCU is not a „true" Church (non-canonicity (in the sense of a lack of Eucharistic unity with world Orthodoxy) is equated with a lack of grace), as well as the creation of a negative image of the OCU in the eyes of many supporters of the UOC-MP, which was actively created and promoted by the media resources of the UOC-MP and affiliated with the UOC-MP.[72] Emphasis was also placed on the lack of resources in the OCU comparable to those of the UOC (MP), the active propaganda work of the MP, as well as the position of the Primate of the OCU, Metropolitan Epiphanius, who insisted that the transition process should take place naturally without external pressure.[73]

70 KS vidmovyv u otsintsi zakonu pro perekhid relihiinykh hromad u PTsU. Ukrainska pravda. 20.03.2019. URL: https://pravda.com.ua/news/2019/03/20/7209743

71 Titushki are illegal formations or combat units of mercenary provocateurs of athletic build, semi-criminal elements, and hooligans who are used to intimidate, beat, and disperse demonstrations and attack media representatives.

72 Shcho zavazhaie perekhodu dukhovenstva z UPTs do PTsU? URL: https://espreso.tv/poglyad-shcho-zavazhae-perekhodu-dukhovenstva-z-upts-do-ptsu (19.04.2024).

73 Temp perekhodu parafii u PTsU znyzhuietsia. RBK-Ukraina. 07.05.2019. URL: https://rbc.ua/ukr/news/temp-perehoda-prihodov-ptsu-snizhaetsya-1557215116.html

According to Metropolitan Epifaniy, „This process is gradual, and I stand by my position that we should not measure it by time or numbers. This process must be gradual, peaceful and voluntary. The basis is not quantity, but that there be no confrontation, no war. We do not have the right now to ignite another religious front in Ukraine. We have enough war in the east. If we open up a religious front within the country, it could end very sadly for the Ukrainian state. My position is that everything must be based on love.[74] Peacefully, voluntarily, everyone must be aware of their choice. We must not force it, because it will lead to internal destruction. There is no need to pay attention to numbers and set chronological frameworks. This consistent and balanced position of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has, to a certain extent, yielded positive results. According to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in May 2019 and late February 2020, among the three main churches in Ukraine, 60.6% of Ukrainians surveyed had the most favourable attitude towards the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This was followed by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which was viewed positively by 35.2% of the population. Only the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate recorded the lowest level of positive attitudes, at 25.7%.[75]

The decline in trust in the UOC-MP was largely due to its destructive role in the Russian-Ukrainian war. During the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2021, civil society institutions, participants in the ATO/JFO, and representatives of local authorities cited facts that showed that:

- under the cover of churches of the Moscow Patriarchate, the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea began;
- Russian armed militants were hiding in MP churches in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014;
- MP priests systematically refuse to perform funeral services for Ukrainian soldiers killed in Donbas while defending the state sovereignty of Ukraine;

74 Mytropolyt Epifanii: „My ne maiemo prava rozpaliuvaty v Ukraini relihiinyi front". BBC. 01.03.2019. URL: https://bbc.com/ukrainian/features-47408699

75 Ukraintsi pozytyvno stavliatsia do vsikh tserkov, krim odniiei. RBK-Ukraina. 03.03.2020. URL: https://rbc.ua/ukr/news/ukraintsy-polozhitelno-otnosyatsya-tserkvy-am-1583237983.html

- Publicly, ministers of the Moscow Patriarchate call the sacred duty of citizens to defend Ukraine from the aggressor "brotherly murder."[76]

In addition, the situation proved difficult for the OCU in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, where it suffered persecution, as did believers of the UGCC and Muslims. For example, before 2014, the Crimean Diocese of the UOC-KP had 46 parishes, three Orthodox brotherhoods, one mission and one monastery. After five years of occupation, the Church was left with nine parishes and four clergymen.[77]

In total, at the beginning of 2021, there were 37,049 religious organisations operating in Ukraine (253 more than in 2020).[78] Almost 97% of existing religious structures belonged to the Christian tradition. Orthodoxy remained the largest Christian denomination in Ukraine. According to statistics, about 54% of the religious network consists of associations of several Orthodox jurisdictions. The two largest are the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (with 7,188 centres) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (with 12,406 centres). The UOC MP lags behind the OCU in terms of the number of believers. In particular, the results of a nationwide public opinion poll conducted in June 2021 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed that 58% of respondents identified themselves with the OCU, while only 25% identified themselves with the UOC (MP).[79]

The acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began on 24 February 2022 with Russia's open invasion of Ukraine, provided an opportunity to rethink the processes taking place in the spiritual and religious sphere of society. War, whatever its nature (global or local), is always a human tragedy and an existential

76 Zvernennia uchasnykiv ATO shchodo diialnosti tserkov Moskovskoho Patriarkhatu. 20.01.2018. URL: https://ukrinform.ua/rubric-presshall/2383398-zvernenna-ucasnikiv-ato-sodo-dialnosti-cerkov-moskovskogo-patriarhatu.html

77 Ukraina ta SShA zasudyly zakhoplennia, ruinuvannia ta hrabunok soboru PTsU v Krymu. URL: https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/ukrayina-ta-ssha-zasudili-zahoplennya-ruynuvannya-ta-grabunok-soboru-pcu-v-krimu-1384548.html (25.07.2019).

78 Tokman V. Relihiino-tserkovna dynamika v Ukraini: osoblyvosti 2021 r. URL: https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-11/religiina-dynamika_01112021.pdf

79 Soliar I., Krasivskyi O. Transformatsiia derzhavno-tserkovnykh vidnosyn v Ukraini (1989–2021). P. 77. URL: http://baltijapublishing.lv/omp/index.php/bp/catalog/download/232/6092/12717-1?inline=1

challenge for the state or society as a whole. The Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on for ten years now, has changed the lives of millions of people, caused irreversible structural changes in the global economy, and opened a discussion about the future of all humanity. Almost all global forums (political, economic, social, environmental, religious) and meetings of world leaders who care about the development of civilisation and democracy raise the issue of war, trying to predict its consequences in the short and long term. For Ukraine, the Russian-Ukrainian war is a challenge to preserve its statehood, independence and national identity. On the other hand, the ongoing war in its acute phase is a new understanding of the place of the Church, its mission and ministry, based on national interests.

Russia's open military aggression against Ukraine has accelerated the process of transition of parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. As of March 2022, there were 54 such communities, in April — 104, and in May — already 229.[80] According to the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESC),[81] the total number of religious communities that changed their affiliation and transferred from the UOC-MP to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2023

80 Perekhid hromad do PTsU. Relihiino-informatsiina sluzhba. URL: https://risu.ua/perehid-gromad-do-pcu_t9732

81 The State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESC) was registered as a legal entity on 18 March 2020 in accordance with the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 12 June 2019 No. 503 „On the Establishment of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience" and on the basis of the „Regulations on the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience," approved by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 812 of 21 August 2019. It is the central executive body whose activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and which ensures the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of interethnic relations, religion and the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities in Ukraine. The main tasks of the DESC are: implementation of state policy in the field of interethnic relations, religion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities in Ukraine; submitting proposals to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the formation of state policy in the field of interethnic relations, religion and the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities in Ukraine (https://dess.gov.ua/about/).

is 472 religious communities. Thus, between 2022 and 2023, 968 communities joined the OCU.[82] Looking at the transition process from the end of December 2023 to April 2024, 88 communities that previously belonged to the UOC-MP changed their religious affiliation. More than half of these transitions took place in three regions. The Moscow Patriarchate was most actively abandoned in the Kyiv region (22 communities), the Khmelnytskyi region (18) and the Vinnytsia region (17). Five parishes left the Moscow Patriarchate in the Volyn and Zhytomyr regions. There are more than a dozen regions where no community changed church jurisdiction in 2024. One community transferred to the Chernihiv region, and the Moscow Patriarchate lost two parishes in the Dnipropetrovsk and Bukovina regions.[83]

In total[84], after the Unification Council of Ukrainian Orthodox Churches on 15 December 2018, 1,775 communities of the Moscow Patriarchate UOC joined the OCU by August 2024, which amounted to about 20% of the losses for the MP UOC. The largest number of communities left the UOC MP in the Khmelnytskyi region — 377. More than 200 parishes changed their confessional affiliation in the Kyiv (238), Volyn (218) and Vinnytsia (210), and more than 100 communities in the Zhytomyr and Rivne regions. One community of the MP changed jurisdiction in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, eight parishes switched in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, and nine in the capital. The fewest parishes of the UOC-MP remained in Galicia: 15 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 37 in Lviv, and 73 in Ternopil. The highest percentage of transfers from the Moscow Patriarchate to the OCU is in Ivano-Frankivsk region. Here, the Moscow Patriarchate lost 53% of its parishes, and in Lviv region — exactly half. In Ternopil and Khmelnytskyi regions, the UOC-MP lost 37% of its churches. The Kyiv

82 Maizhe tysiacha hromad pereishla z UPTs MP do PTsU za 2022–2023 rr., — ofitsiini dani. Relihiino-informatsiina sluzhba Ukrainy. URL: https://risu.ua/majzhe-tisyacha-gromad-perejshla-z-upc-mp-do-pcu-za-2022-2023-rr--oficijni-dani_n145424 (12.01.2024).

83 Yavorska T. Karta perekhodiv hromad z moskovskoho patriarkhatu stanom na traven 2024 roku. URL: https://espreso.tv/skilki-gromad-uzhe-pokinulo-moskovskiy-patriarkhat-v-ukraini-karta-po-regionakh (03.05.2024).

84 The statistics do not include occupied territories, as it is currently impossible to carry out transfers in Luhansk, Donetsk or Crimea.

region is not far behind. Here, the pro-Russian denomination lost 36% of its parishes.[85]

As of early May 2024, according to the Unified State Register, 8,097 churches in Ukraine had not yet severed ties with the aggressor state. The largest number of UOC-MP churches remain in Donetsk region — 683 (none have left), Dnipropetrovsk and Vinnytsia regions — 526 each. The smallest number are in Lviv region (17) and Ivano-Frankivsk region (18). Only 22 churches directly indicate their affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate in their names.[86] It should be noted that on the eve of the full-scale war in Ukraine, new rules came into force, according to which churches had to change their names so that their affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate was clear. If this was not done, the changes were made compulsorily and the note „The religious organisation has not indicated its affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)" was added. There are 42 churches in Ukraine whose names have been supplemented by the Ministry of Justice. All of them are located in the Chernivtsi region. In addition, on 27 December 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law requiring the UOC-MP to indicate its affiliation with Russia in its name is in line with the Ukrainian Constitution.

During the years of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the UOC-MP, especially during the open Russian aggression, has openly demonstrated its anti-state and anti-Ukrainian nature. The UOC-MP, despite tens of thousands of victims among the Ukrainian civilian population, destroyed Ukrainian cities and villages, total terror, torture, public executions, rape, including of young children, humiliation, mass abductions of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children, the forcible deportation of almost 3 million Ukrainian citizens, genocide of the Ukrainian nation, ecocide as a result of the destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam, even after the Russian occupiers destroyed hundreds of religious

85 Yavorska T. Karta perekhodiv hromad z moskovskoho patriarkhatu stanom na traven 2024 roku. URL: https://espreso.tv/skilki-gromad-uzhe-pokinulo-moskovskiy-patriarkhat-v-ukraini-karta-po-regionakh (03.05.2024).

86 Pavliuk A. V Ukraini dosi ponad 8 tysiach tserkov Moskovskoho patriarkhatu: de naibilshe. URL: https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/v-ukrajini-zalishayetsya-8-tisyach-cerkov-upc-mp-opendatabot-301372/ (03.05.2024).

buildings (the vast majority of which are churches of the UOC-MP[87]), did not dare to go beyond its long-standing pro-Moscow sycophantic tactics and continued to:

- denying Russian military aggression against Ukraine;
- covering up the chauvinistic policies of the Russian state and church leadership;
- creating an image of a „persecuted church";
- to oppose the recognition of Ukrainian autocephaly by local Orthodox churches;
- to dispute millennia-old church canons, etc.[88]

Acting as Moscow's „last hope," the UOC-MP is currently in a state of confrontation. The level of conflict, which is mainly generated by the pro-Moscow church, is regional in nature. Moreover, this confrontation goes beyond purely confessional boundaries, has a clear political dimension, and therefore belongs to the realm of deep-seated issues and affects the entire spectrum of socio-religious relations.

The active position of the state and the President, who consistently implements a policy of historical justice with regard to depriving the UOC-MP of the right to use national shrines, has been of great importance during this difficult period. Thus, since the proclamation of Ukraine's independence, religious monuments of world importance operating on Ukrainian territory, — the Holy

87 Despite statements by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian troops are destroying and vandalising Ukrainian churches, including those recognised by Russia as canonical, most often by Russian military personnel. According to data from the project „Religion in Flames" (https://mar.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Religion-on-Fire-report-2023-UKR.pdf), during 330 days of full-scale Russian invasion, at least 530 religious buildings — churches, mosques, synagogues, chapels — were damaged. Half of them, 205, belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The largest number of damaged religious buildings is in the Donetsk region — 102. In the Kyiv region, 81 sites have been damaged, in the Luhansk region — 62, in the Kharkiv region — 61, in the Kherson region — 56, and in the Zaporizhzhia region — 32. In addition, dozens of religious buildings have been damaged in the Sumy, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

88 Derzhavno-tserkovni ta suspilno-relihiini vidnosyny v umovakh viiny Rosii proty Ukrainy : analit. dop. / [S. Zdioruk, V. Tokman] ; za red. S. Zdioruka. Kyiv : NISD, 2023. PP. 8–9 (36 pages).

Dormition Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, the Holy Dormition Pochaiv Lavra, and the Holy Dormition Svyatogorsk Lavra (which received its status in 2004) — were used by the UOC-MP. During Viktor Yanukovych's first term as prime minister, all three monasteries were transferred to the pro-Moscow church on a 49-year rent-free lease. Public pressure and demands on the authorities to evict supporters of the „Russian world" from Ukrainian cultural and spiritual shrines for many years did not yield the desired result. Only the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war moved this issue forward.[89] Initially, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine did not renew the agreement with the UOC-MP on the use of the Upper Lavra. Thanks to this, for the first time in 30 years after the restoration of state sovereignty, the Local Orthodox Church of Ukraine held a solemn service on the occasion of Christmas in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. In March 2023, the Ukrainian authorities unilaterally terminated the lease agreement with the UOC-MP for the free use of all other premises of this Lavra.[90] For almost a month and a half, an inventory commission of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine worked on the territory of the Kyiv-Pechersk Reserve. Despite physical, psychological, informational and legal opposition from the monastery's leadership and the entire UOC-MP, all 79 objects were inspected. The agenda includes the liberation of the Pochaiv Lavra from the occupying church administration. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has registered a resolution on this issue to appeal to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to terminate the lease agreement with the UOC-MP for the Orthodox holy sites in the Ternopil region. At the same time, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine has set up a commission to investigate the activities of the UOC-MP on the territory of the Pochaiv Lavra.[91]

89 Minkult ne rekomenduvatyme prodovzhuvaty z UPTs MP uhodu pro orendu dvokh khramiv u Lavri. URL: https://detector.media/infospace/article/206428/2022-12-27-minkult-ne-rekomenduvatyme-prodovzhuvaty-z-upts-mp-ugodu-pro-orendu-dvokh-khramiv-u-lavri/ (21.12.2022).

90 Zapovidnyk «Kyievo-Pecherska lavra» rozryvaie dohovir orendy z UPTs (MP). Radio Svoboda. 10.03.2023. URL: https://radiosvoboda.org/a/news-lavra-rozryvaje-dohovir-z-upc-mp/32312410.html

91 Bodenchuk B. Rozirvannia dohovoru orendy Pochaivskoi lavry: narodni deputaty prokomentuvaly postanovu. 11.05.2023. URL: https://suspilne.media/ternopil/442173-rozirvanna-dogovoru-orendi-pocaivskoi-lavri-narodni-deputati-prokomentuvali-postanovu/

The depth of understanding of the problem of confrontation in the Orthodox community and the need to avoid provocations has led to corresponding steps being taken by the Ukrainian legislative authorities and relevant services. Based on statistics on criminal cases involving representatives of the UOC-MP, as well as public opinion, on 19 October 2023, the Verkhovna Rada voted in the first reading on a bill to ban religious organisations associated with the Russian Federation. The UOC (MP) stated that the bill „does not comply with the Convention on Human Rights and the Constitution of Ukraine" and called the church „autonomous and independent." As for the cases opened by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), as of October 2023, since the start of the full-scale aggression by the Russian Federation, 68 criminal proceedings have been opened against representatives of the UOC (MP), including 16 metropolitans of the church. Among the crimes exposed are 20 cases of treason and collaboration. Twenty-six representatives of the UOC (MP) have been notified of suspicion, and another 19 have already received court sentences. In addition, law enforcement agencies are investigating 18 cases of public incitement to religious hatred, as well as the sale of firearms and the distribution of child pornography. As a result of operational and investigative actions, 26 suspects representing the UOC (MP) have been notified of suspicion, and 19 more perpetrators have already received court sentences. Thanks to this, two convicted clergymen who collaborated with the enemy were exchanged for Ukrainian soldiers who had been held captive by the enemy.[92] The exposure of the anti-Ukrainian activities of agents of the Moscow Patriarchate continues.[93]

According to a sociological survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) on 20–25 April 2024, 63% of Ukrainians believe that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) should be completely banned in Ukraine. In December 2022, 54% of Ukrainians supported this

92 Kolaboranty y zradnyky u lavakh tserkvy: desiatky kryminalnykh sprav shchodo klirykiv UPTs MP. URL: https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/politics/zaborona-upc-mp-yaki-skandali-cerkvi-nayvidomishi-i-yak-vona-pov-yazana-z-rpc-novini-ukrajini-50420660.html (04.10.2023).

93 As of the end of August 2024, since the start of the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation (according to the Security Service of Ukraine), criminal proceedings have been opened against more than 100 clergymen of the UOC (MP), almost 50 of whom have already been notified of suspicion, and 26 have received court sentences.

decision, and in May 2023, 66% did. Also, 83% of Ukrainians believe that the state should intervene in the activities of the UOC (MP) to some extent (in December 2022, this figure was 78%, and in May 2023, it was 85%). Another 20% currently favour a somewhat „softer" approach that does not involve a complete ban but does provide for state control and supervision (24% in December 2022 and 19% in May 2023). Only 12% of respondents believe that nothing should be done and that there should be no interference in the affairs of the UOC (MP), but only individual cases of possible violations should be investigated. According to KIIS, in all regions of Ukraine, the majority of the population (from 76% in the east to 85% in the west and 86% in the centre) support a proactive position of the state on the activities of the UOC (MP). At the same time, in the south and east, slightly fewer people support a complete ban (55% and 46% against, compared to 69% in the west and 68% in the centre). Sociologists also asked respondents whether they trust the UOC (MP) — 82% of Ukrainians do not trust it. Only 8% trust it, while another 11% were unable to decide.[94]

The above quantitative indicators of sociological research make it possible to identify a number of important trends.

First, Russian armed aggression has led to an increase in the number of OCU parishioners and a significant decrease in the number of UOC-MP believers.

Second, as the war drags on, Ukrainians are getting more and more against banning the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine.

Third, the war has prompted many citizens to reflect on the role of ideological narratives, particularly religious ones, in creating threats to Ukraine's national security, destroying its statehood, and fuelling external expansion.[95] In this context, the words of the Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epifaniy, are resonant. He emphasised that the UOC-KP has from the very beginning supported the need to protect Ukraine from the use of religious communities by Russian centres as instruments of hybrid aggression, because these centres „... spread the ideology of the Russian world and justified the war against Ukraine. They tell us that we all know that this is a so-called Holy War,

94 63% ukraintsiv pidtrymuiut zaboronu UPTs (MP) v Ukraini — KMIS. Radio Svoboda. 07.05.2024. URL: https://radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zaborona-moskovskyy-patriarkhat/32936504.html

95 Derzhavno-tserkovni ta suspilno-relihiini vidnosyny v umovakh viiny Rosii proty Ukrainy : analit. dop. / [S. Zdioruk, V. Tokman] ; za red. S. Zdioruka. Kyiv : NISD, 2023. P. 22.

that the destruction of Ukraine is a morally justified goal and even a duty of the Russian troops. And in Ukraine, they tried to spread this ideology through religious institutions in particular. Therefore, in defending our people from Russian aggression, we must do so together, not only on the battlefield of information, diplomacy, economics, and other areas but also in the spiritual realm, because without spiritual independence from the Kremlin and the evil Russian Empire, we cannot speak of our true independence."[96] Therefore, the issue of protecting Ukrainian religious space from the influence of Russian religious centres at the legislative level has risen with full force on the agenda. Although the UOC-MP formally rejected the abbreviation „(MP)"[97] from its name more than two years ago, as of August 2024 the head of the UOC, Metropolitan Onufriy, remains a member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, all bishops of the UOC remain members of the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, and many priests of the UOC continue to commemorate the name of Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church in their liturgies.

On 17 August, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations (AUCCRO) supported a legislative initiative to ban the activities of religious organisations linked to Russia. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations supported the basic principles of the bill but was not involved in its final drafting. In its statement, the Council of Churches condemned the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchate, noting that the Russian Orthodox Church „has become an accomplice to the bloody crimes of the Russian invaders" and that the Moscow Patriarchate „justifies pogroms and restrictions on religious freedom, the torture and murder of priests and pastors, and cynically tramples on the Lord's institutions and the basic norms of universal morality."[98]

96 Epifanii rozpoviv, yak novyi zakon pro UPTs MP vplyne na relihiinu sytuatsiiu v Ukraini. URL: https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/yepifaniy-rozpoviv-yak-noviy-zakon-vpline-na-religiynu-situaciyu-v-ukrayini-2644515.html (21.08.2024).

97 At a council in Feofaniya near Kyiv in May 2022 (three months after the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine), the UOC (MP) held a council and declared its independence from the ROC, but ties with Moscow were not completely severed.

98 Rada tserkov pidtrymala zakonoproiekt shchodo zaborony UPTs MP. URL: https://hromadske.ua/suspilstvo/229637-rada-tserkov-pidtrymala-zakonoproyekt-shchodo-zaborony-upts-mp (17.08.2024).

On 20 August 2024, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a draft law prohibiting the activities of religious organisations associated with the Russian Federation, in particular the UOC-MP, on the territory of Ukraine. The draft law was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada (265 MPs voted in favour). It provides that: The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) shall be banned as a religious organisation; the activities of all religious organisations affiliated with the ROC shall be terminated in accordance with a clear procedure, which shall include an investigation, an order to comply with the law and a court ban;[99] The ROC and its affiliated structures will not be able to use state and municipal property; the transition of communities to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will be simplified. The law will come into force 30 days after its publication. With the exception of one clause, according to which communities of the UOC-MP will have nine months (a transition period) to sever ties or prove that they have no ties with the ROC. This process will be monitored by the State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience,[100] and only a court will decide on the termination of a religious organisation that refuses to comply with the DESC's order to sever its ties with the ROC. Among other things, the law stipulates that the ROC cannot be the owner or participant of legal entities registered in Ukraine.

To avoid further interfaith confrontation, the head of the OCU, Epiphanius, on the eve of the vote in the Verkhovna Rada, called on the head of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Onufriy, to unite and engage in dialogue without preconditions: „If you are the church of the Ukrainian people, then, please, in the interests of the people, let there be a single autocephalous local church in Ukraine. We appeal, we are open, we have extended our hand to Metropolitan Onufriy, the episcopate and the clergy with a call to begin dialogue without preconditions. We appeal to the faithful because our common Ukrainian future depends

99 Rada pryiniala zakon pro zaboronu UPTs MP v Ukraini. URL: https://unian.ua/society/rada-uhvalila-zakonoproekt-pro-zaboronu-upc-mp-v-ukrajini-12733104.html (20.08.2024).

100 Religious organisations suspected of cooperating with the Russian Orthodox Church will be investigated by a special expert commission. The commission will be established by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience. If the commission finds violations, the DESC will issue an order to the church to rectify the situation. If ties with the aggressor country are not severed, the DESC will file a lawsuit against this specific legal entity, which will have the right to decide on a ban.

on them..."[101] Commenting on the words of the representative of the UOC-MP, Clement, about the lack of dialogue between the clergy of the OCU and the UOC-MP (after the adoption of the law banning religious organisations associated with the Russian Federation, the UOC-MP stated that it plans to continue living as the „true church" and that „any attempts to ban it could discredit those who seek to do so"), Epiphanius called his words „strange." According to him, since 2019, he personally and the Synod have appealed to the UOC-MP, but in response have received only an ultimatum, which the OCU will never agree to.[102]



A view of the destroyed Virgin Mary Skete of the Sviatohirsk Lavra in Donetsk Oblast, May 6, 2323. Photo: Yan Dobronosov/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images. (Ruslan Khalikov, head of the Religion on Fire project, said that since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has damaged or destroyed approximately 530 churches of various denominations in Ukraine. At least 25 ministers were killed. — Data as of January 24, 2024)

101 Dyv.: Khotyn R. Yak pratsiuvatyme zakon pro zaboronu RPTs i chy obiednaiutsia PTsU ta UPTs? Radio Svoboda. 22.08.2024. URL: https://radiosvoboda.org/a/zakon-zaborona-tserkva-chy-obyednayutsya-ptsu-ta-upts/33087541.html

102 Ibid.

The head of the UGCC, Sviatoslav, assessing the significance of the adopted bill, noted that „Law 8371 is not a ban on the Church, but its protection from the danger of using religion as a weapon... The law applies to all religious organisations with governing centres in countries recognised by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as aggressors. Russia has used the Orthodox Church under its control as a tool of militarisation, turning it into a neurotropic weapon... The law provides for a response to the ideology of the "Russian world" in the same way that European countries respond to the ideology of religious extremist groups such as the Islamic State.[103]

It is expected that after the adoption of the law banning the activities of religious organisations associated with the Russian Federation, in particular the UOC-MP, on the territory of Ukraine, the process of transition of its communities to the OCU will accelerate. Moreover, the OCU declares its European identity and openness to change and reform. The first steps in this direction have already been taken within the framework of the OCU's calendar reform. Thus, on 8 October 2022, the Holy Synod of the OCU for the first time allowed parishes to hold Christmas services according to the New Julian calendar, i.e. on 25 December (if the community and the rector of the church so desire).[104] On 2 February 2023, the Holy Synod of the OCU approved the procedure for blessing the use of the New Julian calendar. On 24 May 2023, at the Bishops' Council in the Refectory Church of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine decided to switch to the New Julian calendar from 1 September. The decision was approved by the Local Council on 27 July 2023.[105] Commenting on the changes in the church calendar, such as celebrating Christmas on the same

103 Hlava UHKTs: Zakon 8371 — zakhyst relihii vid militaryzatsii, a ne zaborona Tserkvy. 21.08.2024. URL: https://ugcc.ua/data/glava-ugkts-zakon-8371-zahyst-religiy-vid-militaryzatsiy-a-ne-zaborona-tserkvy-5342/

104 Most Orthodox churches switched to the New Julian calendar 100 years ago during the Pan-Orthodox Congress held in Constantinople in May 1923, and still use it today, considering it more accurate. The old Julian calendar, which is 13 days behind the secular calendar, continues to be used by the Russian, Georgian, Serbian and Macedonian Orthodox Churches, as well as the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

105 PTsU — 2 roky: yak stvoriuvaly Pravoslavnu tserkvu Ukrainy ta skandaly dovkola. 15.12.2020. URL: https://24tv.ua/ptsu-2-roki-yak-stvoryuvali-pravoslavnu-tserkvu-novini-ukrayini_n1482907

day as Catholics, 25 December, Epiphanius repeatedly emphasised that these changes should take place gradually, as a result of educational work and corresponding changes in society's views. The calendar reform initiated by the OCU was a response to the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, which accelerated the process of moving away from Moscow's influence on Ukrainian Orthodoxy and also considered the breakdown in the public consciousness of Ukrainians. For example, in November 2022, according to sociologists, 44% of Ukrainians were already ready to move the celebration of Christmas from 7 January to 25 December. According to a poll conducted by the sociological group „Rating" in early June 2023 in Ukraine, excluding the occupied territories, 63% of respondents supported the transition to the new church calendar.[106] Among those who celebrated Christmas on 25 December 2024, Greek Catholics predominated (93%). In second place were believers of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (58%).[107]

Certain innovations are also being introduced in church music. For example, during the Easter celebrations in 2019, the St. Michael's Golden-Domed Cathedral resounded with chimes written and performed by students of the Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy. The OCU plans to introduce or has already introduced a number of new rules in churches: women may enter churches with their heads uncovered (since a headscarf is not the main sign of a person's religiosity; it is not necessary for women who come to church for the first time to wear a headscarf or skirt, etc., as this should not be an obstacle; on the contrary, a person should feel that they are welcome, loved and supported here and that they will be given advice), the installation of benches for sitting in churches, and permission to conduct funeral services for Catholics. However, representatives of the OCU must clarify why a Catholic has turned to them for such a service.[108] Today, the priest's vestments, the Greek-style stole, differ from the Russian ones, so it is

106 Rzheutska L. Istorychna reforma kalendaria PTsU nabula chynosti. DW. 01.09.2023. URL: https://dw.com/uk/nabula-cinnosti-istoricna-reforma-kalendara-pcu-so-zminilosa/a-66649134

107 Уже понад 50%: в Україні все більше людей святкують Різдво 25 грудня. URL: https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/ponad-50-ukrajinciv-cogorich-svyatkuvali-rizdvo-25-grudnya-opituvannya-i-zmini-300876/ (04.04.2024).

108 Lebid N. "Ostannia nadiia Moskvy": shcho ukraintsiam robyty z "UPTs MP" v umovakh voiennoho chasu. Novynarnia. 12.05.2022. URL: https://novynarnia.com/2022/05/12/scho-z-upc-mp/

even possible to determine that this priest belongs to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In addition, the Synod of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) removed the day of remembrance of Prince [kniaz`] Alexander Nevsky from the church calendar (the image of Alexander Nevsky is used by Russian occupiers for propaganda purposes. The Kremlin has made Nevsky an image of the „defender of Rus" from Western encroachment. He is considered the patron saint of the Russian Navy's marines, and since 2016, also of the Russian Ground Forces, which was celebrated on 23 November. Instead, it was decided to establish 23 November as a day of celebration for another saint, St. Alexander, the first abbot of the Nevsky Monastery (c. 430), and to include him in the church calendar of the OCU.[109]



Metropolitan Epifaniy blesses battle banners for the defenders of Ukraine

The growing authority of the OCU in Ukrainian society was also marked by the fact that Metropolitan Epiphanius was named among the people who had

109 Haliichuk D. PTsU vyluchyla iz tserkovnoho kalendaria den pamiati kniazia Oleksandra Nevskoho: shcho z nym ne tak. URL: https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/pcu-viluchila-iz-cerkovnogo-kalendarya-den-pam-yati-knyazya-oleksandra-nevskogo-scho-z-nim-ne-tak-2506552.html (03.02.2024).

the greatest influence on the life of Ukraine in 2024. As in previous years, he remains one of the most influential people in Ukraine.[110] The Primate of the OCU is ranked 35th in the overall list. He is the only representative of the religious community on this year's list.[111] To a large extent, this is a recognition of the efforts of the entire patriotic Orthodox community of Ukraine, which, at a time of momentous challenges for the Ukrainian state, is doing everything possible to stop Russian aggression, defend its national identity and win its independence in a spiritual confrontation with Moscow's influence. In the current situation, the issue of the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is not just a matter of social importance but is fundamental to the protection of national interests and the strengthening of national security, which directly affects the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine.

110 In the overall list, the name of the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is ranked 35th. In this year's list, he is the only one representing a religious community. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 23.08.2024. URL: https://pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/mytropolyt-epifanij-nazvanyj-sered-osib-yaki-najbilshe-vplynuly-na-zhyttya-ukrayiny/

111 The Primate of the OCU is ranked 35th in the overall list. He is the only representative of the religious community in this year's list. Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 23.08.2024. URL: https://pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/mytropolyt-epifanij-nazvanyj-sered-osib-yaki-najbilshe-vplynuly-na-zhyttya-ukrayiny/

CONCLUSIONS

Orthodoxy in Ukraine is a unique phenomenon that combines a thousand years of historical continuity with the dynamic processes of modern national and spiritual revival. From the moment of the baptism of Kyivan Rus under Prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr in 988, a complex and multifaceted process of forming Ukrainian Orthodox identity began, which over the centuries preserved its originality even in conditions of political dependence and religious transformations.

The structuring of the church organization in Ukrainian lands took place in the unique historical circumstances of interaction and rivalry between different centers of Christianity. Constantinople, Rome, Muscovy, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth created a complex geopolitical context in which a special model of "Kyiv Christianity" was formed, a symbiosis of theological depth, cultural openness, and religious tolerance. This unique tradition distinguished Ukrainian Orthodoxy from other Orthodox churches by its organic combination of Eastern spiritual values with elements of European humanism.

Over the centuries, the development of the Orthodox tradition was accompanied by a permanent struggle for church autocephaly, which became an integral part of the broader process of national self-awareness of the Ukrainian people. This struggle took various forms, from Prince [kniaz`] Yaroslav the Wise's attempts to establish an independent church hierarchy to the activities of Cossack leaders and Orthodox brotherhoods in the 16th and 17th centuries. Each stage of this long process demonstrated the organic connection between religious aspirations and national liberation movements, emphasizing the role of the Church as a defender of national culture, language, and spirituality.

Political factors and external influences significantly complicated the development of the Ukrainian Orthodox tradition. During the Soviet era, the Orthodox Church suffered unprecedented persecution, restrictions, and marginalization, which led to a deep crisis in spiritual life. However, even under a totalitarian regime, the Orthodox faith retained its vitality in popular consciousness and

cultural memory. The era of independence brought new challenges in the form of jurisdictional divisions and the influence of Russian church policy, which deepened the fragmentation of the Orthodox community. State policy toward the Church was often characterized by inconsistency and controversy, which led to a complex mosaic of religious identities and a search for their own mission by various Orthodox structures.

The sociological aspect of the development of Orthodoxy in Ukraine is becoming particularly important in the context of contemporary challenges, in particular the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, which has a profound impact not only on the country's politics and security but also on the spiritual and identity dimensions of society. Since the beginning of the war, there has been a significant increase in religious activity and mobilization among Orthodox believers, namely The continuous strengthening of the role of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as an institution that has become an important center of national consolidation, moral support, and resistance to the aggressor. Sociological data indicate an increased focus on religious identity as an element of social solidarity, visualising a new "spiritual front" in the course of the conflict: believers increasingly identify themselves with the local autocephalous church, perceiving it as a symbol of state independence and civic unity.

Changes in the nature of religiosity in Ukraine manifest in two trends. First, the diversification of religious experience — in addition to traditional rites, Orthodoxy is increasingly perceived as an ethical, cultural, and worldview marker that integrates a wide range of social groups, including those who are not active participants in church life. Second, there is internal institutional differentiation within Orthodoxy, reflecting the diversity of political, cultural, and social positions in the context of war and challenges from external influences.

The war is also contributing to the revitalization of the church's social mission: the church provides humanitarian aid, cares for the victims, and supports the military, which significantly strengthens trust in it among various segments of the population. At the same time, the religious community is becoming an arena for the formation of national discourses that link the Orthodox faith with ideas of freedom, dignity, and resistance. These processes are of great importance for the consolidation of civil society and are an important factor in maintaining social stability in times of crisis.

Thus, in the current sociocultural conditions, the role of Orthodoxy in Ukraine goes far beyond the traditional religious sphere and becomes a powerful social phenomenon that influences the formation of civic identity, regional

and national solidarity, and strengthens resistance to external aggression. This transformation of Orthodoxy in wartime defines a new quality of religiosity, in which spirituality and national identity are organically intertwined, contributing to the stability of Ukrainian society.

The contemporary religious and confessional landscape of Ukraine demonstrates a unique multi-confessionalism, where Orthodoxy retains its dominant position amid significant internal diversity. The long-standing tripartite nature of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, represented by the UOC (MP), the UOC KP, and the UAOC, reflected deeper social divisions and regional characteristics of religious consciousness. Western and Central Ukraine traditionally demonstrated a higher level of religiosity and a greater concentration of religious communities, while the southern and eastern regions were characterized by less church activity and a specific configuration of interfaith relations. The struggle for autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church turned out to be not only a purely religious issue, but also an important component of nation-building and gaining subjectivity in the international arena. The lengthy process, which culminated in the granting of the Tomos in 2019, demonstrated the complex interaction of religious, political, and geopolitical factors. This achievement was the result of the consolidated efforts of society, the church hierarchy, and secular authorities, confirming the significant support for the idea of church independence in the mass consciousness of Ukrainians.

The Orthodox Church of Ukraine is the largest Orthodox church in the country in terms of the number of believers. The OCU is an autocephalous local church established on December 15, 2018, at the United Council in Kyiv. The signing and receipt of the Tomos of Autocephaly of the OCU took place on January 5–6, 2019, at St. George's Cathedral, the cathedral of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The granting of the Tomos of Autocephaly to the OCU was not recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church and its foreign structures.

The social dimension of contemporary Ukrainian Orthodoxy is manifested in its active participation in key socio-political processes, from the Maidan protests to the current war with Russian aggression. For a significant part of the population, Orthodox identity remains a key component not only of spiritual but also of socio-cultural life. The Church has demonstrated its ability to mobilize, consolidate society, and resist external pressure, confirming its role as an important actor in civil society. Transformations in state policy, increased tolerance, and pluralism have contributed to a reduction in interfaith tensions and the development of more effective mechanisms for state-church interaction.

This is facilitated by the decision to switch to the New Julian calendar on September 1, 2023, adopted on May 24, 2023, at the Bishops' Council in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.

The current stage of development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is characterized by new challenges and prospects related to the deepening of autocephaly and strengthening of institutional unity. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has become a spiritual pillar for the protection of national identity, state independence, and universal human values. The process of international recognition of autocephaly continues, testifying to the gradual formation of a new configuration of world Orthodoxy.

The future prospects for the development of Orthodoxy in Ukraine will be determined by the ability of the church community to find an optimal balance between preserving traditional values and adapting to the challenges of modernity. Of particular importance are the formation of adequate responses to social and political changes, the development of social services, and participation in solving the pressing problems of Ukrainian society. The success of these processes will largely depend on the Orthodox community's ability to consolidate internally, engage in creative dialogue with other denominations, and actively participate in the development of a democratic Ukraine.

Thus, the path of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church represents a unique historical heritage, a complex process of searching for its own identity in the face of external and internal challenges, and a significant contribution to the formation of a modern Ukrainian nation and state. The attainment of autocephaly marks a new stage in the thousand-year history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, opening up new opportunities for the spiritual development of the nation and strengthening its place in the global Orthodox community.

ПАТРІАРШИЙ І СИНОДАЛЬНИЙ ТОМОС НАДАННЯ АВТОКЕФАЛЬНОГО ЦЕРКОВНОГО УСТРОЮ ПРАВОСЛАВНІЙ ЦЕРКВІ В УКРАЇНІ

Варфоломій, милістю Божою Архієпископ Константинополя, Нового Риму і Вселенський Патріарх. «Ви приступили до гори Сіонської… і до Церкви первородних» (Євр. 12:22-23), блаженний серед народів Апостол Павло говорить усім вірним; і дійсно, Церква є горою, тому міцною і стійкою, непорушною та непохитною. Хоча одним стадом та одним тілом Христовим є і називається Церквою Божою, яка повсюди має сповідання православної віри, спільність в таїнствах у Дусі Святому та непорушність апостольського спадкоємства та канонічного порядку, але ще від апостольських часів складається з Церков, розташованих по місцях і країнах, внутрішньо самоврядованих власними пастирями та вчителями, і служителями Євангелія Христового, тобто кожного місця єпископами, з причин не лише історичного значення міст і країн у світі, але й внаслідок особливих пастирських потреб у них.

Отож, оскільки благочестива та Богом бережена земля України укріплена та звеличена вищим промислом та отримала свою повну політичну незалежність, державні та церковні керівники якої вже тридцять років палко просять її церковного самоврядування та пліч-о-пліч з народом й суголосно з давніми його проханнями, свого часу зверненими до святішого Апостольського Константинопольського Престолу, котрий за багатовіковим канонічним переданням зобов'язаний турбуватися про Святі православні Церкви, які мають в цьому потребу, а найдужче про ті, які від початку з ним зв'язані канонічними узами, як-от історична Митрополія

Київська, – то наша Мірність з Преосвященними при нас Митрополитами та всечесними, улюбленими в Святому Дусі братами та співслужителями, з обов'язку турботи Великої Христової Церкви за Православний світ, для зцілення постійно загрожуючих розколів та розділів у помісних Церквах, однодумно визначаємо та проголошуємо, щоб уся Православна Церква, що знаходиться в межах політично сформованої та цілковито незалежної держави України разом із Священними Митрополіями, Архієпископіями, Єпископіями, монастирями, парафіями та всіма в них церковними установами, котра знаходиться під покровом Засновника Єдиної, Святої, Соборної і Апостольської Церкви Боголюдини Господа і Спасителя нашого Ісуса Христа, існувала віднині канонічно автокефальною, незалежною та самоврядованою, маючи Першого в церковних справах і визнаючи кожного канонічного її Предстоятеля, який носить титул «Блаженніший Митрополит Київський і Всієї України», – не допускається якогось доповнення чи віднімання від його титулу без дозволу Константинопольської Церкви, – який є головою Святішого Синоду, котрий щороку скликається з Архієреїв, запрошуваних почергово за їхнім старшинством, з числа тих, що мають єпархії в географічних межах України. Таким чином управлятимуться справи Церкви в цій країні, як проголошують божественні та святі Канони, вільно й у Святому Дусі, та безперешкодно, без будь-якого іншого зовнішнього впливу.

До того ж, цим підписаним Патріаршим і Синодальним Томосом ми визнаємо та проголошуємо встановлену в межах території України Автокефальну Церкву нашою духовною донькою та закликаємо всі світові Православні Церкви визнавати її як сестру та згадувати під іменем «Святіша Церква України», як таку, що має своєю кафедрою історичне місто Київ, не може ставити єпископів чи засновувати парафії за межами держави; вже існуючі відтепер підкоряються, згідно з порядком, Вселенському Престолу, який має канонічні повноваження в Діаспорі, бо юрисдикція цієї Церкви обмежується територією Української Держави.

І ми надаємо їй привілеї та всі суверенні права, належні автокефальній церковній Владі, так що відтепер Митрополит Київський і Всієї України, здійснюючи богослужіння, поминає «Усіх Єпископів Православних», а сонм найсвятіших Архієреїв при ньому поминає його ім'я як Першого та Предстоятеля Найсвятішої Церкви в Україні. Те, що стосується внутрішнього церковного управління, розглядається, судиться та визначається виключно ним і Священним Синодом, слідуючи

євангельському та іншому вченню, згідно зі священним Переданням і шанованими канонічними постановами нашої Святої Православної Церкви, і настановою 6-го канону I Нікейського Вселенського Собору, який визначає, що «якщо ж при спільному голосуванні всіх, яке буде справедливим і згідно церковного канону, двоє чи троє через власну схильність до суперечок будуть [це] заперечувати, то нехай має силу рішення більшості». до того ж зберігається право всіх архієреїв та іншого духовенства на апеляційне звернення до Вселенського Патріарха, який має канонічну відповідальність приймати безапеляційні судові рішення для єпископів та іншого духовенства помісних Церков, згідно з 9-м і 17-м священними канонами IV Халкідонського Вселенського Собору.

Прояснюємо до вище сказаного, що Автокефальна Церква в Україні визнає головою Святіший Апостольський і Патріарший Вселенський Престол, як і інші Патріархи та Предстоятелі, та має разом з іншими канонічними обов'язками та відповідальностями насамперед збереження нашої Православної Віри неушкодженою та канонічної єдності та спілкування з Вселенським Патріархатом й іншими помісними Православними Церквами непорушними. І до цього, Митрополит Київський і Всієї України, як і Архієреї Найсвятішої Церкви України, обираються віднині відповідно до належних положень божественних і священних Канонів і згідно з відповідними положеннями її Статуту, які мають в усьому обов'язково відповідати положенням цього Патріаршого і Синодального Томосу. Усі архієреї зобов'язані турбуватися, щоб боголюбно пасти народ Божий, провадячи в страху Божому мир і згоду в країні та в своїй Церкві.

Але щоб в усьому перебував не применшений зв'язок духовної єдності та спілкування святих Божих Церков, бо ми навчилися «зберігати єдність духа в союзі миру» (Еф. 4:3), то кожний Блаженніший Митрополит Київський і Всієї України повинен поминати за давніми Переданнями святих Отців наших Вселенського Патріарха, Блаженніших Патріархів та інших Предстоятелів помісних Православних Церков, у ряду Диптихів, згідно з канонічним порядком, отримавши своє місце після Предстоятеля Церкви Чехії і Словакії в священних Диптихах і на церковних зібраннях.

Таким чином, Православна Церква в Україні, через свого Першого чи канонічного місцеблюстителя Київського Престолу, зобов'язана брати участь стосовно важливих канонічних, догматичних та інших питань у міжправославних нарадах, які збираються час від часу, за священним звичаєм, від початків усталеним Отцями. Перший же, настановлений, зобов'язаний обов'язково посилати необхідні належні Мирні Грамоти до Вселенського Патріарха та до інших Предстоятелів, і сам має право від них отримувати, починаючи свої мирні поїздки від Першопрестольної Церкви Константинополя за звичаями, отримуючи від неї і Святе Миро, для вияву духовної єдності з нею. Для вирішення значних питань церковного, догматичного та канонічного характеру слід Блаженнішому митрополиту Київському і всієї України від імені Священного Синоду своєї Церкви звертатися до нашого Святішого Патріаршого і Вселенського Престолу, прагнучи від нього авторитетної думки та твердого взаєморозуміння, причому права Вселенського Престолу на Екзархат в Україні та священні ставропігії зберігаються непримененшеними.

Отже, на всіх цих умовах наша Свята Христова Велика Церква благословляє та проголошує Православну Церкву в Україні Автокефальною та щедро закликає на Ієрархію на Українській землі, непорочний клір і благочестивий народ її, з невичерпного скарбу Святого Духа, божественні дари, молячись, щоб Перший і Великий Архієрей Ісус Христос, заступництвом всенепорочної і всеблагословенної Владичиці нашої Богородиці і пріснодіви Марії, святого славного і рівноапостольного князя Володимира і святої славної княгині Ольги, преподобних і богоносних Отців наших, подвижників і монахів Києво-Печерської Лаври та інших монастирів, укріпив назавжди її в тілі Єдиної, Святої, Соборної і Апостольської Церкви таким чином зараховану Автокефальну Церкву України і подав їй благостояння, єдність, мир і зростання, на славу Його і Отця і Святого Духа.

Таким чином, таке вирішене та розсуджене і в радості сповіщене вам від шанованого Центру Православ'я було соборно затверджено, для постійного збереження видається цей Патріарший і Синодальний Томос, написаний і підписаний в Кодексі нашої Великої Христової Константинопольської Церкви, вручений в точній і ідентичній копії Блаженнішому Предстоятелю Святішої Церкви України, кір Епіфанію та його високопревосходительству, Президенту країни пану Петру Порошенку, для вічного доказу та постійного представлення.

Року дві тисячі дев'ятнадцятого, місяця січня, 6 числа, індиктіона 12.

- Вселенський Патріарх Варфоломій, в Христі Бозі вирішує
- митрополит Вріульський Пантелеймон,
- митрополит Італійський і Мальтійський Геннадій
- митрополит Германський Августин
- митрополит Транупольський Герман
- митрополит Нью-Джерський Євангел
- митрополит Родоський Кирилл
- митрополит Ретімнський і Авлопотамський Євгеній
- митрополит Корейський Амвросій
- митрополит Сингапурський Контантин
- митрополит Австрійський Арсеній
- митрополит Сімський Хризостом
- митрополит Чиказький Нафанаїл[1]

1 https://www.patriarchate.org/announcements/-/asset_publisher/MF6geT6kmaDE/content/patriarchikos-kai-synodikos-tomos-choregeseos-autokephalou-ekklesiastikou-kathestotos-eis-ten-en-oukraniai-orthodoxon-ekklesian?_101_INSTANCE_MF6geT6kmaDE_languageId=uk_UA

PATRIARCHAL AND SYNODAL TOMOS FOR THE BESTOWAL OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL STATUS OF AUTOCEPHALY TO THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN UKRAINE

Bartholomew, by God's mercy Archbishop of Constantinople-New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch: "You have come to Mount Zion ... and to the Church of the first-born" (Heb. 12.22–23), as the blessed Paul, apostle to the nations, declares to all the faithful, appropriately likening the Church to a mountain to affirm conviction and recognition as well as steadfastness and stability. For although the Church of God both is and is called one flock and one body of Christ—everywhere sharing the confession of Orthodox faith, the communion through the sacraments in the Holy Spirit, and the constancy of apostolic succession and canonical order—already from the earliest apostolic times it also consists of local and native Churches internally self-administered by their own shepherds, teachers and servants of the Gospel of Christ, namely, their regional Bishops, not only for the historical and secular significance of these cities and lands, but also for the particular pastoral needs of these places.

Therefore, inasmuch as the most devout and divinely-protected country of Ukraine has been fortified and magnified by heavenly providence, while also acquiring comprehensive political independence, and inasmuch as its civil and church leaders have avidly sought its ecclesiastical self-administration over more than thirty years—thereby further echoing previous similar requests periodically addressed by its people to the most holy Apostolic Throne of Constantinople, which is obliged by a lengthy canonical tradition to care for the holy Orthodox

Churches facing difficulties, especially those with which it has always been associated through canonical bonds, such as the historical Metropolis of Kyiv—our Modesty, along with our most reverend Metropolitans and most honorable beloved brothers and concelebrants in the Holy Spirit, in the imperative concern of the Great Church of Christ within the Orthodox world for healing long standing schisms and divisions in the local Churches, unanimously determine and declare that the entire Orthodox Church contained within the boundaries of the politically constituted and wholly independent State of Ukraine, with its sacred Metropolitan, Archdiocesan and Episcopal sees, its monasteries and parishes, as well as all the ecclesiastical institutions therein, operating under the Founder of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, our Godman Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, shall hereafter exist as canonically a u t o c e p h a l o u s, independent and self-administered, having and recognizing as its First Hierarch in all church matters its presiding canonical Primate, who shall bear the title "His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine," without any lawful addition or deletion to this title without permission from the Church of Constantinople. This Primate shall preside over the Holy Synod, annually comprised of Hierarchs invited by rotation and seniority from those serving within the geographical boundaries of Ukraine. This is how the affairs of the Church shall be governed in this land, as the sacred and holy Canons declare, freely and in the Holy Spirit and unimpeded, far from any other external interference.

Moreover, we recognize and declare this Autocephalous Church, established within the boundaries of the sovereign territory of Ukraine by means of this signed Patriarchal and Synodal Tomos, as our spiritual daughter, and recommend that all Orthodox Churches throughout the world acknowledge and commemorate it by the name "Most Holy Church of Ukraine" with its see in the historic city of Kyiv, without being henceforth entitled to establish bishops or found extraterritorial altars in regions already lawfully dependent on the Ecumenical Throne, which bears canonical competence over the Diaspora, but instead restricting its proper jurisdiction within the territories of the State of Ukraine. Indeed, we bestow upon this autocephalous ecclesiastical Authority all the attending privileges and sovereign rights, so that from this day the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine shall commemorate "Every Orthodox Diocese" during the liturgy, while the surrounding choir of most holy Hierarchs shall commemorate his name as First Hierarch and Primate of the most holy Church in Ukraine. As for matters related to internal ecclesiastical administration, these shall be arbitrated, adjudicated and determined absolutely by the Primate and

the Holy Synod, adhering to the evangelical and other teachings—in accordance with sacred Tradition and the venerable canonical regulations of our Holy Orthodox Church, as well as the teaching and injunction of Canon 6 of the First Ecumenical Council in Nicaea, which dictates that "whereas the common vote of all is reasonable and in accordance with the ecclesiastical canon, in cases where two or three disagree by reason of personal rivalry, let the vote of the majority prevail"—while further preserving the right of all Hierarchs and other clergy to address petitions of appeal to the Ecumenical Patriarch, who bears the canonical responsibility of irrevocably passing judgment over matters related to bishops and other clergy in local Churches, in accordance with the sacred Canons 9 and 17 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council in Chalcedon.

In addition to the above, we declare that the Autocephalous Church in Ukraine knows as its head the most holy Apostolic and Patriarchal Ecumenical Throne, just as the rest of the Patriarchs and Primates also do, while having along with its other canonical obligations and responsibilities, as its foremost mission, the preservation of our Orthodox Faith inviolable as well as the canonical unity and communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the other local Orthodox Churches unwavering. Furthermore, the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine, as well as the Hierarchs of the most holy Church of Ukraine, are from now on elected in accordance with the provisions of the holy and sacred Canons as well as the relevant regulations of its Constitutional Charter, along with mandatory agreement in all matters on the regulations of the present Patriarchal and Synodal Tomos. All the Hierarchs have the duty to shepherd the people of God in a manner pleasing to God, advancing, in the fear of God, peace and concord in their country and Church.

Nonetheless, in order that the bond of spiritual unity and association of the holy Churches of God may remain in every way undiminished—for we have been instructed "to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace" (Eph. 4.3)—His Beatitude the presiding Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine is required to commemorate, in accordance with the ancient traditions of our holy Fathers, the Ecumenical Patriarch, Their Beatitudes the Patriarchs and other Primates of the local Autocephalous Churches, in the sequence of the Diptychs, according to canonical order, assuming his proper place after the Primate of the Church in the Czech Lands and Slovakia both in the sacred Diptychs and church assemblies.

At the same time, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, through its Primate or else the canonical locum tenens on the Throne of Kyiv, is obliged to participate in periodical Inter-Orthodox consultations on significant canonical, doctrinal

and other issues, in accordance with the sacred custom of the Fathers that has prevailed from the outset. The First Hierarch, after being installed, must also immediately dispatch the necessary Irenic Letters concerning his establishment both to the Ecumenical Patriarch and the other Primates, just as he is also entitled to receive the same from these, while commencing his irenic journey as customary from the First-Throne Church of Constantinople, wherefrom it will likewise receive the Holy Myron as affirmation of its spiritual unity with the latter. In the case of major issues of ecclesiastical, doctrinal and canonical nature, His Beatitude the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine must, on behalf of the Holy Synod of his Church, address our most holy Patriarchal and Ecumenical Throne, seeking its authoritative opinion and conclusive support, while the prerogatives of the Ecumenical Throne over the Exarchate and Sacred Stavropegial institutions in Ukraine shall be preserved unmitigated.

Consequently, on the basis of all the above and on the basis of these conditions, our Holy Great Church of Christ blesses and declares the Orthodox Church in Ukraine as Autocephalous, invoking the abundant gifts of God and boundless treasures of the All-Holy Spirit upon the venerable Hierarchy, the righteous clergy and pious people throughout the land of Ukraine, and praying that the First and Great High Priest Jesus Christ—through the intercessions of our all-holy and most blessed lady, the Theotokos and ever-virgin Mary; the holy and glorious prince [kniaz`] Volodymyr, equal to the apostles; the holy and glorious queen Olga; our venerable and God-bearing Fathers, the ascetics and monastics of the Kyiv Lavra and all the Monasteries—may forever support the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine, now reckoned in the body of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, and grant it stability, unity, peace and increase for His glory and that of the Father and the Holy Spirit.

These things, then, are deemed and determined, joyfully proclaimed to you from the venerable Center of Orthodoxy, having been ratified in synod, whereas this Patriarchal and Synodal Tome is issued for permanent protection, being recorded and signed in the Code of the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, delivered in an identical and accurate copy to His Beatitude Epifanios, the Primate of the Most Holy Church of Ukraine, and to His Excellency the President of Ukraine, Mr. Petro Poroshenko, for abiding verification and permanent confirmation.

On this sixth day of the month January of the year two thousand and nineteen, of the XII indiction:

- Bartholomew of Constantinople, hereby determines in Christ God
- Panteleimon of Vryoula
- Gennadios of Italy and Malta
- Avgoustinos of Germany
- Germanos of Tranoupolis
- Evangelos of New Jersey
- Kyrillos of Rhodes
- Evgenios of Rethymnon and Avlopotamos
- Ambrose of Korea
- Konstantinos of Singapore
- Arsenios of Austria + Chrysostomos of Symi
- Nathanael of Chicago[1]

1 https://www.patriarchate.org/announcements/-/asset_publisher/MF6geT6kmaDE/content/patriarchikos-kai-synodikos-tomos-choregeseos-autokephalou-ekklesiastikou-kathestotos-eis-ten-en-oukraniai-orthodoxon-ekklesian?_101_INSTANCE_MF6geT6kmaDE_languageId=en_US

ΠΑΤΡΙΑΡΧΙΚΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΥΝΟΔΙΚΟΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΧΟΡΗΓΗΣΕΩΣ ΑΥΤΟΚΕΦΑΛΟΥ ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΟΥ ΚΑΘΕΣΤΩΤΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΝ ΟΥΚΡΑΝΙΑΙ ΟΡΘΟΔΟΞΟΝ ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΝ

Βαρθολομαῖος, ἐλέῳ Θεοῦ, Ἀρχιεπίσκοπος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, Νέας Ρώμης καὶ Οἰκουμενικὸς Πατριάρχης. «Προσεληλύθατε Σιὼν ὄρει ... καὶ Ἐκκλησίᾳ πρωτοτόκων» (Ἑβρ. ιβ΄, 22-23), ὁ μακάριος τῶν ἐθνῶν Ἀπόστολος Παῦλός φησι πᾶσι πιστοῖς, εἰκότως δὲ ὄρος ἡ Ἐκκλησία, διὰ τὸ βέβαιον καὶ πάγιον καὶ ἀσάλευτον καὶ ἄσειστον. Κἂν δὲ μία ποίμνη καὶ ἓν σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ Ἐκκλησία, ἔχουσα πανταχοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως ὁμολογίαν, τὴν ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ ἐν τοῖς μυστηρίοις κοινωνίαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστολικῆς διαδοχῆς καὶ κανονικῆς τάξεως ἀδιασάλευτον, συνίσταται ἀπό τῶν ἀποστολικῶν ἤδη χρόνων, ἐκ κατὰ τόπους καὶ χώρας Ἐκκλησιῶν, ἐσωτερικῶς αὐτοδιοικουμένων ὑπὸ ἰδίους ποιμένας καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ διακόνους τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἤτοι τοὺς ἑκασταχοῦ Ἐπισκόπους, ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ οὐ μόνον τῆς ἱστορικῆς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ σημασίας τῶν πόλεων καὶ χωρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἰδιαζουσῶν ποιμαντικῶν ἀναγκῶν.

Τοιγαροῦν, τῆς εὐσεβεστάτης καὶ θεοφρουρήτου χώρας τῆς Οὐκρανίας, τῇ ἄνωθεν προνοίᾳ κρατυνθείσης καὶ μεγαλυνθείσης καὶ τὴν ὁλοτελῆ πολιτικὴν αὐτῆς ἀνεξαρτησίαν ἀπολαβούσης, τῶν δὲ πολιτειακῶν καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν αὐτῆς ἀρχόντων ἐπὶ τριακονταετίαν ὅλην διακαῶς αἰτουμένων τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν αὐτῆς αὐτοδιοίκησιν, συστοιχούντων καὶ εἰς παλαιὰ συναφῆ αἰτήματα τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτῆς κατὰ καιροὺς διατυπωθέντα πρὸς τὸν ἁγιώτατον Ἀποστολικὸν Θρόνον τῆς

Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς μακρᾶς κανονικῆς παραδόσεως ὑποχρεωμένον προνοεῖν περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνάγκαις εὑρισκομένων Ἁγίων Ὀρθοδόξων Ἐκκλησιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ διὰ κανονικῶν δεσμῶν ἀείποτε συνδεδεμένων τοιούτων, ὡς ἡ ἱστορικὴ Μητρόπολις Κιέβου, ἡ Μετριότης ἡμῶν μετὰ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς Ἱερωτάτων Μητροπολιτῶν καὶ ὑπερτίμων, τῶν ἐν Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι ἀγαπητῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ συλλειτουργῶν, ἐν τῇ ὀφειλετικῇ μερίμνῃ τῆς Μεγάλης τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἐκκλησίας πρὸς τὸν Ὀρθόδοξον κόσμον, ἐπὶ θεραπείᾳ τῶν χρονίως σοβούντων σχισμάτων καὶ μερισμῶν εἰς τὰς κατὰ τόπους Ἐκκλησίας, ὁμογνωμόνως, ὁρίζομέν τε καὶ ἀνακηρύττομεν, ἵνα σύμπασα ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὁρίοις τοῦ πολιτικῶς συγκροτηθέντος καὶ τέλεον ἀνεξαρτητοποιηθέντος Κράτους τῆς Οὐκρανίας περιλαμβανομένη Ὀρθόδοξος Ἐκκλησία, μετὰ τῶν Ἱερῶν Μητροπόλεων, Ἀρχιεπισκοπῶν, Ἐπισκοπῶν, μοναστηρίων τε καὶ ἐνοριῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἐκκλησιαστικῶν καθιδρυμάτων, τελοῦσα ὑπὸ τὸν Δομήτορα τῆς Μιᾶς, Ἁγίας, Καθολικῆς καὶ Ἀποστολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας θεάνθρωπον Κύριον καὶ Σωτῆρα ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, ὑπάρχῃ τοῦ λοιποῦ κανονικῶς αὐτοκέφαλος, ἀνεξάρτητος καὶ αὐτοδιοίκητος, Πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἐκκλησιαστικοῖς πράγμασιν ἔχουσα καὶ ἐπιγιγνώσκουσα τὸν ἑκάστοτε κανονικὸν Προκαθήμενον αὐτῆς, φέροντα τὸν τίτλον «Μακαριώτατος Μητροπολίτης Κιέβου καὶ πάσης Οὐκρανίας», μὴ ἐπιτρεπομένης προσθήκης τινὸς ἢ ἀφαιρέσεως τῷ αὐτοῦ τίτλῳ, δίχα τῆς ἀδείας τῆς Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως· πρόεδρον ὄντα Ἱερᾶς Συνόδου, συγκροτουμένης κατ᾽ ἔτος ἐξ Ἀρχιερέων, προσκαλουμένων ἐκ περιτροπῆς κατὰ τὰ πρεσβεῖα αὐτῶν, ἐκ τῶν ἀρχιερατευόντων ἐν τοῖς γεωγραφικοῖς ὁρίοις τῆς Οὐκρανίας. Οὕτω γὰρ διακυβερνηθήσονται τὰ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ταύτῃ, ὡς οἱ θεῖοι καὶ ἱεροὶ διακηρύττουσι Κανόνες, ἐλευθέρως τε καὶ ἐν Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι καὶ ἀκωλύτως, μακρὰν πάσης ἄλλης ἔξωθεν ἐπεμβάσεως.

Πρὸς τούτοις δὲ τὴν καθισταμένην διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἐνυπογράφου Πατριαρχικοῦ καὶ Συνοδικοῦ Τόμου, ἐν τοῖς ὁρίοις τῆς ἐπικρατείας τῆς Οὐκρανίας, Αὐτοκέφαλον Ἐκκλησίαν ἐπιγιγνώσκομεν καὶ ἀνακηρύττομεν πνευματικὴν ἡμῶν θυγατέρα καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀνὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην Ὀρθοδόξοις Ἐκκλησίαις συνιστῶμεν ὡς ἀδελφὴν ἀναγνωρίζεσθαι καὶ μνημονεύεσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι «Ἁγιωτάτη Ἐκκλησία τῆς Οὐκρανίας», ἔχουσαν ἕδραν αὐτῆς τὴν τοῦ Κιέβου ἱστορικὴν

πόλιν, μὴ δυναμένην καθιστάναι ἐπισκόπους ἢ πηγνύειν ὑπερόρια θυσιαστήρια, τῶν ἤδη ὑφισταμένων ὑπαγομένων τοὐντεῦθεν, κατὰ τὴν τάξιν, τῷ Οἰκουμενικῷ Θρόνῳ, τῷ ἔχοντι τὴν κανονικὴν ἁρμοδιότητα ἐπὶ τῆς Διασπορᾶς, περιοριζομένης τῷ ὄντι τῆς δικαιοδοσίας αὐτῆς ἐντὸς τῶν ἐδαφῶν τοῦ Οὐκρανικοῦ Κράτους. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς προνομίας καὶ πάντα τὰ κυριαρχικὰ δικαιώματα τὰ τῇ αὐτοκεφάλῳ ἐκκλησιαστικῇ Ἀρχῇ παρομαρτοῦντα παρέχομεν αὐτῇ, ὥστε τοῦ λοιποῦ τὸν μὲν Μητροπολίτην Κιέβου καὶ πάσης Οὐκρανίας ἱερουργοῦντα μνημονεύειν «Πάσης Ἐπισκοπῆς Ὀρθοδόξων», τὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν χορείαν τῶν ἁγιωτάτων Ἀρχιερέων τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, ὡς Πρώτου καὶ Προκαθημένου τῆς ἐν Οὐκρανίᾳ Ἁγιωτάτης Ἐκκλησίας. Τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἐσωτερικὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν διοίκησιν ἀφορῶντα ἀνακρίνεσθαι, ἐκδικάζεσθαι καὶ καθορίζεσθαι ἀπολύτως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς Ἱερᾶς Συνόδου, ἀκολούθως τῇ εὐαγγελικῇ καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ, κατὰ τὴν ἱερὰν Παράδοσιν καὶ τὰς σεβασμίας κανονικὰς διατάξεις τῆς Ἁγίας Ὀρθοδόξου ἡμῶν Ἐκκλησίας, διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ τῇ προτροπῇ τοῦ ς΄ κανόνος τῆς Α΄ ἐν Νικαίᾳ Οἰκουμενικῆς Συνόδου, τῆς ὁριζούσης ὅτι, «ἐὰν μέντοι τῇ κοινῇ πάντων ψήφῳ, εὐλόγῳ οὔσῃ, καὶ κατὰ κανόνα ἐκκλησιαστικόν, δύο ἢ τρεῖς δι' οἰκείαν φιλονικείαν ἀντιλέγωσι, κρατείτω ἡ τῶν πλειόνων ψῆφος», διατηρουμένου προσέτι καὶ τοῦ δικαιώματος πάντων τῶν Ἀρχιερέων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν κληρικῶν ἐκκλήτου προσφυγῆς τῷ Οἰκουμενικῷ Πατριάρχῃ, κατέχοντι τὴν κανονικὴν εὐθύνην τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἀμετακλήτως ἀποφάσεις ἐπὶ τῶν κρίσεων δι' ἐπισκόπους καὶ λοιποὺς κληρικοὺς τῶν τοπικῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν, συμφώνως τοῖς θ΄ καὶ ιζ΄ ἱεροῖς κανόσι τῆς Δ΄ ἐν Χαλκηδόνι Οἰκουμενικῆς Συνόδου.

Προσεπιδηλοῦμεν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ὅτι ἡ ἐν Οὐκρανίᾳ Αὐτοκέφαλος Ἐκκλησία γινώσκει ὡς κεφαλὴν τὸν Ἁγιώτατον Ἀποστολικὸν καὶ Πατριαρχικὸν Οἰκουμενικὸν Θρόνον, ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Πατριάρχαι καὶ Προκαθήμενοι, ἔχει δέ, σὺν ταῖς ἄλλαις κανονικαῖς ὑποχρεώσεσι καὶ εὐθύναις, πρωτίστην ἀποστολὴν τὴν τήρησιν τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου ἡμῶν Πίστεως ἀδιαλωβήτου καὶ τῆς κανονικῆς ἑνότητος καὶ κοινωνίας μετὰ τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριαρχείου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν κατὰ τόπους Ὀρθοδόξων Ἐκκλησιῶν ἀπαρασαλεύτου. Προσέτι δέ, ὁ Μητροπολίτης Κιέβου καὶ πάσης Οὐκρανίας, ὡς καὶ οἱ Ἀρχιερεῖς τῆς Ἁγιωτάτης Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Οὐκρανίας, ἐκλέγονται ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν κατὰ τὰς προβλέψεις τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν Κανόνων καὶ κατὰ τὰς σχετικὰς διατάξεις τοῦ Καταστατικοῦ

Χάρτου αὐτῆς, συμφωνοῦντος ἀπαραιτήτως ἐν πᾶσι πρὸς τὰς διατάξεις τοῦ παρόντος Πατριαρχικοῦ καὶ Συνοδικοῦ Τόμου. Ὀφείλουσι πάντες οἱ Ἀρχιερεῖς ἵνα ποιμαίνωσι τὸν λαὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ θεοφιλῶς, προάγοντες, ἐν φόβῳ Θεοῦ, τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ τῇ Ἐκκλησίᾳ αὐτῶν.

Ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὁ τῆς πνευματικῆς ἑνότητος καὶ συναφείας τῶν ἁγίων τοῦ Θεοῦ Ἐκκλησιῶν ἀπαραμείωτος ἐν ἅπασι παραμένῃ σύνδεσμος, καὶ γὰρ ἐδιδάχθημεν «τηρεῖν τὴν ἑνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης» (Ἐφεσ. δ΄, 3), ὁ κατὰ καιροὺς Μακαριώτατος Μητροπολίτης Κιέβου καὶ πάσης Οὐκρανίας ὀφείλει μνημονεύειν, κατὰ τὰ παλαιόθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγίων Πατέρων ἡμῶν παραδεδομένα, τοῦ τε Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριάρχου, τῶν Μακαριωτάτων Πατριαρχῶν καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Προέδρων τῶν κατὰ τόπους Ὀρθοδόξων Αὐτοκεφάλων Ἐκκλησιῶν, ἐν τῇ σειρᾷ τῶν Διπτύχων, κατὰ τὴν κανονικὴν τάξιν, τοῦ ἰδίου λαμβάνοντος τὸν τόπον μετὰ τὸν Προκαθήμενον τῆς κατὰ Τσεχίαν καὶ Σλοβακίαν Ἐκκλησίας ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς Διπτύχοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησιαστικαῖς συνελεύσεσιν.

Ὡσαύτως, ἡ ἐν Οὐκρανίᾳ Ὀρθόδοξος Ἐκκλησία, διὰ τοῦ Πρώτου αὐτῆς ἢ τοῦ κανονικοῦ τοποτηρητοῦ τοῦ Θρόνου τοῦ Κιέβου, ὑποχρεοῦται μετέχειν, ἐπὶ σπουδαίων κανονικῶν, δογματικῶν καὶ λοιπῶν ζητημάτων, τῶν κατὰ καιροὺς Διορθοδόξων διασκέψεων, κατὰ τὴν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς κρατήσασαν ἱερὰν τῶν Πατέρων συνήθειαν. Ὀφείλει δὲ ὁ Πρῶτος, ἐγκαθιστάμενος, ἀποστέλλειν ἐξάπαντος τὰ ἀναγκαῖα Εἰρηνικὰ Γράμματα καταστάσεως πρός τε τὸν Οἰκουμενικὸν Πατριάρχην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς Προκαθημένους, τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τούτων ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀρχομένης τῆς εἰρηνικῆς περιοδείας αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς Πρωτοθρόνου Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως κατὰ τὰ εἰωθότα, λαμβάνων καὶ τὸ Ἅγιον Μύρον παρ᾽ αὐτῆς, εἰς δήλωσιν τῆς πνευματικῆς μετ᾽ αὐτῆς ἑνότητος. Προκειμένου δὲ περὶ μειζόνων ζητημάτων ἐκκλησιαστικῆς, δογματικῆς καὶ κανονικῆς φύσεως, ὁ Μακαριώτατος Μητροπολίτης Κιέβου καὶ πάσης Οὐκρανίας, ἐκ μέρους τῆς Ἱερᾶς Συνόδου τῆς Ἐκκλησίας αὐτοῦ, δέον ὅπως ἀπευθύνηται πρὸς τὸν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς Ἁγιώτατον Πατριαρχικὸν καὶ Οἰκουμενικὸν Θρόνον, ἐκζητῶν τὴν ἔγκυρον γνώμην καὶ βεβαίαν συναντίληψιν αὐτοῦ, τῶν δικαιωμάτων τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Θρόνου ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν Οὐκρανίᾳ Ἐξαρχίας καὶ τῶν Ἱερῶν Σταυροπηγίων σῳζομένων ἀπαραμειώτων.

Ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὖν τούτοις καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὅροις, ἡ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς Ἁγία τοῦ Χριστοῦ Μεγάλη Ἐκκλησία εὐλογεῖ καὶ ἀνακηρύσσει τὴν ἐν Οὐκρανίᾳ Ὀρθόδοξον Ἐκκλησίαν ὡς Αὐτοκέφαλον καὶ δαψιλεῖς ἐπικαλεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνὰ τὴν Οὐκρανικὴν χώραν σεβασμίαν Ἱεραρχίαν, τὸν εὐαγῆ κλῆρον καὶ τὸν εὐσεβῆ λαὸν αὐτῆς, ἐκ τῶν ἀκενώτων θησαυρῶν τοῦ Παναγίου Πνεύματος, τὰς θείας δωρεάς, ἐπευχομένη ὅπως, ὁ Πρῶτος καὶ Μέγας Ἀρχιερεὺς Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, πρεσβείαις τῆς παναχράντου καὶ ὑπερευλογημένης δεσποίνης ἡμῶν Θεοτόκου καὶ ἀειπαρθένου Μαρίας, τοῦ ἁγίου ἐνδόξου καὶ ἰσαποστόλου πρίγκηπος Βλαδιμήρου καὶ τῆς ἁγίας ἐνδόξου βασιλίσσης Ὄλγας, τῶν ὁσίων καὶ θεοφόρων Πατέρων ἡμῶν ἀσκητῶν καὶ μοναχῶν τῆς Λαύρας τοῦ Κιέβου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Μονῶν, στηρίζῃ ἐσαεὶ τὴν οὕτως ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς Μιᾶς, Ἁγίας, Καθολικῆς καὶ Ἀποστολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας συναριθμηθεῖσαν Αὐτοκέφαλον Ἐκκλησίαν τῆς Οὐκρανίας καὶ παρέχῃ αὐτῇ εὐστάθειαν, ἑνότητα, εἰρήνην καὶ αὔξησιν, εἰς δόξαν Αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος.

Ταῦτα οὕτω δόξαντα καὶ κριθέντα καὶ ἐν χαρᾷ ἐξαγγελλόμενα ὑμῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ σεπτοῦ τῆς Ὀρθοδοξίας Κέντρου, ἐκυρώθησαν συνοδικῶς, εἰς μόνιμον δὲ τούτων παραφυλακὴν ἐκδίδοται ὁ Πατριαρχικὸς καὶ Συνοδικὸς οὗτος Τόμος, καταστρωθεὶς μὲν καὶ ὑπογραφεὶς ἐν τῷ Κώδικι τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς Μεγάλης τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, ἐγχειρισθεὶς δὲ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ ἀπαραλλάκτῳ τῷ Μακαριωτάτῳ Προκαθημένῳ τῆς Ἁγιωτάτης Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Οὐκρανίας κυρίῳ Ἐπιφανίῳ καὶ τῷ ἐξοχωτάτῳ Προέδρῳ τῆς χώρας κυρίῳ Πέτρῳ Ποροσένκο, εἰς διηνεκῆ ἔνδειξιν καὶ μόνιμον παράστασιν.

Ἐν ἔτει δισχιλιοστῷ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἑνάτῳ, κατὰ μῆνα Ἰανουάριον ς΄, Ἐπινεμήσεως ΙΒ᾽

- Ὁ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως Βαρθολομαῖος, ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ ἀποφαίνεται
- Ὁ Βρυούλων Παντελεήμων
- Ὁ Ἰταλίας καὶ Μελίτης Γεννάδιος
- Ὁ Γερμανίας Αὐγουστῖνος
- Ὁ Τρανουπόλεως Γερμανός
- Ὁ Νέας Ἰερσέης Εὐάγγελος
- Ὁ Ρόδου Κύριλλος
- Ὁ Ρεθύμνης καὶ Αὐλοποτάμου Εὐγένιος

- Ὁ Κορέας Ἀμβρόσιος
- Ὁ Σιγκαπούρης Κωνσταντῖνος
- Ὁ Αὐστρίας Ἀρσένιος
- Ὁ Σύμης Χρυσόστομος
- Ὁ Σικάγου Ναθαναήλ[1]

1 https://www.patriarchate.org/announcements/-/asset_publisher/MF6geT6kmaDE/content/patriarchikos-kai-synodikos-tomos-choregeseos-autokephalou-ekklesiastikou-kathestotos-eis-ten-en-oukraniai-orthodoxon-ekklesian?_101_INSTANCE_MF6geT6kmaDE_languageId=el_GR

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ABSTRACTS OF DISSERTATIONS

243. Kondratiuk Yu. Pravoslavni instytutsii ta dukhovenstvo yak subiekty formuvannia tserkovnoparafiialnoho dilovodstva Volynskoi yeparkhii naprykintsi XVIII — na pochatku XX stolit : avtoref. dys. ... kand. istor. nauk. Ostroh, 2008. 20 pages.
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ABSTRACT

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Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Historical and sociological discourse

The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical and sociological development of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It traces religious processes from pre-Christian polytheistic beliefs, through the Christianization of Kyivan Rus' during the reigns of Askold, Princess Olha, and Prince Volodymyr, to the formation and autonomous functioning of the Kyiv Metropolis. The authors examine key historical milestones,

including the Christianization's cultural impact, the 1054 Great Schism, and the challenges faced during the Mongol invasion and feudal fragmentation. Special attention is given to inter-confessional relations, ecumenical efforts, and union attempts, such as the 1439 Council of Florence, the 1569 Union of Lublin, and the 1596 Union of Brest, highlighting the ensuing polemics, national revival, and the role of the Cossacks in defending Orthodoxy. Finally, the text details the gradual loss of the Ukrainian Church's autonomy, leading to its canonical subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686. Grounded in European and national historiographical traditions, the work explores how religious dynamics influenced Ukrainian statehood, identity, and integration into the European civilisational space.

Keywords: Orthodox Church in Ukraine, Kyivan Rus', Kyiv Metropolis, Christianization, Union of Brest, ecumenism, religious identity

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